

DOI: 10.15838/esc.2026.4.106.10

UDC 314.6; 314.372.43, LBC 60.7

© Kamarova T.A., Tonkikh N.V., Markova T.L.

The Significance of Financial Incentives in the Motivation for Having a Large Family: A Qualitative Study



Tatyana A. KAMAROVA

Ural State University of Economics

Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation

e-mail: kta@usue.ru

ORCID: 0000-0003-0087-9310; ResearcherID: ABC-9312-2021



Natalia V. TONKIKH

Ural State University of Economics

Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation

e-mail: tonkihvn@usue.ru

ORCID: 0000-0003-2957-7607; ResearcherID: O-9705-2018



Tatiana L. MARKOVA

Ural State University of Economics

Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation

e-mail: markova_tl@usue.ru

ORCID: 0000-0002-2520-6836; ResearcherID: ABC-7152-2021

For citation: Kamarova T.A., Tonkikh N.V., Markova T.L. (2026). The significance of financial incentives in the motivation for having a large family: A qualitative study. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 19(4), 172–190. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2026.4.106.10

Abstract. This study aims to identify the role of financial motives among the motivational and value orientations that shape people's decisions to have a large family. It draws on focus group discussions with parents of large families in Yekaterinburg, divided into two groups: Generation 1 (those who became parents of large families before the introduction of maternity capital in 2007; N = 14; 8 women and 6 men) and Generation 2 (those who became parents of large families after 2007; N = 15; 8 women and 7 men). The interview guide covered motivation, drivers behind the decision to have a large family, and the influence of financial factors on reproductive choice. The working hypothesis was that the introduction of maternity capital had reshaped the hierarchy of motives: Generation 1 was expected to be driven primarily by sociocultural values, while for Generation 2 financial factors were expected to gain importance without displacing value-normative attitudes. The results show that the motivation for having a large family is driven primarily by value-normative attitudes and social-relational drivers rather than by an orientation toward financial benefits from state support. Both generations exhibited a similar set of key motives: an intentional orientation toward having a large family; the influence of positive examples of large families in older generations; the desire to create a family; and the expectation that siblings will support one another. Intergenerational differences in the structure of motivation proved insignificant. At the same time, gender-specific features were recorded: men less often report planning for a large family, which reflects different perceptions of planning and a reliance on the woman's reproductive readiness; they also more often emphasize the effect of "renewal of parental energy" at the birth of a child. Women, in turn, stress entering a new marriage, the fulfillment of parental love, and the enrichment of the motherhood experience. Future research could assess the institutional effect of maternity capital by comparing one-child and two-child families before and after 2007, shedding light on how motivational structures evolve and how support measures shape reproductive decisions.

Key words: large family, maternity capital, value-motivational structure, focus group method.

Acknowledgment

The study was supported by Russian Science Foundation grant 22-18-00614-P, <https://rscf.ru/project/22-18-00614/>.

Introduction

Against the backdrop of a continuing demographic decline, a falling total fertility rate, and population shrinkage, support for the family, motherhood, and childhood has acquired particular importance within the state's social and demographic policy. Despite a range of measures aimed at stimulating fertility – including material support programs for families with children – the demographic situation in Russia continues to be marked by declining reproductive activity, especially with regard to second and subsequent births.

The phenomenon of the large family has taken on particular importance in current conditions as

a socio-demographic resource for population reproduction. At the same time, having many children is not only a demographic but also a sociocultural phenomenon, bound up with value orientations, family attitudes, life strategies, and the personal motives of parents. The decision to have a third or subsequent child is shaped by a combination of factors.

Given the persistent demographic challenges, support for large families is regarded as a priority area of state social and demographic policy. An important step in institutionalizing support measures for large families was the adoption of Presidential

Decree 63 of January 23, 2024, “On Measures of Social Support for Large Families”, which for the first time established a normative definition of a large family at the federal level. The adoption of this document resulted from interaction between public authorities and civil society organizations representing the interests of large families. Of particular importance is the establishment of the indefinite status of a large family regardless of the children’s age, which helps to strengthen the social standing of large families and expand the system of social guarantees (Rostovskaya et al., 2024).

The importance of the large family as a key resource for the country’s demographic development was also highlighted in the Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024, which emphasized the need to foster a positive public perception of large families and to improve the quality of life of families with children¹.

To overcome the negative demographic trends in the Russian Federation, the federal law “On Additional Measures of State Support for Families with Children” came into force on January 1, 2007, providing financial assistance to families considering the birth of a second or third child. The set of state support measures for families with children, including the right to receive maternity capital, was one of the significant factors that influenced fertility dynamics and contributed to its rise. Thus, in 2007 the number of births increased by almost 123,000 compared with the previous year. While in 2006 the number of births per 1,000 population was 10.4, in 2009 it rose to 12.4 and reached 13.3 in 2014. Among all births in 2007, the share of second and third children increased from 33 to 44%. Between 2006 and 2011, the total fertility rate rose from 1.3 to 1.6 births per woman, and from 2007 to 2014 the crude birth rate increased by 2.24 per mille (Svetlichnaya, Menshikova, 2017).

Despite the expansion of state support measures for large families, scholarly debate continues regarding the factors that shape families’ readiness to have a third or subsequent child. Researchers note that economic incentives alone do not serve as the decisive condition for having many children. Family values, attitudes toward parenthood, the specifics of family socialization, intergenerational support, and the subjective perception of parenthood all play a substantial role (Borisova, Pavlyutkin, 2019; Gudkova, 2019).

At the same time, the personal motives behind the decision to transition to having a large family remain underexplored in the Russian literature, especially in the context of changing value orientations of the modern family and the transformation of reproductive behavior. Analyzing the subjective foundations of having many children is particularly important given the need to develop effective demographic policy measures aimed not only at material incentives for fertility but also at fostering a positive image of the large family. Studying the motives underlying reproductive decisions helps to better understand the declining fertility trends and the postponement of decisions about subsequent children in contemporary society.

Given the strategic importance of increasing the number of large families, it is essential to understand the extent to which the existing, predominantly financial support for families with children contributes to the spread of large families. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to identify the degree of significance of financial motives in the decision to create a large family.

In line with the stated aim, the following research objectives are defined:

- to conduct focus group discussions to identify existing similarities and differences in the structure of motivational and value orientations that determine the decision to create a large family

¹ Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. February 29, 2024. Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585> (accessed: 10.03.2026).

among representatives of two generations of large families: Generation 1 – families that became large before the introduction of maternity capital (from January 1, 2007, for the second and subsequent child), and Generation 2 – families that became large after the introduction of maternity capital;

– to assess the relative importance of the financial component in the motivation for having many children, to carry out a comparative analysis of its role among representatives of the two generations of large families under study, and to identify the gender specificity of motivational attitudes.

