

EDITORIAL

DOI: 10.15838/esc.2025.3.99.1

UDC 354, LBC 66.03

© Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V.

“The Constitutional Ban on State Ideology Means a Ban on Revising the Ideological Tenets of Liberalism”: What the 30-Year Absence of a State Ideology Leads to



**Vladimir A.
ILYIN**

Vologda Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences
Vologda, Russian Federation

e-mail: ilin@vscc.ac.ru

ORCID: 0000-0003-4536-6287; ResearcherID: N-4615-2017



**Mikhail V.
MOREV**

Vologda Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences
Vologda, Russian Federation

e-mail: 379post@mail.ru

ORCID: 0000-0003-1396-8195; ResearcherID: I-9815-2016

Abstract. In the article, we continue to reveal the topic related to the problem of liberal ideology, which was actually established in Russia after the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993, which proclaimed a ban on official state ideology (Article 13). The emphasis is placed on the empirical results of monitoring sociological research, which allow us to see the dynamics of changes in indicators of the intellectual, creative and moral level of Russian society for the period from 1996 to 2024. The study was carried out in the Vologda Region, but a comparison of the data obtained with the results of opinion polls conducted in other regions of the Russian Federation suggests the existence of identified trends in many regions of the country. The analysis has shown that, on average, over the period from 1996 to 2024, the proportion of people interested in various topics about life, such as family, culture, upbringing

For citation: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2025). “The constitutional ban on state ideology means a ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism”: What the 30-year absence of a state ideology leads to. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 18(3), 9–39. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2025.3.99.1

of younger generations, the life of the country and society, etc. decreased by 11 percentage points. The proportion of people who do not tend to engage in creative activities in everyday life has increased by 15 percentage points. The proportion of people experiencing remorse in the case of committing certain immoral acts (deception, rudeness, injustice, etc.) decreased by 8 percentage points. The generalization of expert assessments given in the article indicates that the cause of negative trends is largely the ideology of liberalism, which is based on the ideas of consumerism and money as the leading values in life, the understanding of benefit as the only driving force of social development. Special emphasis is placed on the values and behaviors of the ruling elites, who continue to adhere to the basic tenets of liberal ideology, which, in the context of the special military operation, leads to extremely negative consequences for the country and creates real threats to national security. Some of the ruling elites are still guided by liberal attitudes that contradict traditional spiritual and moral values such as justice, patriotism, and the priority of the spiritual over the material, which are contained in Presidential Decree 809 of November 9, 2022. Therefore, there is a growing need in the expert community and among the general public for a real understanding of the answer to the question “What kind of state are we building?” Our contribution lies in the analysis and interpretation of the database of sociological data accumulated from 1996 to 2024 in the context of current problems of public administration effectiveness.

Key words: ideology, Constitution of the Russian Federation, public opinion, threats to national security, intellectual, creative potential, moral level.

In the previous editorial “**What the 30-year absence of a state ideology leads to: “*The enemy is not only on the other side of the frontline*”**” published in the April issue of the journal *Economic and Social Change: Facts, Trends, Forecast*¹, the facts and expert opinions reflecting current trends in the development of the situation in the country and in the world were analyzed, which determine the **high and increasing degree of urgency of the problem related to the definition of the ideological vector of**

national development, and more specifically, the problem of the lack of an official state ideology in Russia.

The subtitle “The enemy is not only on the other side of the frontline”² reflected, perhaps, one of the main consequences of this problem – the **systemic nature of corruption in power**, which is for Russia the most real “internal enemy” in the context of the ongoing war with the “external” enemy – NATO countries.

¹ Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2025). What the 30-year absence of a state ideology leads to: “The enemy is not only on the other side of the frontline”. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 18(2), 9–38.

² With this quote, acting governor of the Kursk Region A. Khinsein, assessed the situation that unfolded in late 2024 and early 2025 around the activities of the Kursk Region Development Corporation. In December 2024, general director of the Kursk Region Development Corporation V. Lukin, as well as his deputies I. Grabin and S. Martyanova, were arrested. On April 15, 2025, A. Smirnov, former governor of the Kursk Region, and A. Smirnov, former first deputy governor A. Dedov were detained... All of them were connected with the activities of the KRDC, on the basis of which a criminal scheme was organized, which for many years allowed embezzlement of budget funds, including those allocated for the construction of defensive structures. The result of this criminal activity was the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the territory of the Kursk Region on August 6, 2024.

The urgency of the problem of the lack of ideology in Russia is due to external and internal reasons.

First, “the aggravation of cultural issues, preservation of the cultural code” *in the context of the civilizational crisis faced by the world community in the 21st century*³.

Second, the fact that “the Russian Federation is facing a civilizational crisis *not only at the global level* (associated with a change in the form of the world order, with the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world and the need to occupy a worthy place in this new world), *but also at the national level, associated with the incipient exit from the semi-colonial condition, in particular which our country found itself in after the collapse of the USSR in 1991...* Therefore, *in order to get out of the value-worldview conflict, our country will need value-worldview changes*: within the elites, within the general population, within the state and public policy in all its manifestations (in economy, education, science, culture, etc.)”⁴.

One of the key conclusions, summarized in an April article based on expert opinions, was that “*there is no state without an ideology; if a state does not have its own ideology, then someone else will surely take its place*”⁵, or, as some analysts point out, “upbringing does not tolerate emptiness. It will definitely be filled in, but the question is by whom? and with what?”⁶.

In this issue of the journal, in the editorial, we continue to disclose this thesis, and this time attention is focused on specific empirical data from

long-term monitoring sociological studies conducted by the VoIRC RAS since 1996, which allow us to clearly see the negative impact of the lack of Russia’s own state ideology on trends in intellectual, creative, and moral potentials using the example of the regional community.

The headline “The constitutional ban on state ideology means a ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism”⁷ reflects the general essence of the research: **Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which has been in force in Russia since 1993 and which prohibits official state ideology, does not just proclaim “ideological diversity”⁸, but legislatively enshrines the ideology of liberalism, which contradicts the course of national development aimed at strengthening sovereignty.**

First of all, we should note that, according to many experts, the situation that has developed since the beginning of the special military operation, not only around but also inside Russia, places very special and increased demands on the ruling elites responsible for implementing the objectives of the President of the Russian Federation, including ensuring sustainable growth in the standard of living and quality of life, as well as the security of territories.