Theoretical and methodological framework of the study

In contemporary social and demographic research, reproductive behavior is viewed as the product of a complex interaction of economic, institutional, cultural, and personal factors. In Russian fertility sociology, one of the foundational approaches is that of V.A. Borisov, according to whom reproductive behavior is a system of actions, relations, and psychological states of the individual connected with the birth or non-birth of children of any order. In the structure of reproductive behavior, the author distinguishes interrelated components: reproductive needs, attitudes, motives, interests, plans, decisions, and actions (Borisov, 1970, p. 8). Within this framework, reproductive attitudes serve as one of the internal regulators of reproductive behavior. From the perspective of family crisis theory, they represent a personal predisposition that determines the consistency of actions driven by a positive or negative attitude toward the birth of a certain number of children (Sivoplyasova, 2022).

Unlike reproductive attitudes, which reflect an individual's attitude toward childbearing, the concept of demographic attitudes is broader and captures the individual's readiness for certain life-course outcomes. Accordingly, reproductive attitudes can be regarded as a specific type of

demographic attitude directly related to the attitude toward childbearing, the desired number of children, and the readiness to pursue a corresponding reproductive strategy. Reproductive motives, in turn, are the impulses underlying the decision to have a child (Kornienko et al., 2017).

Amid declining fertility, it is particularly important to study not only actual reproductive behavior but also reproductive intentions, which largely predetermine the subsequent realization of births (Dommermuth et al., 2025). At the same time, the current research agenda is shifting from a predominantly economic explanation of reproductive behavior to a comprehensive analysis of value orientations, life strategies, family relations, and the subjective motivation for parenthood.

There is currently a shortage of empirical and theoretical work that reveals the mechanisms through which large-family reproductive strategies are formed (Šmeriangaiová, 2025). The scholarly literature identifies several main groups of factors that shape the choice in favor of having many children: economic and housing conditions, the characteristics of partner relations, value orientations, the experience of the parental family, the specifics of employment and gender roles, and the institutional and sociocultural context. The importance of the material component in the formation and realization of reproductive intentions is confirmed by contemporary research: financial situation and the stability of living conditions are significant determinants of reproductive behavior (Jurczak et al., 2026; Bakytzhanova et al., 2026). At the same time, the realization of reproductive intentions is determined not only by economic parameters but also by a set of socio-demographic characteristics of the family. In particular, as women age, reproductive constraints accumulate, driven by both biological factors and the specific features of partner status (Makarentseva, Biryukova, 2023, p. 44).

The significance of institutional conditions is confirmed by research on the reproductive attitudes of young families. Drawing on in-depth interviews, A.V. Korolenko and O.N. Kalachikova identify a range of positions among young families regarding state support, from denying its influence on reproductive decisions to expecting state assistance and recognizing its importance for realizing births. The most widespread position was one in which families do not view state support as a decisive factor in having children (Korolenko, Kalachikova, 2022). Thus, the influence of external incentives on reproductive behavior is not unambiguous and is mediated by a family's subjective perception of its own resources and the support measures available to it.

The stability of partner relations and the presence of emotional support act as “organizing” factors (Rahnu, Jalovaara, 2023, pp. 11–12) that determine both the readiness to have a child and the timing of reproductive decisions.

Socio-economic analysis makes it possible to identify a number of factors that shape reproductive intentions and set the further trajectory of reproductive behavior. These include the age of the youngest child (3–6 years), positive expectations about improving housing conditions, and the husband's desire to have more children within an agreed reproductive plan for the couple. Of particular research interest are women who express a desire to have more children but have no concrete plans to realize it, which may manifest itself in either postponement or complete abandonment of the intention. For this group, economic factors are significant: the availability of one's own housing, stable employment, and the absence of debt (Makarentseva et al., 2025). A separate important subgroup consists of women over 35 (Smulyanskaya,

2017), owing to the growing share of this category in the female population in recent years.

Among the postulated motives for childbearing, researchers highlight the value of parenthood as a source of life satisfaction, the possibility of fulfilling the parental role, and the satisfaction derived from raising a child (Brini et al., 2026). At the same time, most women of reproductive age express a desire to have two or three children, with the desired number exceeding the expected number in all age groups². This confirms the “ideal” of the small family (two children) described in Russian and international publications (Kovalchuk et al., 2018) and indicates that a significant proportion of women who already have one child retain the intention to have a second and, in some cases, a third³.

The economic component occupies a special place among the factors shaping reproductive decisions. Russian and international research has extensively examined the influence of financial incentives on fertility, including the short-term effects of financial support and the impact of social and economic reforms on reproductive behavior (Rasmussen, 2010; Brewer et al., 2012; Carneiro et al., 2015; Tudor, 2020). The effectiveness of family policy measures, however, depends on a combination of factors: the institutional context, the socio-economic characteristics of families, and the specific features of the national social policy model (Gonzalez, 2013; Gurko, 2023; Ezdi et al., 2024). Studies show that in low-fertility countries, economic support is more effective when combined with institutional conditions that allow work and family life to be reconciled (Gauthier, Gietel-Basten, 2025).

The maternity capital program, introduced in 2007, is a central element of contemporary Russian demographic policy and offers a valuable empirical

² Sample Survey of Reproductive Plans of the Population in 2022. Federal State Statistics Service. Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/free_doc/new_site/RPN22/reports.html

³ Reproductive plans of Russians: two in the hand, three in the mind? VCIOM. Available at: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/reproduktivnye-plany-rossijan-dva-pishem-tri-v-ume>

case for analyzing how direct financial incentives affect reproductive behavior. Methodologically, its launch can be treated as a “natural experiment” that makes it possible to assess the extent to which institutionalized economic measures can modify the reproductive strategies of the population.

Empirical evidence indicates that the program made only a limited contribution to final fertility. Much of the rise in fertility observed after its introduction was driven not by an increase in the planned number of children but by the redistribution of births over time – so-called “timing” shifts (Arkhangelsky et al., 2024b). This suggests that maternity capital functioned less as a factor that creates a new orientation toward large families and more as a mechanism for realizing existing reproductive intentions by lowering economic barriers and changing the timing of decisions about having a child.

Thus, despite its relatively modest direct demographic effect, the program retains significant research value: it helps clarify the place of financial incentives in the motivation for having many children and sheds light on how these incentives interact with the value-based and cultural determinants of reproductive choice. This makes the analysis of how large families perceive support measures a relevant direction for sociological and demographic research.

The literature review therefore suggests that the motivation for having a large family is shaped by a set of interrelated factors. Economic security and housing conditions define a family’s resource capacity but do not by themselves explain the decision to have a third or subsequent child. Also important are the stability of partner relations and emotional support (Rostovskaya et al., 2021), the value of parenthood and family, and institutional conditions that facilitate combining professional and family life (Markova, 2024).

Gender, regional, and intergenerational specificities also play no less important a role in

reproductive behavior (Rostovskaya et al., 2023; Vakulenko et al., 2024).

Gender specificity manifests itself in the differing balance of economic, social, and psychological grounds for deciding to have children. For both genders, constructive psychological motives related to the value of family and parenthood, as well as love for children, are of fundamental importance, while the set and weight of additional motives differ. According to several studies, men are oriented to a greater extent toward the economic aspects of having a child, whereas women more often take into account social expectations from the family and society (Sinelnikov et al., 2023; Trusova, Tkach, 2022).

For women, the decision to have subsequent children is connected not only with material conditions but also with the potential consequences for professional employment and the possibilities of combining the parental role with work. In particular, studies of middle-income large families show that the choice in favor of having many children is often associated with the restriction of the mother’s professional and social opportunities, which may influence subsequent reproductive decisions (Bannykh et al., 2019, p. 125). In a broader context, changes in gender roles, career orientations, and the distribution of family responsibilities are also regarded as factors that determine the timing and realization of reproductive intentions (Gorlatykh, Abramov, 2025, p. 250; Abdulaeva, 2024).

The sociocultural specificities of regions also determine differences in the structure of motivation for having many children. In Moscow, the choice of a large-family strategy is more often linked to value orientations and the availability of state support, while the material component also retains its significance. Large families in Moscow are described as a relatively more deliberate and rare choice (Rusanova, Zhuravleva, 2019). In the Ural region, the importance of a combination of material and non-material factors has been recorded, with

value-biographical determinants, including the experience of the parental family, playing a special role (Bannykh et al., 2019). By contrast, in the North Caucasus, reproductive behavior is largely determined by traditions, ideas about family and marriage, religiosity, and sociocultural norms. Among the regionally specific factors are an orientation toward large families, gender attitudes (including a preference for sons), expectations regarding the early marriage of daughters, and restrictions on women's life trajectories, such as educational opportunities (Sirazhutdinova, 2024, p. 269).

Alongside current socio-economic conditions and the sociocultural specificities of regions, the family experience of the previous generation is a significant determinant of reproductive behavior. Data from the Sample Survey of Reproductive Plans of the Population point to a positive relationship between the number of children born to the respondent's mother and the respondent's average desired and expected number of children⁴. This relationship is consistent with research findings that record the influence of the parental family's reproductive experience on the probability of choosing a large-family parenting strategy (Sinelnikov et al., 2023).

At the same time, the transmission of attitudes across generations does not imply that reproductive behavior is simply replicated. Research on how large-family attitudes are passed down within families shows that even when the values of the parental family are adopted, the actual number of children in the next generation may fall short of the level needed for simple population replacement (Karpova, Lyalikova, 2023, p. 77). This suggests that the passing down of large-family attitudes occurs in the context of changing socio-economic conditions.

Accordingly, achieving positive demographic dynamics becomes increasingly difficult from one generation to the next (Arkhangelsky et al., 2024a, p. 57).

Thus, the literature shows that most existing studies focus either on general reproductive intentions or on individual determinants of their realization. What remains underdeveloped is a comprehensive approach that captures the dynamics of motivational structures amid the changing institutional conditions of state support. In particular, relatively little attention has been paid to how shifts in family policy parameters relate to changes in the hierarchy of motives for having many children across different socio-demographic groups. It is precisely this gap that defines the research niche of the present study and provides the rationale for a comparative analysis of the structure of motivation for large families under changing institutional conditions.

Materials, methods, and hypotheses of the study

This study carries out a comparative analysis of the personal motivations for creating large families between representatives of two generations:

- the first generation: families that became large before the introduction of financial state support measures in the form of maternity capital (from January 1, 2007, for the second and subsequent child);
- the second generation: families that became large after the introduction of this financial measure.

The study of the personal motivational and value orientations of multi-child parents was conducted using focus groups from November 22 to November 30, 2025. The city of Yekaterinburg was chosen as the research location owing to its representativeness for analyzing the situation in the Sverdlovsk Region. According to statistical data⁵, Yekaterinburg is the

⁴ Sample Survey of Reproductive Plans of the Population in 2022. Federal State Statistics Service. Available at: https://rosstat.gov.ru/free_doc/new_site/RPN22/reports.html

⁵ Main results of the Ministry's activities and priority areas. Ministry of Social Policy of the Sverdlovsk Region: official website. Available at: <https://msp.midural.ru/deyatelnost/otchety-o-deyatelnosti/osnovnye-itogi-deyatelnosti-ministerstva-i-prioritetnye-napravleniya.html> (accessed: 10.08.2026).

region's largest city by population, and in 2023 it accounted for 28.3% of the total number of large families in the region. At the same time, the number of large families in the city is growing steadily: from 17,304 families in 2021 to 18,309 in 2022 and 19,494 in 2023. This concentration and positive dynamic make it possible to regard Yekaterinburg as a relevant setting for studying the reproductive attitudes and motivations of multi-child parents, and also ensure sufficient accessibility of the target group for organizing focus groups.

The study involved four focus groups: one with women and one with men representing the first generation under study, and one with women and one with men belonging to the second generation (*Tab. 1*).

The choice of the focus group method was driven by its high informational value in qualitative research, since a semi-structured group discussion makes it possible to identify and substantively reveal the main motives and drivers behind the decision to have a large family. Respondents were differentiated along two dimensions: gender (men and women) and generation (first and second generation under study). A separate focus group was organized for each combination of these criteria. The choice of the two study generations was determined by differences in the institutional conditions under which reproductive strategies were realized. Representatives of the second generation had access to additional government financial support for families on the birth of a second and subsequent child; representatives of the first generation did not have such support measures. The focus groups were conducted separately for men and women because the topic of reproductive and multi-child parenthood is highly sensitive and can influence how participants express themselves. In particular, when planning the study, there were concerns that in a mixed-gender group men would be inclined to deny the importance of financial motives in the decision to have children. Discussing the material side

of the issue might have been perceived as undermining their role as family providers and calling their financial capacity into question. These assumptions were not confirmed, however: during the discussions, men openly considered state support measures as one of the factors motivating them to have many children.

The focus group guide was designed as a tool for uncovering the deep motivational attitudes of multi-child parents and was based on the principles of semi-structured interviewing. The structure of the guide drew on approaches close to methods for studying the value-motivational field, including the logic of value ranking similar to the technique of M. Rokeach. Participants were asked not only to answer direct questions but also to establish priorities, compare the significance of various factors (economic, social, value-based), and give examples from personal experience illustrating reproductive decisions. The discussions were focused on key thematic blocks: "Motivation for creating a large family", "Financial factors", and "Expectations of multi-child parents regarding the improvement of family policy". For the cohort of large families that received maternity capital, a separate module of questions was included to assess the real impact of this measure on reproductive behavior. This structure of the guide made it possible not only to record declared motives but also to reveal hidden attitudes, contradictions, and the hierarchy of respondents' values, as well as to distinguish situational statements from stable positions through a combination of direct, ranking, and projective questions.