And this concerns, first of all, the internal situation in the country, since the actions of the so-called Collective West (the United States, UK and NATO bloc as a whole), which is actually waging a full-scale war with Russia at the hands of the “Kiev regime”, are quite understandable and naturally fit into the logic of their publicly announced goals to

³ Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2025). What the 30-year absence of a state ideology leads to: “The enemy is not only on the other side of the frontline”. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 18(2), p. 20.

⁴ Ibidem. P. 25.

⁵ Ibidem. P. 33.

⁶ Kireev M., Koreneva E., Kireeva N. (2024). The cultural code of Russia and its evolution. *Nauka, iskusstvo, kul'tura=Science, Arts, Culture*, 3(43), 22–35.

⁷ Radikov I.V. (2019). The search for ideological orientation in post-Soviet Russia. *Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki*, 1(834), p. 57.

⁸ The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Available at: <http://duma.gov.ru/legislative/documents/constitution/>

A.A. Prokhanov (writer): “Russia, which is waging a terrible war, needs a wartime army, needs a wartime economy, needs wartime industry, wartime culture, wartime ideology, wartime managers, wartime leaders. **Russia needs a wartime elite capable of leading the country and leading it to Victory. Russia does not have such an elite.** The Russian elite was created by the West, which conquered the country after 1991, and it is a product of the West, like Coca-Cola, jeans, or Broadway musicals”⁹.

R.I. Nigmatulin (RAS Academician): “... **the elite itself must be rebuilt: the government elite, the state elite**, all these deputies, and so on. And besides, of course, a cohort of people who are rich, who have huge wealth concentrated on themselves, who consume a lot, fly business jets abroad as before, spend their vacation there, thereby wasting our resources. **All this is as it was, and it remains**”¹⁰.

achieve “Russia’s strategic defeat”¹¹, “defeat Russia on the battlefield”¹²; and declaring our country its enemy in official documents¹³.

As for the internal situation in the country, first, a certain number of representatives of the ruling elites, through their specific actions, which are actually revealed on a daily basis by investigative authorities (Insert 1), discredit Russia’s entire course toward strengthening national sovereignty, which includes traditional spiritual and moral values formulated in Presidential Decree 809 dated November 9, 2022 “On approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”: “justice”, “patriotism”, “high moral ideals”,

“Law 809 is a turning point. We generally live in a new era. This new era in Russia began on February 24 after the start of the special military operation, which led to huge transformations in the positioning of our country in a global context. **The law “On approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” is a fundamental point...**”¹⁴

“the priority of the spiritual over the material”, “collectivism”¹⁵ and so on.

⁹ Prokhanov A. Russian martin. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/russkij_marten?ysclid=mcd319lbp301691139

¹⁰ Nigmatulin R. The elite itself must rebuild. Available at: <https://dzen.ru/a/ZttL8YPwYey7MA6N?ysclid=mcbp45zrxh200197138>

¹¹ “From the point of view of the United States, the ultimate goal is the **strategic defeat** of Russian President Vladimir Putin,” US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland said on March 9, 2022 (Source: <https://russian.rt.com/world/news/973180-nuland-ssha-rossiya>).

¹² The fact that “**this war will be won on the battlefield**” was stated on April 9, 2022 by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy J. Borrel. Available at: <https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2022/04/09/17546431.shtml>

¹³ For example: H.R. 3364 – Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Available at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20171214193452/https://www.whitehouse.gov/legislation/hr-3364-countering-americas-adversaries-through-sanctions-act>; Global Britain in a competitive age The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy. March 2021. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age-the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf

¹⁴ Dugin A. Tradition and modernity. Speech at the First Siberian Forum of the World Russian People’s Council on December 20, 2022. Available at: <https://izborsk-club.ru/23673?ysclid=mcbkw4bcvc72439398>

¹⁵ Presidential Decree 809 dated November 9, 2022 “On approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values”. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/48502>

Second, these actions lead to the appearance of so-called “black swans”¹⁶, which occur **regularly throughout virtually the entire period of the special military operation**¹⁷ and they indicate serious internal failures of the public administration system as a whole.

In recent days, such “black swans” have been a series of terrorist attacks on railway tracks in the border territories¹⁸ and the cynical AFU Operation Spiderweb – a drone attack on Russian airfields, carried out directly from trucks, which raises many questions about the work of “all our special services”¹⁹.

*A. Gurulev: “Let’s be honest... By the way, this applies not only to the army, unfortunately, we will have no less in civilian life. But an army is still the price of a human life. After all, the meaning is very simple. If you’re the boss and your subordinates tell you lies, I’m sorry, they tell you lies, or you let them tell you lies, let’s put it this way, or you want to hear only the good, you’ll listen to the good, but it won’t be true. **And if that’s not true, you won’t have the raw data to make decisions about the problems that exist. And without making a decision on the problems that exist, you will drive yourself into a dead end. That’s the trouble**”²⁰.*

¹⁶ «Black swans» – “events that initially seem rare, difficult to predict, but after the fact often turn out to be quite logical based on the current situation” (source: Zuikova A. “Black swan” – what is it and how to prepare for it). Available at: <https://trends.rbc.ru/trends/futurology/60be57219a794724c40c369a>

¹⁷ “Black swans” include:

- ✓ August 20, 2022 – terrorist attack in Moscow, as a result of which Russian journalist and political scientist D. Dugina was killed;
- ✓ September 11, 2022 – retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from the Kharkov Region;
- ✓ November 9, 2022 – retreat of the Russian Armed Forces from Kherson (which, according to political scientist S. Markov, became “Russia’s largest geopolitical defeat since the collapse of the USSR and a natural consequence of internal problems related to the Army and ideology” (source: https://wsem.ru/publications/otstuplenie_rossii_iz_khersona_realnye_prichiny_vyk_hoda_rossiyskoy_armii_iz_khersona_5155/));
- ✓ April 2, 2023 – terrorist attack in Saint Petersburg, as a result of which the military blogger V. Tatarsky was killed;
- ✓ June 24, 2023 – armed coup attempt carried out by head of the Wagner Private Military Company, E. Prigozhin;
- ✓ March 22, 2024 – terrorist attack in Crocus City Hall, which claimed the lives of 149 Russians;
- ✓ April 23, 2024 – arrest of Deputy Defense Minister T. Ivanov;
- ✓ August 6, 2024 – Ukrainian Armed Forces invaded the territory of the Kursk Region;
- ✓ December – April 2025 – detention of persons associated with the activities of the Kursk Region Development Corporation, including ex-governor of the region A. Smirnov (April 15, 2025).

¹⁸ **In two weeks, there were five explosions on the railway in the border regions:** on May 25 in the Belgorod Region, on May 31 in the Bryansk Region, on June 1 in the Bryansk and Kursk regions, and on June 5 in the Voronezh Region (source: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2025/06/05/21163862.shtml?ysclid=mbotvyibpw670474206>).

¹⁹ **“Several Russian military facilities were attacked by kamikaze drones on June 1... The attacks were carried out according to the same scheme: drones took off from trucks equipped as launching pads.** Eyewitnesses reported that the trucks stopped near military installations, and then drones began to fly out of them... Despite the fact that many videos of what was happening were posted on Telegram and social medias, and military personnel reported which specific military facilities were attacked, official sources did not provide detailed information about the emergency. In the late afternoon, the Russian Defense Ministry reported that airfields in the Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur regions had been attacked by drones” (source: Mukhin V. The collapse of bridges was followed by a high-profile drone attack. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/armies/2025-06-01/1_9264_attack.html?ysclid=mbouauzyhr222168336).

²⁰ Gurulev A. Interview on June 14, 2024. Available at: <https://www.chita.ru/text/politics/2024/06/14/73698665/>

Many experts²¹ point to the similarity of Operation Spiderweb with the Israeli drone attack on Iran on the night of June 13, 2025. This suggests that “Israel and Ukraine had the same source of technology... and it is the West that is the scriptwriter and director of this well-planned operation”²².

1. “State Duma deputy A. Gurulev regarded attacks with trucks and drones, including in Siberia, as **“a failure of all our special services”**. He said that the special services should find out how the truck, where the drones were, was able to reach its destination in the Irkutsk Region, “carry out investigation from all sides, and draw conclusions”.

2. Military expert V. Shurygin, author of “Ramzai” Telegram channel, commenting on the attack, said that more than three years after the start of the military operation in Ukraine, Russian airfields, for the most part, “still do not have protected caponiers and concrete shelters for aircraft, air defense systems of most airfields remote from the SMO zone are primitive and do not meet the current threat level”²³.

3. Yu. Knutov (military expert): **“It has been known for a long time that the drones attacking us are launched from the territory of Russia. Opponents could disguise as volunteers and purchase and assemble them, ostensibly to send them to the front... The containers were also made in Russia**, because such cargoes coming from abroad are screened using X-ray inspection equipment, and the strange filling, of course, would have been immediately detected...”²⁴

4. A. Salin (Chairman of the Presidium of the Astrakhan Regional Branch of the Officers of Russia organization): **“What happened in the Murmansk and Irkutsk regions is over the top**. This should not be allowed in the future... We, veterans of military operations on the ground, have long been calling **for tougher actions inside the country**. What is it about? **We need to ask officials responsible for security and important strategic facilities more harshly...** If officials, prosecutors, and police officers do not perform their duties, they should be fired, and those who are able to fulfill their tasks should be hired instead”²⁵.

²¹ For example: philosopher A. Dugin (source: Operation Spiderweb was repeated. But everything turned upside down (interview with A. Dugin). Available at: <https://dzen.ru/a/aEyiUGSZYHY828nz?ysclid=mbynu7223e142707617>), Member of the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation A. Akhmedova (source: Ivanov A. Unprecedented attack by the Jewish state on our ally Iran. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/bespretcedentnoe_napadenie_evrejskogo_gosudarstva_na_nashego_soyuznika_iran).

²² “Israel and Ukraine have the same source”: it turned out why Operation Spiderweb was repeated in Iran (opinion of military expert, senior researcher at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Yuri Lyamin). Available at: <https://www.mk.ru/politics/2025/06/13/u-izrailya-i-ukrainy-odin-istochnik-vyyasnilos-pochemu-operaciya-pautina-povtorilas-v-irane.html?ysclid=mbyn5qgm1a317825354>

²³ How trucks with drones were able to get close to military airfields in Russia. Available at: <https://dzen.ru/a/aD3YXmgYIDFEVIQv?ysclid=mbouewsvsc155302776>

²⁴ The expert spoke about the fight against attacks on military airfields. Available at: <https://vz.ru/news/2025/6/1/1335975.html>

²⁵ What lessons should Russia learn from Operation Spiderweb? Available at: <https://sevastopol.su/news/kakie-uroki-rossii-sleduet-izvlech-iz-operacii-pautina>

*Insert 1***Facts of the detention and arrests of representatives of the ruling elites in May – June 2025**

May 12 – head of the Ministry of Transport of Buryatia was detained on charges of corruption.
May 13 – The Federal Security Service of Russia for the Rostov Region detained the head of the Novochoerkassk administration, Yu. Lysenko, on suspicion of taking a bribe.
May 14 – The Federal Security Service of Russia for the Kemerovo Region announced the detention of the deputy head of the Siberian Department of the Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision (Rostekhnadzor), Viktor Brodt, in a bribery case.
May 14 – head of the Migration Department of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Rostov Region, and head of one of the sections of the department became defendants in the criminal case. They helped 18 citizens of a foreign state who did not speak Russian or know the history and legislation of Russia to keep their work permits, thus creating conditions for their illegal stay in the country.
May 15 – Rostov-on-Don's Leninsky District Court arrested Novochoerkassk Mayor Yuri Lysenko for two months in a bribery case.
May 15 – Kaluga Region's Deputy Head of the FSIN Regional Directorate was arrested on suspicion of accepting a bribe.
May 21 – Former Deputy Governor of Tambov Region S. Ivanov was arrested in connection with the bribery case of Rusagro founder Vadim Moshkovich.
May 22 – Former Vice Governor of Krasnodar Region A. Nesterenko was arrested on suspicion of abuse of office.
May 27 – head of the state-owned institution "Capital Construction Department of the Government of Buryatia" was arrested. He is suspected of committing a crime under paragraph "e" of Part 3 of Article 286 of the Russian Criminal Code (abuse of office committed out of other personal interest).
May 28 – First Deputy Minister of Natural Resources of the Krasnodar Territory was detained on suspicion of large-scale fraud. Between August and September 2023, the suspect received 3.8 million rubles from a resident of Kurganinsky District through an acquaintance.
May 29 – head of the non-departmental security service of the Russian Guard for the Novosibirsk Region, R. Kurbanov, was arrested on suspicion of receiving a bribe.
May 29 – director of the center for taking exams (in Russian language, Russian history, and the fundamentals of Russian legislation) from foreigners was detained in Yekaterinburg. He gave migrants the correct answers for money. Eight more people were also detained for helping foreigners obtain fictitious registration.
June 4 – general director of RusKhimtrejd, Evgeny Gerasimov, and commercial director of PJSC Khimprom, Alexey Fedotov, were detained on suspicion of illegal actions related to professional activities. Gerasimov served as Minister of Industry and Energy of Chuvashia from September 2020 to the end of August 2021.
May 12 – head of the Ministry of Transport of Buryatia was detained on charges of corruption.
June 9 – Krasnoyarsk Mayor Vladislav Loginov was detained. According to the investigation, the official received more than 180 million rubles in cash and payment for the construction of a bathhouse, in exchange for ensuring the victory of a commercial organization in tenders for the repair of city roads.
June 11 – director of the Oryol branch of JSC Rosselkhozbank M. Shikhman was detained on suspicion of abuse of office and illegal transfer of €2.4 million abroad. Rosselkhozbank suffered damages of over 167 million rubles.