The financial factors influencing reproductive behavior are highly diverse and include benefits, tax incentives, housing programs, regional payments, and others. In this study, maternity capital was considered as the key economic motive, owing to its institutional significance and its pronounced motivational function in the context of large families. First, maternity capital represents a relatively large one-time payment capable of

substantially influencing long-term family strategies, including the decision to have a second or subsequent child. Second, this measure is highly recognizable and is consistently associated in the public mind with support for large families, which increases its relevance for analyzing both declared and latent motives. Third, maternity capital has a long implementation period and a wide range of permitted uses, which makes it possible to treat it as a comprehensive institutional factor rather than a narrow current payment.

At the same time, no distinction was drawn between the federal and regional levels of implementation of this support measure. Maternity capital was analyzed as a single institutional factor capable of serving as a motive for having many children. This approach is justified from the standpoint of the study's focus on respondents' meaning-making attitudes. In the narratives of focus group participants, regional measures were often not

singled out as an independent significant stimulus but were perceived within the broader context of state support for the family.

The focus group sessions involved audio recording of respondents' oral answers to the guide questions, followed by transcription and the preparation of verbatim records. The results were processed by analyzing the verbatim statements of respondents, which at the next stage of analysis were grouped into thematic categories describing the motives for having a child. The constant comparison method was also used, which made it possible to identify similarities and differences in the motivation for having many children between the two groups of respondents, as well as between men and women.

Respondents were then grouped into the two target groups under study (*Tab. 1*).

The characteristics of the focus group participants are presented in *Table 2*.

Table 1. Target groups of the study

Generation	Characteristic	Composition
1	Families that became large before the introduction of financial state support measures in the form of maternity capital (from January 1, 2007, for the second and subsequent child)	Women – 1 focus group, Men – 1 focus group
2	Families that became large after the introduction of financial state support measures in the form of maternity capital (from January 1, 2007, for the second and subsequent child)	Women – 1 focus group, Men – 1 focus group

Table 2. Characteristics of the study's target groups

Indicator	Generation 1	Generation 2
Women		
Number of focus group participants, persons	8	8
Age of participants, years	45–59	34–45
Years of children's birth	First two children: 1990–2004 Third child: 1997–2006	Second child*: 2009–2018 Third child: 2014–2024
Men		
Number of focus group participants, persons	6	7
Age of participants, years	48–60	36–60
Years of children's birth	First two children: 1987–2005 Third child: 2000–2006	Second child**: 1987–2018 Third child: 2008–2024
* In the group of women, six participants received federal maternity capital for their second child and then received regional maternity capital for their third; two received federal maternity capital for their third child.		
** In the group of men, three received federal maternity capital for their second child and then received regional maternity capital for their third; four received federal maternity capital for their third child.		

Three key factors should be noted as methodological limitations of the study:

- first, the considerable time distance between the birth of a child and the moment of the survey may affect the representativeness of the declared motives: memories of reproductive decisions are subject to cognitive transformation, and the hierarchy of motives may be restructured under the influence of subsequent life circumstances;

- second, the generational differences between the compared groups create heterogeneity in their socio-economic and cultural-normative contexts. Representatives of different generations were socialized in dissimilar institutional conditions, which complicates direct comparison of the motivational grounds for having many children and calls for a cautious interpretation of intergroup differences;

- third, the regional specificity of the sample (the study covered multi-child parents living in Yekaterinburg) limits the possibility of extrapolating the results to other regions of the Russian Federation. The identified patterns of motivation and assessments of support measures may be shaped by local socio-economic features of family policy implementation and by regional cultural attitudes. Generalizing the findings requires verification of the results in other territorial contexts.

The working hypothesis of the study is that the institutional introduction of maternity capital has influenced the transformation of the motivational structure of reproductive behavior:

- in the narratives of Generation 1, predominantly sociocultural and value-based motives will dominate, while economic considerations will figure to a lesser extent and mainly in the context of general life difficulties rather than as an independent driver of reproductive decisions;

- in the narratives of Generation 2, financial aspects will occupy a more prominent place in justifying the decision to have a large family. It is assumed that this group perceives material support

measures as a significant factor complementing the value-normative foundations of reproductive choice.

Results and discussion

Motives for having many children

The positive decision to have a third child in the family is not always formulated in terms of values or life principles; more often it is expressed in more down-to-earth and concrete terms. For some it is planned in advance; for others it is situational (some motives are dictated by life changes, and the family becomes large as a result of certain events and circumstances), but in any case it is verbalized through terms and meanings of an internal psychological order rather than of a material-practical kind. The key drivers of having many children in the statements of respondents from the two study generations are systematized in *Table 3*.

The analysis of the narratives shows that the representatives of both generations share common motives for having many children. However, even the intentional orientation toward a large family is not present in all study participants, although all of them are multi-child parents.

Childhood experience of living in a large family can also be assessed negatively: *“My wife comes from a large family; she says, ‘It’s a nightmare when everything is divided among everyone, all this crowd, all these squabbles’”* (M). A skeptical attitude can be found in those who were the eldest child in a large family: *“My husband is the second child in his family; he didn’t get enough attention. His mother, it turns out, kept him busy – he was her older helper, she had a third child, and then a fourth was born. So she didn’t really give him much attention. That’s why he didn’t want a third child. Two is enough”* (F). One respondent, originally from Uzbekistan (an ethnic Uzbek), was raised in an environment with a cult of large families, but in his own family he did not strive to follow these traditional patterns: *“Back home, your parents or your grandmothers are always asking how many children you have and always pushing you –*