V. Shurygin (military expert): “The situation requires **extraordinary measures** from the country’s leadership and special services. It is necessary to **create a powerful special service on the basis of the main directorate for counterterrorism, modeled on Stalin’s Smersh during the Great Patriotic War, with the broadest powers**”²⁶.

O. Nilov (State Duma deputy): “Only capital punishment can somehow prevent and minimize the threat of terrorist attacks. **Smersh must be returned, especially at such a time**”²⁷.

A. Gurulev (State Duma deputy): “**It’s time to recreate Smersh. We need to pick up the documents, register everything. The State Duma is able to pass a law in a day**”²⁸.

I. Korotchenko (editor-in-chief of Natsionalnaya oborona magazine): “**We need a new SMERSH. The functions and powers of the FSB in the border and new regions of the Russian Federation need to be expanded to counter the intelligence and sabotage activities of the Kiev regime**”²⁹.

The facts presented in *Insert 1* clearly show that some of the ruling elites still live according to the liberal paradigm of the past decades, in which material gain and personal success are more important than traditional spiritual and moral values. And the ongoing terrorist attacks and the continuing questions among experts about the work of the management system as a whole are a logical consequence of connivance, negligence, and in the worst case, direct sabotage of the instructions of the head of state by such representatives of the public administration system.

Obviously, this is a matter of culture, worldview and values of the ruling elites responsible for the practical implementation of the goals and objectives of national development formulated by the President.

“It is important to note that the ruling elite de facto controls all branches and authorities. It can adopt any laws and interpret those already in force as it sees fit... It is difficult to recall that new norms were blocked by any institution, including the Constitutional Court. It is also difficult to recall that the provision of the Basic Law actually prevented the introduction of a new ban”³⁰.

²⁶ The specifics of the SMO: Is Russia ready for the revival of Smersh? Available at: <https://topcor.ru/34776-specifika-svo-gotova-li-rossija-v-vozhrozhdeniju-smersh-2.html>

²⁷ Khomyakov V. “Russia is reviving Stalinist structures”: Who will the new Smersh catch. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/rossija-vozhrozhdaet-stalinskie-struktury-kogo-budet-lovit-novyj-smersh_943102

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Korotchenko I. We need a new “SMERSH”. Available at: https://t.me/igor_korotchenko/23148

³⁰ On the possibility of new constitutional amendments. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2025-05-21/2_9257_red.html

“The fact that the Security Council has raised the issue of preserving traditional values suggests that they are under serious attack”³¹.

This is largely why the head of state pays special attention to the systematic implementation of state policy aimed at protecting traditional values and strengthening the moral foundations of Russian society³². On June 10, 2025, in its continuation, the President held a Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the agenda of which included *“issues of improving state policy in the field of protection of traditional spiritual and moral values ...”*. As Vladimir Putin noted, this is *“an extremely significant and relevant topic, **directly related to ensuring Russia’s sovereignty and national interests**”³³.*

During the meeting, as some experts emphasized, the President actually *“**demanding legislative protection of traditional values**”³⁴*. Vladimir Putin noted that Russia needs not only to *“resist attempts to impose attitudes that destroy our values on our citizens, especially young people...”* but also to *“**consistently and actively promote our values, form our humanitarian and cultural meanings that are in demand both in the country and in the world**”³⁶.*

*“In the modern world, the value and semantic space is subject to fierce competition... neoliberal, so-called neoliberal, and essentially, in practice, totalitarian models are being pushed through. Moreover, they are not only being persistently introduced in a number of Western countries, they are **actively trying to export them all over the world and impose them. And it’s clear why. Because by depriving peoples of their value base, depriving them of sovereignty, it is easier to subjugate them, turn them into vassals**”³⁵.*

Indeed, as the results of monitoring management decisions show, the President, the Government, and the State Duma are actually taking measures on a daily basis aimed not only at improving the safety and socio-economic support of the general population, but also at improving the spiritual and moral atmosphere in society – to combat the negative influence of foreign agents, to introduce educational elements in the educational process, the gradual replenishment of management personnel by former members of the SMO, etc. (Insert 2).

³¹ A. Dugin’s speech at Radio Sputnik on June 11, 2025. Available at: <https://radiosputnik.ru/20250611/dugin-1978615534.html?ysclid=mc0aom4ief908940539>

³² Other, most important management decisions in this area include:

- ✓ Presidential Decree 809, dated November 09, 2022 “On approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” (the decree lists traditional spiritual and moral values);
- ✓ Presidential Decree 35, dated January 25, 2023 “On amendments to the fundamentals of state cultural policy, approved by Presidential Decree 808, dated December 24, 2014” (the concept of “cultural sovereignty” is enshrined in the legislation);
- ✓ Presidential Decree 229, dated March 31, 2023 “On approval of the concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation” (Russia is proclaimed a “civilization state”);
- ✓ Presidential Decree 314, dated May 08, 2024 “On Approval of the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of historical education” (a unified methodology for teaching history is being created, starting from kindergartens and ending with universities).

³³ Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on June 10, 2025. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77160>

³⁴ Rodin I. Putin demands legislative protection of traditional values. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2025-06-10/3_9271_security.html?ysclid=mbtfbda54q867917249

³⁵ Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on June 10, 2025. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77160>

³⁶ Ibidem.

The monitoring of regulatory legal acts (laws, decrees) signed by the RF President in the period from April 21 to June 21, 2025³⁷

MEASURES TO SUPPORT SMO PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, TO DEVELOP THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, MEASURES RELATED TO MOBILIZATION, ORGANIZATION OF MARTIAL LAW, INCREASE IN THE ANTI-TERRORIST PROTECTION OF FACILITIES

April 21 – Federal Law 99 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”. The law is aimed at improving measures to ensure the safety of protected facilities in order to protect against threats associated with the use of unmanned vehicles. State authorities, organizations and persons authorized by law to prevent the presence of unmanned aircraft in the airspace are allowed to place and use facilities, installations and devices designed for such suppression in the appropriate subzone of the airfield territory of the airport. In addition, the law unifies the provisions on the responsibility of private security guards, departmental security personnel and transport security units for their use of physical force, special means or firearms in excess of their powers, extreme necessity or necessary defense.

April 21 – Federal Law 102 “On Amendments to Article 2056 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation”. The law is aimed at improving the effectiveness of the system for detecting, preventing and suppressing criminal activities carried out in order to undermine the foundations of the constitutional order, the country’s defense capability and State security. In this regard, criminal liability is established for failure to report to the authorities authorized to consider reports of a crime about a person(s) who, according to reliably known information, is preparing, committing or has committed at least one of the crimes related to sabotage activities.

May 8 – Decree 300 “On additional social guarantees for family members of military personnel, employees of some federal government agencies and citizens staying in volunteer formations”. Family members of military personnel, employees of some law enforcement agencies and citizens staying in volunteer formations have been granted the right to receive free admission to a sanatorium-resort organization to which these persons are sent for medical rehabilitation after treatment due to injury (wounds, injuries, concussions) or illness while performing tasks during the special military operation. Accompanying family members of these categories of citizens also receive the right to free travel to a medical (sanatorium) organization.

May 23 – Federal Law 103 “On Amendments to Article 71 of the Federal Law on Education in the Russian Federation”. Special rights are granted to children of military personnel, employees of federal executive authorities and federal government bodies in which military service is provided by federal law, employees of internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation, employees of the penal enforcement system when applying for bachelor’s and specialist degree programs at the expense of budget allocations from the federal budget, budgets of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local budgets of the Russian Federation, who participated in military operations on the territory of the Russian Federation in accordance with the decisions of the state authorities of the Russian Federation.

May 23 – Federal Law 113 “On Amendments to Article 56 of the Law of the Russian Federation ‘On Pension Provision for Persons who have completed Military Service, Service in Internal Affairs Bodies, the State Fire Service, Bodies for the Control of Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Institutions and Bodies of the Penal system, the troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation, the enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation, and their families’”. The law is aimed at reducing the time of payments to pensioners and their family members by improving the procedure for executing the federal budget through the use of treasury technologies (a mechanism for direct payments by Federal Treasury bodies through the Mir national payment system to pensioners’ bank cards).

³⁷ The insert is a continuation of the monitoring of the most important regulatory legal acts signed by the President of the Russian Federation, which we have been conducting since June 2022 (the first issue of the monitoring is presented in the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). A difficult road after the Rubicon. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(3), 9–41).

**MEASURES TO PROTECT INFORMATION SECURITY, REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS,
AND UPBRING AND EDUCATE THE YOUNGER GENERATIONS**

April 21 – Federal Law 89 “On Amendments to Article 4 of the Federal Law on Control over the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence”. The list of activities, the implementation of which is one of the elements of the status of a foreign agent, is being supplemented. In particular, a person who has received support and (or) is under foreign influence in other forms may be recognized as a foreign agent if such a person assists in the execution of decisions of international organizations in which the Russian Federation does not participate, or foreign government agencies if they are directed against the security of the Russian Federation, in the case of the involvement of minors in the activities provided for by the provisions of the Federal Law “On Control over the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence”, and in the case of financing all the listed activities.

April 21 – Federal Law 90 “On Amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Article 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation”. It provides for increased criminal liability for discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for mercenary motives or for hire, calls for the introduction or extension of sanctions against the Russian Federation and assistance in the implementation of decisions of international organizations in which the Russian Federation does not participate, or foreign government agencies on the criminal prosecution of officials of public authorities of the Russian Federation and others. persons for purposes contrary to the interests of the Russian Federation. Property obtained as a result of the commission of such crimes, as well as used or intended for their financing, will be subject to confiscation on the basis of a guilty verdict.

April 21 – Federal Law 100 “On Amendments to the Federal Law ‘On Education in the Russian Federation’ and Articles 9 and 11 of the Federal Law ‘On Control over the Activities of Persons under Foreign Influence’”. A number of measures are being established aimed at further improving the mechanism for monitoring the activities of persons under foreign influence. In particular, it provides that a foreign agent is not entitled to carry out teaching activities in state and municipal educational organizations and (or) educational activities in relation to both minors and adults. In addition, foreign agents are prohibited from entering the governing bodies of State corporations. It also stipulates that a non-profit organization that is a foreign agent cannot be included in the register of socially oriented non-profit organizations.; It provides for the inadmissibility of providing municipal financial and other property support to a foreign agent, including in the implementation of his creative activities.

April 21 – Federal Law 101 “On Amendments to Article 247 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation”. It is established that criminal proceedings can be conducted in cases of certain minor and moderate crimes in the absence of the defendant, if such acts are aimed at undermining the foundations of the constitutional order, the country's defense capability and the security of the Russian Federation, and the defendant is outside the territory of the Russian Federation and (or) evades court appearance.

May 19 – Decree 335 “On State Monitoring of Harm Caused to the Russian Federation, Subjects of the Russian Federation, the Federal Territory of Sirius, Municipalities, Individuals and Organizations by Foreign Sources”. The Prosecutor's office is responsible for state monitoring of harm caused by foreign sources. We are talking about the harm caused to Russia, its subjects and municipalities, to the life, health and property of individuals, to the property of organizations (except damage from sanctions in the financial sphere) by unfriendly states and territories and persons acting in their interests.

End of Insert 2

MEASURES TO PROVIDE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL POPULATION, STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, INCLUDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

May 23 – Federal Law 105 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation”. A multi-level system is being established to counteract the legalization (laundering) of proceeds from crime, the financing of terrorism, extremist activities and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction when individuals and legal entities carry out operations with digital rubles on the digital ruble platform. The main responsibilities for countering these criminal acts are assigned to the operator of this platform (the Bank of Russia).