Table 3. Motivation and drivers of having many children

Generation 1	Generation 2
Intentional (goal-setting) orientation toward having many children: initially wanted to have at least three children (herself / together with her husband)	
<i>"My husband and I had planned on three" (F)</i> <i>"I always dreamed of having at least three children" (F)</i>	<i>"I planned back when I was 18 that I would have three children" (F)</i> <i>"Before our first [child], we discussed [with my husband] that we would have a large family" (F)</i> <i>"We discussed it romantically at first. How many kids will we have? – Let's have three, that would be nice. You can hardly call that planning. And what kind of apartment will we have? – A five-room one" (M)</i>
Positive examples of large families from older generations: large families of parents, uncles/aunts, exposure to practices of big close-knit families in childhood	
<i>"My parents, both on my dad's side and my mom's side, each had three children. And we, as kids – there were a lot of us at all the holidays. And now I have a lot of cousins, both sisters and brothers. So, yeah, I kind of looked at them and wanted the same" (F)</i> <i>"The more children, the better. I myself come from a large family" (F)</i>	<i>"My husband always wanted 10 children, so we'd have a big close-knit family, with kids and fun. His family line is all large families – some have 8 children, some 10" (F)</i> <i>"In the summer when I was a kid, they'd send us to grandma's dacha; all the cousins lived there, we all lived in the house, and there were lots of children. I really liked that" (F)</i> <i>"My wife comes from a large family; there were six kids in hers. She wanted three, but it didn't work out, and then suddenly it did" (M)</i>
Formation of a new family (second/subsequent marriage); new partner	
<i>"A different husband. I wanted to strengthen the relationship by having a child" (F)</i> <i>"The third child is from my second marriage" (F)</i>	<i>"My husband is my second; he has no children. And he really wanted a child" (F)</i>
Desire to provide one's children with the support of brothers/sisters in life	
<i>"I'm an only child, and for as long as I can remember, especially before my teens, I wanted to have brothers who would protect me. I felt lonely. And I decided that in my family, my child must have one or two brothers or sisters" (F)</i> <i>"The most stable structure rests on three points" (F)</i> <i>"Children 200% need at least a brother or a sister. That's for sure" (M)</i>	<i>"My husband is an only child. And he always said he really regrets not having a sister or a brother, that it's such support and backup in life. And so he said he wants his children to have brothers and sisters" (F)</i> <i>"I'm an only child. When I got married, I thought to myself that my children would definitely have brothers and sisters. Because I always wanted to have a brother or a sister, you know, blood siblings" (F)</i> <i>"I was an only child, and I dreamed of having brothers and sisters. Families with siblings are more united; they lean on each other at some point" (M)</i>
Desire to have children of both sexes	
<i>"I had two sons. I wanted a girl" (F)</i> <i>"I also wanted a daughter. My first two are sons" (M)</i> <i>"I have two older boys, so my wife and I thought: if only we could have a girl too" (M)</i>	<i>"We wanted children of both sexes. And if our first kids had been the same sex, we would have definitely, quite consciously, gone for a third" (F)</i> <i>"I had two daughters, they're already grown, and I dreamed of a son" (M). "That's the main motive – I wanted a daughter because all my children are sons" (M)</i>
Expansion of parental and family potential	
<i>"When you have your second or third child, more opportunities open up for you. Your motivation is different" (F)</i> <i>"Children give you a boost, because you want to achieve more, to move forward both financially and intellectually" (F)</i>	<i>"Something good always comes; with the birth of any child, something good appears in the family. It doesn't matter whether it's material or something else" (F)</i> <i>"My wife and I are having a second youth. My wife got younger after the birth of our third late child. I feel an impulse, of course I got younger. First of all, it's the care: you have to raise, bring up, provide for, educate them. That kind of care makes you younger" (M)</i>

have another, have another. When I moved here, in Russia, everything is different. My mentality has already changed” (M).

On the other hand, the intention to have many children is also found among those whose parental family was not large. One of the motives for creating a large family is so that the children have brothers and sisters as a support in life, a kind of “insurance” against loneliness. Characteristically, this attitude was voiced mainly by those who were themselves an only child in the family. Unfulfilled childhood dreams of a brother or sister were realized in their own families.

The attitude that children should be of both sexes strengthens or emerges if the first two children turned out to be of the same sex. At the same time, having many children may or may not be initially planned – and then the desire to have a child of the other sex becomes the main driver of having a large family. The desire to have both boys and girls among one’s children is akin to the ideal of completeness, of the finished model of a full-fledged family. The desire to have children of both sexes is far from universal among multi-child parents. Moreover, this attitude does not guarantee the desired result, and after becoming a large family, the family may still end up with children of the same sex.

The motive of expanding the parents’ opportunities and potential with the arrival of the next child is sometimes formulated in quite down-to-earth terms: *“Things actually got better for us after the third one was born. My husband’s career took off. Because the goal was three children – they need to be fed, clothed, and so on. That’s how it worked out: with each birth, his career growth increased”. Sometimes it is expressed almost magically: “God gave the bunny, He will also give the meadow” (F).* Men characterize this factor even more actively and in more detail: the increased volume of care and expenses associated with the birth of a child stimulates them to build up family resources, discover new opportunities, and find the strength to solve emerging problems.

Alongside the motives for having many children shared by both generations, the analysis revealed intergenerational differences in the structure of motivational attitudes. Several motives, in particular, appeared exclusively in the narratives of the second generation. The partial absence of comparable motives in the statements of first-generation respondents may stem from the time gap between the survey and the moment of the reproductive decision: the greater the distance from the event, the more memories may be reshaped and the subjective weight of certain motives diminished in retrospective assessment:

- a small child revitalizes and brings the family together: *“I had long been ready for another child, because a child improves the family and brings it together. That was extremely important. I felt that, to avoid sliding into everyday routine, we needed a child who would shake things up” (M);*

- the desire to feel the charm of babyhood again when the older children have already grown up: *“I wanted a little baby. To bring back the sound of children’s laughter. Like in the song, ‘little bare feet on the carpet’” (F); “Our first two children had grown up. My wife kept looking at little kids. She wanted to fuss over a baby again” (M);*

- the desire to give love that has not yet been spent: *“I want to give more love. There is love, and I want to keep giving it” (F);*

- to experience the joy of motherhood once more: *“I was able to feel it again, to breastfeed again. The third time was completely different, and everything I couldn’t feel with the first and second, I made up for with the third. My third child fulfilled all my motherhood needs” (F).*

Parents deciding to have a third child are well acquainted with the special emotional atmosphere created by a small child. Many parents – both women and men – want to experience these feelings of tactile love and tenderness again and again. When the older children have already grown up, parents gain an additional driver: the desire to have a baby

in the family again, to hear children's laughter once more. This is mentioned equally often by both women and men in Generation 2. In Generation 1, the youngest child was born twenty or more years ago; all the children have already become adults and bring completely different cares and worries, and having another child of their own is unlikely. This is probably why they do not recall this driver.

In addition to intergenerational differences, the study also revealed gender differences in the structure of motivational attitudes underlying the orientation toward having many children. Analysis of the focus group data made it possible to record differentiation in motivational priorities between men and women within both generations.

In particular, men hardly ever mention planning for a large family on their part. Many came to the birth of a third child without initially having such plans. Perhaps for them the very notion of planning implies a rather strict goal-setting of the "said and done" type, rather than just talk, since in matters of childbearing they feel dependent on the woman's readiness for motherhood. Men tend to emphasize that they did not plan the arrival of a third child (just as with the first two, when it comes to biological children). They do not deny their participation in the positive decision, but they prefer to use formulations of a providential plan: *"Since it was destined, we did not refuse what was given"* (M, Generation 1); *"It just happened the way it happened"* (M, Generation 1); *"If God gives, it would be a sin to refuse. One must give birth"* (M, Generation 1); *"We didn't think about whether [this child] should or should not be. And there was no scenario in which he could not be"* (M, Generation 2); *"Circumstances had already come together, and you accept everything as it is, as a given"* (M, Generation 2).

A related motive voiced by men in Generation 2 is that the arrival of a new little child renews the parents' energy; they feel younger, especially compared with their peers. *"It's more care, but I feel better, I feel younger. My little daughter is seven*

months old now. My classmates feel like grandmothers. And I'm still young, and it really keeps me going" (M). This is perhaps not so much a driver of family expansion as a tangible "bonus" of having many children – perhaps already at the stage of expecting the child, but especially after its birth.

Among women, a fairly typical factor in having many children is another marriage or a new partner. Almost half of the participants in each group had their third child in a new marriage or as a result of a new relationship, sometimes without a husband.

Two further motives for the decision to have a third child were mentioned only by women of Generation 2: the opportunity to give another child an unspent reserve of love, and the desire to complete the experience of motherhood with a third child.

The role of maternity capital in the decision to have a third child

No stark differences are observed in the motivation and drivers behind the birth of a third child between families that did not receive maternity capital for the third child and those that did. The possibility of receiving maternity capital did not influence the decision to have a large family: *"We started thinking: okay, we now have a small apartment. We need a bigger apartment, we need to earn more, we need this, that, and the other. But we didn't think, 'Oh, we'll also get maternity capital!'"* (M, Generation 2).

None of the study participants agrees that the presence or absence of the possibility of receiving maternity capital could affect their decision to have a third child. This may reflect established mental priorities and forms of self-presentation in Russian society. In other words, publicly admitting that the decision to have a child could have been externally stimulated by material considerations is not normatively encouraged.

Although expanding the family is seen above all as a spiritual act, the need for a material foundation to take such a step is not only recognized but also asserted.

Generation 1: *“There has to be readiness for the fact that this child will need to be supported, clothed, placed in a nursery, kindergarten, school, and then they will need to get into college. Readiness for all these expenses”* (M).

“I think you can’t ignore objective material factors. Because you have to raise the child, not just give birth. If you have a one-room apartment, you’d think very hard about whether to have even one” (F).

“If people are doing well, if they have good jobs, I’d say definitely yes. But if they are unemployed and their material situation is not great at all, then maybe it makes sense to first get on their feet and only then think about children” (F).

Generation 2: *“Children need to be provided for, they need education, they need the opportunity to go to clubs and activities, we must develop them and give them life experience. If you’re ready for that, then yes, no questions. But if you’re not, you start to think twice”* (M).

“We could see that our age, our finances, and our housing allowed it. Well, we simply understood that we were ready to go through all of it again” (F).

“Maybe we would have planned a third child earlier. But we understood that our apartment didn’t allow us to create individual conditions for each child. So until we saved up a certain amount to buy a house, we put our plans for a third child on hold” (F).

Most of the study participants confirm that the family’s material situation at the time of the decision allowed them to have another child and provide everything necessary.

At the same time, men of Generation 2 emphasize that the arrival of a third child forced the family to rethink its housing situation: *“We had to change the apartment; we had to change jobs. We had to earn more”* (M, Generation 2); *“When we were expecting the third, we had to move; there was a mortgage. We lived in a two-room apartment, and we had to make it a three-room one so that each child would have their own room”* (M, Generation 2); *“We moved from a*

three-room apartment to a five-room one. We took out the biggest mortgage” (M, Generation 2).

The existence of a socially approved idea that creating a large family should rest on a solid material foundation — housing and sources of income — does not exclude the possibility that some families become large without material certainty.

Among the men of Generation 1, there was a participant whose financial situation at the time of his children’s birth did not particularly allow for a large family, since he was a student, had no housing of his own, and the children came one after another, a year or two apart. The only thing that helped them stay afloat was material support from relatives: *“It was hard. We lived like students; the only thing that helped us was her parents, my wife’s parents”* (M, Generation 1; three children born in 2003–2006).

If we look at the cases of women who gave birth to a third child while risking their financial stability, including without a husband, there is no doubt about their strong character and readiness to overcome difficulties and “resistance from the environment”: *“My mother said I was out of my mind. But if I had been afraid of everything, I probably wouldn’t have had any children at all. It’s hard to knock me off course. I guess I just have a man’s character”* (F, Generation 1; the third child was born outside marriage); *“I worked at jobs that allowed me to still look after the children. I even had to work while nursing babies. And my husband worked two jobs”* (F, Generation 1); *“I found out from my acquaintances that there are various benefits. They weren’t very big, but they saved us. That year was very hard. We tightened our belts; for a year we didn’t allow ourselves and the children what we were used to. But it was okay; little by little we got back on our feet. God gave the bunny, He will also give the meadow. There is always an opportunity to earn. I sewed, I took in orders at home, I took on whatever I could get”* (F, Generation 2; the third child was born outside marriage).

Generation 1 holds the view that at the time their third child was born, the state did not provide support to large families (although some support measures did exist, and respondents remember them). The types of support offered back then were either extremely insignificant or did not actually work. Men of Generation 1 can recall little about the state support measures, partly because their wives handled these matters: *"We had some benefits; my wife dealt with all that, not me. So I just can't say right now"* (M).

Attitudes toward the availability of state support are more positive in Generation 2. Unlike Generation 1, some women of Generation 2 deliberately sought information about forms of assistance and thought about how to use them: *"We knew what we were supposed to receive; I found out about the regional payments right away. I immediately thought we would put it toward buying another apartment"* (F). Overall, according to Generation 2 respondents, the most significant state support measure is federal maternity capital, the amount of which makes a tangible contribution to purchasing housing. The role of regional maternity capital is much smaller, and it has virtually no effect on resolving the housing issue. In this context, women of Generation 2 who received federal maternity capital for their second child believe that the birth of a third child (for which only regional maternity capital is available) is not stimulated by the state at all: *"For a third child, the maternity capital is tiny. I mean, there's no full-fledged maternity capital. There's a top-up of 170 thousand, and what can you do with that? Look at our mortgage; it's not even enough for a down payment. So the state does not motivate the birth of a third child"* (F).

Conclusion

The study yields the following conclusions. The core motives for having many children identified among respondents from both generations include: an institutional orientation toward large families

(formed in childhood or reinforced by agreement between spouses when starting a family); an orientation toward positive images of large families (parents or relatives with many children) or, conversely, a desire to compensate for growing up as an only child by creating a large family and ensuring that one's children have siblings; the desire to have children of both sexes; and the motive of expanding one's life and parenting opportunities. At the same time, the study finds that childhood experience of living in a large family can be assessed ambivalently, including negatively, and that the intention to have many children also occurs among those without such experience.