June 7 – Federal Law 131 “On Amendments to the Federal Law “On Additional Measures of State Support for Families with Children”. Registration of persons entitled to maternity capital will now be conducted in GIS “Unified centralized digital platform in the social sphere”. The deadline for reviewing an application for the disposal of maternity capital's funds has been reduced from 10 to 5 working days, the deadline for the authorized body to consider requests from the SFR and send responses to it from 5 working days to 48 hours, and the deadline for the Fund to make a decision in case of non-receipt of the requested materials from 20 to 12 days. The right to the parent capital will be transferred to the legal successors (the father or the children themselves) in a proactive (undeclared) manner in the event that the certificate holder ceases to have such a right due to death, deprivation of parental rights, restriction in them and in other cases. Previously, this approach was used only for the initial provision of maternity capital.

However, all these efforts are largely designed for the future, and in the present, experts are paying attention to the growing disagreements and contradictions in the ruling elites.

“The economic differences between the government and the Central Bank manifested themselves like never before, in 2025 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). At the same time, both the leadership of the Central Bank and the ministers relied on their theses that clearly contradict the facts of the current economic reality. Head of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina stated the need to create a new economic model in Russia, which the ministers loudly objected to. In addition, the ministers suggested that the Central Bank reassess its faith in the 4% annual inflation targets...

There were also contradictory assessments of the current situation in the Russian economy at the SPIEF. “In terms of numbers, we have cooling. **But for us, all our figures are a rearview mirror.** According to the current business sentiment, we already seem to be on the verge of going into recession”, the head of the Ministry of Economic Development said. However, the head of the Central Bank claims that the economy is “cooling down”...

Observers may also have questions about the arguments of the participants in the discussion. **Thus, Nabiullina claims that in the Russian Federation “the production capacities and the capital reserve of the banking system are really exhausted”.** But what kind of exhaustion of production capacity can we talk about if factories are shutting down in the country, production is declining and the number of facilities starting construction is falling? What kind of exhaustion of the “capital of the banking system” can we talk about if lending is restrained manually due to the so-called macroprudential prohibitions?

Siluanov’s claims that “Russia is growing by 4% plus” also raise questions. The planned GDP growth rate this year is 2.5%. The current GDP growth is about 1.4%. According to the Central Bank’s forecast, GDP growth in the last quarter of 2025 could reach zero percent”³⁸.

And in this regard, there are more and more calls for the head of state to amend Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which bans official state ideology. Moreover, we should note that these calls were made even before the start of

the SMO, and they come not only from reputable experts, but also from representatives of the public administration system (including the Presidential administration).

³⁸ Sergeev M. Fundamental differences between the government and the Central Bank surfaced at SPIEF 2025. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2025-06-19/4_9276_inflation.html

For example:

1. May 12, 2021 – I. Volynets (Commissioner for Children’s Rights in Tatarstan) on the shooting at the Kazan school on May 11, 2021: “The main reason for what happened is the absolute absence of state ideology in the country”³⁹.

2. May 16, 2021 – A. Sergeev (President of the Russian Academy of Sciences): “Serious problems remain in school education in Russia, and one of them is the lack of ideology”⁴⁰.

3. June 20, 2022 – S. Novikov (head of the presidential office for ensuring the activities of the State Council), at a meeting with classroom teachers, urged “not to be shy about the word ‘ideology’”, which Russia was urged to abandon in the post-Soviet period: “Now it is clear that it was a technique. We were told that your country should not have an ideology. And as a result, we got a whole generation completely de-ideologized, which drew these ideological attitudes from other parts of the world. As a result, we have people who are ideologically lost”⁴¹.

4. May 11, 2023 – K. Chuychenko (head of the Ministry of Justice): “Of course, we will have to resolve the issue with the article of the Constitution, which states that we have neither a state nor a mandatory ideology (Part 2 of Article 13 of the Basic Law of Russia)... in principle, no country in the world has such provisions in its Constitution. Only Russia at one time, on the advice of our so-called partners, assumed these increased obligations”⁴².

5. November 22, 2023 – Aleksandr Bastrykin (head of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation): “It is necessary to formulate the state ideology and goals of Russian society and consolidate them in the Basic Law of the country... Of course, it should be a slow job. But to go... along the path of defining the prospects for our development without enshrining these prospects in the Constitution.... I think it is necessary.... You can’t just dismiss it”⁴³.

6. June 7, 2024 – S. Karaganov (Doctor of Sciences (History), political scientist, economist, public figure): “... a great state cannot exist without a national ideology, without a great idea. States that lost their national idea and national ideology inevitably collapsed. The world is littered with the graves or shadows of such states... Why are we afraid to introduce a unified state ideology, mandatory for all those who want and are ready to serve the state and society...?”⁴⁴

“The lack of ideology”, as many analysts point out, “is very beneficial for some segments of society”⁴⁵. Perhaps that is why, in part, the issue of introducing new amendments to the text of the Basic Law is blocked at the discussion level.

³⁹ The Ombudsman spoke about the relationship of the Kazan shooter with his parents. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfrenews/609b074f9a79475e7a15e176>

⁴⁰ The President of the Russian Academy of Sciences called the lack of ideology a problem of schools. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/society/16/05/2021/60a0ed049a794785b8cf4647?from=article_body

⁴¹ Vinokurov A. Ideological pricing. Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5422483>

⁴² The head of the Ministry of Justice called for resolving the issue of the ban on state ideology in the Constitution. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/11/05/2023/645ce8869a7947ffdeaed6a3>

⁴³ Bastrykin called for the state ideology to be written in the Constitution. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/22/11/2023/655db8f39a7947609f6e6b9e?ysclid=mbw9ft2qx5125649289>

⁴⁴ The plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 7, 2024. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74234>

⁴⁵ Prosfor O. The battle for ideals: our right to win. Available at: https://rusvesna.su/news/1649873378?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fden.ru%2Fnews%2Fby%2Fstory%2Fc5d833a4-0bae-5f17-8795-65c9402041e9

1. *D. Ayatskov: “The elites cannot abandon the liberal ideology, because only manipulations with so-called liberal values ensure their position in power and the preservation of acquired property.... As long as there is a possibility of redistributing the remnants of property between different clans within the elites ... the sustainability of the political course toward national revival is questionable”*⁴⁶.

2. State Duma deputy speaker Pyotr Tolstoy said that the amendments made to the Basic Law in 2020, in his opinion, are unlikely to be the last. The deputy suggests taking into account “the circumstances in which our current Constitution was written”. Tolstoy believes that the new changes may be “much more significant than those that we discussed five years ago”.

Some have raised objections to what the deputy speaker said. Senator Andrei Klishas said that he respects colleague Tolstoy, but urges him to “live under the current version of the Constitution”. Deputy Pavel Krashenninikov agreed with Klishas: in his opinion, the Basic Law meets the realities of the time and is “written well enough”... Dmitry Peskov, press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation, also had to react to Tolstoy’s words. He stated that new amendments “were not on the agenda”⁴⁷.