Intergenerational differences in the structure of motivation proved to be insignificant. The only motive specific to the second generation was the desire to recreate within the family an atmosphere of special emotionality, tactile love, and tenderness associated with the arrival of a small child. This finding is interpreted as a methodological limitation of the study: the considerable time gap between the birth of a child and the survey may reshape memories and reduce the subjective weight of certain motives in retrospective assessment, which may explain the absence of a comparable motive in the narratives of the first generation.

The study reveals pronounced gender differences in the structure of motivational attitudes. Men less frequently articulate any planning of a large family, which may reflect their perception of "planning" as rigid goal-setting and their sense of dependence on the woman's readiness for motherhood. Among male motives, the effect of "renewal of parental energy" stands out, along with the subjective feeling of youth that accompanies the arrival of a new child. For women, significant motives include entering a new marriage, the opportunity to channel an unspent reserve of parental love, and the desire to complete the experience of motherhood with a third child.

The findings do not support the working hypothesis that the institutional introduction of maternity capital decisively shaped the motivational structure of reproductive behavior. Analysis of the focus group discussions shows that the key motives behind the decision to have a third child are predominantly value-normative and sociocultural in nature and are largely shared by representatives of both generations.

Although financial incentives do not act as independent drivers of reproductive choice, the material factor retains considerable importance as a normatively approved precondition for realizing reproductive intentions. Representatives of both generations express a desire to secure adequate housing and financial conditions before having a third child. Respondents from the second generation who had the opportunity to use maternity capital recognize its importance mainly in resolving the housing question but deny its influence on the decision to have a child itself. The material component is thus often implicitly embedded in reproductive decisions as a necessary condition, even when it does not figure among the declared value-based motives.

Given the identified priority of the housing factor in reproductive decisions, it is advisable to improve demographic policy instruments. Potentially effective measures to support large families could include increasing maternity capital to a level sufficient to cover the down payment on a mortgage for a large family; subsidizing mortgage repayment in the amount of 50% of the outstanding balance; and providing preferential mortgage loans for each child in the family. The regional context and differences in housing costs should be taken into account when designing such measures. Their implementation could serve as a significant stimulus for the formation of large families and improve the effectiveness of demographic policy.

A promising direction for future research is to study the impact of maternity capital on reproductive behavior through a comparative analysis of one-child and two-child families. Comparing families in which a second child was born before and after 2007 would help identify how this institutional support measure affects reproductive decisions and assess changes in motivational attitudes depending on the program's implementation.

References

- Abdulaeva Z.Z. (2024). Transformation of models of distribution of gender roles in the modern family. *Regional'nye problemy preobrazovaniya ekonomiki*, 6(164), 135–144. DOI: 10.26726/1812-7096-2024-6-135-144 (in Russian).
- Antonov G.V., Laktyukhina E.G. (2012). Reproductive attitudes of population categories responsible for demographic reproduction: A sociological analysis. *Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i yuridicheskie nauki, kul'turologiya i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy teorii i praktiki*, 11-2, 14–19 (in Russian).
- Arkhangelsky V.N., Bezverbnaya N.A., Bezverbny V.A., Zemlyanova E.V. (2024a). Relationship of reproductive behavior of generations in the family. *Narodonaselenie*, 27(3), 48–61. DOI: 10.24412/1561-7785-2024-3-48-61 (in Russian).
- Arkhangelsky V.N., Zolotareva O.A., Kuchmaeva O.V. (2024b). Two approaches to assessing the effectiveness of demographic policy (using the example of federal maternity capital). *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognozy* = *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 17(6), 77–97. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2024.6.96.4 (in Russian).
- Bakytzhanova A.A., Alimbekova G.T., Toikko T. (2026). Socio-economic determinants of reproductive behavior: A comparative study of Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Kuopio (Finland). *Gumilyov Journal of Sociology*, 154(1), 27–56. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.32523/3080-1702-2026-154-1-27-56>

- Bannykh G.A., Zaitseva E.V., Kostina S.N. (2019). Reproductive motivation in middle-income large families: The results of a narrative interview. *Peterburgskaya sotsiologiya segodnya=St. Petersburg Sociology Today*, 11, 120–127. DOI: 10.25990/socinstras.pss-11.ky9q-vc12 (in Russian).
- Borisov V.A. (1970). *Demografiya i sotsial'naya psikhologiya* [Demography and Social Psychology]. Moscow: Mysl'.
- Borisova O.N., Pavlyutkin I.V. (2019). The revival of tradition, new marriages or network effects: Variability of models of large modern urban families. *Mir Rossii=Universe of Russia*, 28(4), 128–151. DOI: 10.17323/1811-038X-2019-28-4-128-151 (in Russian).
- Brewer M., Ratcliffe A., Smith S. (2012). Does welfare reform affect fertility? Evidence from the UK. *Journal of Population Economics*, 25(1), 245–266. DOI: 10.1007/s00148-010-0332-x
- Brini E., Dommermuth L., Lappegård T., Mynarska M., Raybould A. (2026). Childbearing motivations and fertility desires: An empirical analysis for Norway. *Comparative Population Studies*, 51, 39–72. DOI: 10.12765/CPoS-2026-03
- Carneiro P., Løken K.V., Salvanes K.G. (2015). A flying start? Maternity leave benefits and long-run outcomes of children. *Journal of Political Economy*, 123(2), 365–412. DOI: 10.1086/679627
- Dommermuth L., Lyngstad T.H., Wiik K.A. (2025). Fertility intentions across five decades in Norway. *Comparative Population Studies*, 50, 129–152. DOI: 10.12765/CPoS-2025-09
- Ezdi S. et al. (2024). Childbearing under different family policy schemes. *Journal of Family Research*, 36, 305–326. DOI: 10.20377/jfr-987
- Gauthier A.H., Gietel-Basten S. (2025). Family policies in low fertility countries: Evidence and reflections. *Population and Development Review*, 51(1), 125–161. DOI: 10.1111/padr.12691
- Gonzalez L. (2013). The effect of a universal child benefit on conceptions, abortions, and early maternal labor supply. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 50(3), 160–188. DOI: 10.1257/pol.5.3.160
- Gorlatykh A.Yu., Abramov A.P. (2025). Gender roles in the family: Changing expectations and responsibilities. *Izvestiya Yugo-Zapadnogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Ekonomika. Sotsiologiya. Menedzhment=Proceedings of the Southwest State University. Series: Economics. Sociology. Management*, 15(1), 247–259. DOI: 10.21869/2223-1552-2025-15-1-247-259 (in Russian).
- Gudkova T.B. (2019). Fertility intentions in Russia: Motivation and constraints. *Demograficheskoe obozrenie*, 6(4), 83–103. DOI: 10.17323/demreview.v6i4.10428 (in Russian).
- Gurko T.A. (2023). Family factors of reproductive behavior. *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya=Sociological Studies*, 12, 72–82. DOI: 10.31857/S013216250029338-4 (in Russian).
- Jurczak A., Nenko I., Marcinkowska U.M. (2026). Fertility desires and attitudes toward fertility and childbearing among women of reproductive age. *MedRxiv*. DOI: 10.64898/2026.01.07.26343593
- Karpova V.M., Lyalikova S.V. (2023). Intra-family transmission of large family values. *Kazanskii sotsial'no-gumanitarnyi vestnik=The Kazan Socially-Humanitarian Bulletin*, 6(63), 71–79. DOI: 10.26907/2079-5912.2023.6.71-79 (in Russian).
- Kornienko D.S., Radosteva A.G., Kharlamova T.M. (2017). Psychometric validation of the questionnaire on destructive and constructive reproductive motives. *Vestnik Permskogo gosudarstvennogo humanitarno-pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Seriya No. 1. Psikhologicheskie i pedagogicheskie nauki*, 1, 122–132 (in Russian).
- Korolenko A.V., Kalachikova O.N. (2022). Reproductive attitudes of young families: Driving forces and implementation conditions (on the basis of in-depth interviews). *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognoz=Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(2), 172–189. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2022.2.80.11 (in Russian).
- Kovalchuk O.V., Lazurenko N.V., Podporinova N.N. (2018). Reproductive attitudes of the young (student) family. *NOMOTHETIKA: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo*, 43(2), 349–360 (in Russian).
- Makarentseva A.O., Biryukova S.S. (2023). Factors, consistency, and realization of reproductive intentions in Russia. *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny=The Monitoring of Public Opinion Economic & Social Changes*, 2, 31–56. DOI: 10.14515/monitoring.2023.2.2379 (in Russian).

- Makarentseva A.O., Burdyak A.Y., Sheipak I.I. (2025). Factors in intentions to have a third child: What machine learning analysis reveals. *Population and Economics*, 9(3), 198–224. DOI: 10.3897/popecon.9.e135768
- Markova T.L. et al. (2024). A social portrait of working women in the Urals. *Zhenshchina v rossiiskom obshchestve=Woman in Russian Society*, 4, 119–138. DOI: 10.21064/WinRS.2024.4.8 (in Russian).
- Rahnu L., Jalovaara M. (2023). Partnership dynamics and entry into parenthood: Comparison of Finnish birth cohorts 1969–2000. *Advances in Life Course Research*, 56, 100548. DOI: 10.1016/j.alcr.2023.100548
- Rasmussen A.W. (2010). Increasing the length of parents' birth-related leave: The effect on children's long-term educational outcomes. *Labour Economics*, 17(1), 91–100. DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2009.07.007
- Rostovskaya T.K. et al. (2021). The factors of birth of second child in contemporary Russia: The analysis of sociological survey results. *Problemy sotsial'noi gigieny, zdravookhraneniya i istorii meditsiny=Problems of Social Hygiene, Public Health and History of Medicine*, 29(3), 430–436. DOI: 10.32687/0869-866X-2020-29-3-430-436 (in Russian).
- Rostovskaya T.K., Kuchmaeva O.V., Vasileva E.N. (2024). Large family in the modern Russian society: Demographic aspect. *Voprosy upravleniya=Management Issues*, 3(88), 9–23. DOI: 10.22394/2304-3369-2024-3-9-23 (in Russian).
- Rostovskaya T.K., Vasilieva E.N., Kholina V.N. (2023). Factors shaping the reproductive behavior of young families in Russia: data triangulation. *Changing Societies & Personalities*, 7(1), 72–87. DOI: 10.15826/csp.2023.7.1.219
- Rusanova N.E., Zhuravleva E.K. (2019). The specificity of the large family in the capital: Features of state regulation. *Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie. Elektronnyi vestnik*, 77, 274–291. DOI: 10.24411/2070-1381-2019-10028 (in Russian).
- Sinel'nikov A.B., Karpova V.M., Lyalikova S.V., Antonov A.I. (2023). The influence of reproductive experience of parental families on the probability of choosing a parenting strategy for large families. *Zhenshchina v rossiiskom obshchestve=Woman in Russian Society*, 4, 71–85. DOI: 10.21064/WinRS.2023.4.6 (in Russian).
- Sirazhutdinova S.V. (2024). Reproductive behavior among the peoples of the North Caucasus. *Etnografiya*, 2(24), 257–273. DOI: 10.31250/2618-8600-2024-2(24)-257-273 (in Russian).
- Sivoplyasova S.Yu. (2022). Reproductive attitudes of modern youth towards multi-child parenting: Patterns and contradictions. *Ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny: fakty, tendentsii, prognoz=Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(1), 223–242. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2022.1.79.12 (in Russian).
- Šmeriangaiová, M. (2025). Fertility factors from the perspective of mothers of large families. *Demografie*, 67(1), 24–37. DOI 10.54694/dem.0355
- Smulyanskaya N.S. (2017). What does have influence on fertility decision among women of different age groups? *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya: ekonomicheskie i sotsial'nye peremeny=The Monitoring of Public Opinion: Economic & Social Changes*, 5(141), 289–299. DOI: 10.14515/monitoring.2017.5.16 (in Russian).
- Svetlichnaya T.G., Menshikova L.I. (2017). Maternity capital as an economic factor, forming social expectation of women with two or more children. *Journal of Economic Regulation*, 8(1), 85–95. DOI: 10.17835/2078-5429.2017.8.1.085-095 (in Russian).
- Trusova E.A., Tkach E.N. (2022). Reproductive motives in the married couple: Gender differences. *Missiya konfessii*, 11(62), 84–91 (in Russian).
- Tudor S. (2020). Financial incentives, fertility and early life child outcomes. *Labour Economics*, 64, 101839. DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101839
- Vakulenko E.S., Gorsky D.I., Kondrateva V.P., Trofimenko I.A. (2024). Reproductive intentions of Russians in 2022–2023: The role of subjective factors. *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 138–157. DOI: 10.32609/0042-8736-2024-9-138-157 (in Russian).

Use of AI Tools

The authors used AI (Alisa AI) to edit fragments of the text.

Information about the Authors

Tatyana A. Kamarova – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), associate professor of department, Ural State University of Economics (62/45, 8 Marta / Narodnoy Voli Street, Yekaterinburg, 620144, Russian Federation; e-mail: kta@usue.ru)

Natalia V. Tonkikh – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Associate Professor, head of laboratory, Ural State University of Economics (62/45, 8 Marta / Narodnoy Voli Street, Yekaterinburg, 620144, Russian Federation; e-mail: tonkihvnv@usue.ru)

Tatiana L. Markova – Candidate of Sciences (Sociology), associate professor of department, Ural State University of Economics (62/45, 8 Marta / Narodnoy Voli Street, Yekaterinburg, 620144, Russian Federation; e-mail: markova_tl@usue.ru)

Received May 25, 2026.