N.S. Mikhalkov, a well-known Russian film director and public figure, showed in his speech at the plenary session of the State Duma on June 17, 2025, how initiatives aimed at strengthening the country’s cultural sovereignty are blocked “effectively” and unnoticeably on the sidelines of the government.

**Excerpt from N.S. Mikhalkov’s speech
at the plenary session of the State Duma on June 17, 2025:**

“I want to give you one example. Here’s just an example. My fellow filmmakers have urged me to ask the President for quotas for American cinema in defense of our cinema....

What was in this letter that I wrote at the suggestion of my comrades? The letter proposed quotas for Hollywood movies. The entrance fee for reviewing the submitted film in Russia costs 5 million rubles, and 10% of the rental goes to refinance the national cinema. In addition, it was proposed to organize the principle of a “single window” for entry into the Russian film distribution market, created by Presidential Decree 378, dated June 28, 2021. In addition, in order to avoid the penetration of unnecessary content onto the screens through insignificant private film distribution companies, such companies as Gazprom Media Holding and the National Media Group, controlled to some extent, to varying degrees by the state, should be identified as the largest film distributors. Why? Because the market share of these two companies was 47.2% by the end of 2024.

This letter was written on March 1, 2025. It received the following resolution: “Please support the idea. We need to take measures to protect the market in advance, even before competitors start returning. Work it out and report back”. This is written to Vladimir Medinsky.

⁴⁶ Ayatskov D. Consciousness of the elites. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/soznatel_nost_elit

⁴⁷ On the possibility of new constitutional amendments. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2025-05-21/2_9257_red.html?ysclid=mbwd33q7m0765063660

What happens next? A day later, this letter ends up on Medinsky's desk. A week after any meetings, a document is prepared. The Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Culture approve this document, this idea, and it is sent to the Government, to the structures in charge of culture. What happens next? Then this document is sent to eight different organizations for consultation. But the most interesting and most important thing is that this document is being sent without the first page of my letter, which contains the President's resolution. And this document ceases to be supported by the President. It becomes a private initiative of some people due to the fact that “some movie”, “something like that”. Why? What for? This resolution says: “I ask you to do it faster, before the competitors come”. Today is June 17th. And it just kind of hung like that...

It is wrong to deprive this idea of the President's support that has already been received. But this is wrong. That is, **for anyone who received this paper, it is insignificant, because they do not know that it is supported by the President**”⁴⁸.

As the experts emphasized, it is very important that people like N.S. Mikhalkov, who “*was not afraid to tell the truth to the deputies of the State Duma*”⁴⁹, they have the opportunity to speak in Parliament. But the fact remains that the above example clearly demonstrates a situation where the motives of “personal gain” turn a “correct understanding of strategic prospects” into an “imitation”, which hinders the course of national development toward strengthening sovereignty.

The above examples and facts allow us to agree with the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation G.A. Zyuganov that neoliberalism in the public administration system “*continues to creep out of all cracks*”, leading to hidden crises in the party of power and hidden socio-political tension in society. And this situation has a long history, going back to the era of the 1990s.

O. Belikov: “The well-known director Nikita Mikhalkov **was not afraid to tell the truth to the deputies of the State Duma**, raising hot topics, starting with the thievish privatization of the 1990s and ending with the extinction of Russians, abortions, and the return of the death penalty. He drew the attention of the people's deputies to the fact that **the fighters who returned with a Victory will start asking questions – and it's better if we have the necessary answers**”⁵⁰.

S. Mikheev: “Nikita Mikhalkov addressed the deputies in the State Duma. It was a conversation between a respected person and other respected people **who somehow look at life differently**...”

Mikhalkov spoke to the deputies: “Why don't you do it? Don't you see or don't you notice?”... **It's good that he was allowed to make such a speech in the State Duma. The answer to Mikhalkov's question is simple: when there is nothing in the soul, when there is no true faith and conviction in the truth, then two factors remain. The first: personal gain; the second: the command “from above”.** This is a question of imitation and proper understanding of strategic perspectives”⁵¹.

⁴⁸ N.S. Mikhalkov's speech at the plenary session of the State Duma on June 17, 2025. Available at: <http://duma.gov.ru/news/61632>

⁴⁹ Nikita Mikhalkov was not afraid to tell the truth to the deputies. SMO fighters supported him from the trenches (opinion of the military observer of Tsargrad O. Belikov). Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/dzen/nikita-mihalkov-ne-po-bojalsja-skazat-pravdu-deputatam-bojcy-svo-podderzhali-iz-okopov_1290256

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

⁵¹ Mikheev S. About Mikhalkov's speech in the State Duma. Available at: <https://dzen.ru/a/aFRipUrW1FyULBB9?ysclid=mcd4ebn11o955672720>

Excerpt from the report of Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation G.A. Zyuganov on June 18, 2025:

“Socio-political tension is largely hidden from view. It is hidden like an electrical wire under a protective coating. But the load is increasing, and the control mechanisms are wearing out...

The crisis of the ruling party is not obvious to many. But it is hard not to see it, being vigilant. Then the demagogic approach to state affairs will become visible. And the unpredictability of the results in the implementation of many initiatives. And the outright destruction of the electoral system. The unhealthiness of the situation is manifested in the clash of oligarchic groups, in the discrepancy between the patriotic and comprador “towers”. It is clearly visible in the scale of corruption, in the cynicism of officials who express the interests not of the country and the people, but of large financial and industrial groups. **All of this has the potential of enormous destructive power, and it is becoming a national threat. This is the reality behind the facade of imaginary “solidity”...**

The criminal acts of the Yeltsin-Chubais-Gaidar comprador clique were inspired by this ideology [neoliberalism]. It is still used today by her cynical outspokenness. Neoliberalism continues to creep out of all cracks. It makes itself felt in calls for new privatization, in the mocking rate of the Central Bank, in our cultural and educational losses. All this is a continuation of a long-standing dispute in Russian history”⁵².

Indeed, those representatives of the ruling elites who pose an immediate threat to national security do not appear out of nowhere. **It is a “product” of society and social development “originally from the 1990s”. And if they continue to exist today, it means that appropriate favorable conditions have been created for this in the public administration system and in the country as a whole.**

In this context, we should recall that the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 (in which Article 13 on the prohibition of ideology first appeared) was developed and adopted in very special conditions for the country – after the collapse of the USSR, which symbolized the end of the Cold war, the disappearance of Soviet communist ideology, and the establishment of a new era of a unipolar world with a dominant position of the winner, the United States of America.

The adoption of the first RF Constitution cannot be considered outside the context of these global geopolitical changes, since the Basic Law of the

Russian Federation, in fact, has become **one of the tools for the Americans to implement the “soft power” method**, applied in order to prevent the global “red project” from ever returning to the world stage.

An excerpt from the book *Autopsy on an Empire* by J. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR: *“If we were to attribute the collapse of communist rule in the Soviet Union to one person, we would have to name Mikhail Gorbachev. ... However, the script was written in Washington”*⁵³.

It is no coincidence that there is currently a lot of evidence that Americans (or rather, specialists from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)) were directly involved in the preparation of the text of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993...

⁵² Political report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 19th Party Congress. Report by Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation G.A. Zyuganov on June 18, 2025. Available at: <https://kprf.ru/party-live/cknews/235430.html>

⁵³ Goncharov A. Anatomy of treason. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/anatomiya_izmeni?ysclid=mbyuflue7m673551914

1. “USAID-funded executors helped develop the Russian Constitution, Part I of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and the Russian Tax Code”⁵⁴.

2. “The basic code of laws of Russia was created in 1993 at a difficult time for the country. It is founded on the constitutions of other Western countries, which is the norm for new, developing countries. The consultants were foreign experts and companies”⁵⁵.

3. “In the volumes of the official transcripts of the working group on writing the Constitution, there is not a single mention of Americans and their participation in writing it.... However, there is a large section on the foundation’s website: “USAID in Russia”. We are now talking about “past achievements”. So there we quite openly read: “The USAID-funded Rule of Law implementers helped draft the Russian Constitution, Part I of the Russian Civil Code, and the Russian Tax Code”. “USAID funded the observance of legality in the work of the executors involved in the drafting of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Part I of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, as well as the Tax Code of the Russian Federation”⁵⁶.

Article 13 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stated that *“in the Russian Federation ideological diversity shall be recognized. No ideology may be established as state or obligatory one”*. However, according to experts, the allegations about the absence of an official state ideology in the country **have always been and are “crafty”**,

since ideology is **“an indispensable attribute of the existence of the state as a form of life of a political nation”**. Therefore, the constitutional ban on state ideology, established in Russia in 1993 (no matter how correct and convincing the motives were), in fact meant **“a ban on the revision of the ideological postulates of liberalism” or, in other words, the consolidation of the ideology of liberalism in latent form in the Basic Law of the country**.

I.V. Radikov (Doctor of Sciences (Politics), Professor, St. Petersburg State University): “... the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Article 13), consolidated the course toward de-ideologization: it proclaims that no ideology can be established as state or mandatory... At the same time, the presence of ideology as a system of socially significant ideas and values, both in official **and latent formalization, is an indispensable attribute of the existence of the state as a form of life of a political nation**; therefore, statements about the absence of a state ideology **have always been and still are very crafty...**”

Obsessed with the idea of rapidly entering the Western world, the authors of the Russian Constitution, by including in it a ban on the establishment of a generally binding and state ideology as a political and philosophical doctrine, actually allowed the values of liberal ideology to be introduced into the structure of the Constitution as generally binding, ignoring other ideological guidelines... **As a result, the “new”, “hidden” ideology becomes a real, state ideology without being called official**”⁵⁷.

⁵⁴ Being “more American” than the Americans themselves: Russia’s subordination to the West in the Constitution was invented by Yeltsin’s “demographic franchise” (political scientist M. Sinelnikov-Orishak). Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/news/amerikanistee-samih-amerikancev-podchinenie-rossii-zapadu-v-konstitucii-pridumala-elcinskaja-demshiza-politolog_239442

⁵⁵ The Constitution of the Russian Federation was written under foreign influence. Available at: <https://kpfu.ru/isfnmk/struktura/otdeleniya/massovyh-kommunikacij/faktcheking/konstituciya-rf-napisana-pod-inostrannym.html>

⁵⁶ Starikov N. How Russia was “helped” to write the Constitution. Available at: <https://nstarikov.ru/kak-rossii-pomogali-pisat-konstit-35328>

⁵⁷ Radikov I.V. (2019). The search for ideological orientation in post-Soviet Russia. Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki, 1(834), p. 56.

Moreover, we should emphasize that this “latent” ideology of liberalism was adopted by the elites (political, economic, cultural), but was never accepted by the broad strata of Russian society.

*“The **latent ideology** adopted by the reformist “elite”, which ignores Russian traditional values and morals and **is based on the recognition of the idea of consumerism and money as the leading values in the lives of people**, measures and things of an individual, **the understanding of benefit as the only driving force of social development**, has spread rapidly among the vast majority of officials and entrepreneurs. It was received with approval by a significant part of show business... In fact, the constitutional ban on state ideology means a **ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism**”⁵⁸.*

This is evidenced, for example, by the significantly more convincing support by Russian voters for patriotic and state-oriented amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 2020, compared with the results of the all-Russian referendum in 1993: on December 12, 1993, 32 million voters voted for the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and on July 1, 2020, 57 million voted for its amendment (*Tab. 1*).

In addition, the fact that liberal ideology, by and large, has never met the needs of the population and has never become part of the Russian “cultural code” is evidenced by the fact that throughout virtually the entire post-Soviet period in Russia, attempts were repeatedly made to formulate the foundations of state ideology, and not only by experts and public figures⁵⁹, but also by representatives of the public administration system⁶⁰.

Table 1. Main results of the all-Russian referendums on the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation on December 12, 1993 and amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation on July 1, 2020

Indicator	% of voters			In absolute terms (people)		
	December 12, 1993	July 1, 2020	Dynamics (+/-)	December 12, 1993	July 1, 2020	Dynamics (+/-)
For	58.43	77.92	+19.49	32937630	57747288	+24809658
Against	41.57	21.27	-20.30	23431333	15761978	-7669355
Turnout	54.80	67.97	+13.17	58187755	74215555	+16027800
Total number of voters	100	102.84	+2.84	106170835	109190337	+3019502

Source: database of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

⁵⁸ Radikov I.V. (2019). The search for ideological orientation in post-Soviet Russia. *Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki*, 1(834), p. 56.

⁵⁹ For example:

1. Sulakshin S. (2009). The national idea of Russia. Actions program (problem definition). *Kontury global'nykh transformatsii: politika, ekonomika, pravo*, 5.

2. Stepanov A.D. The ideology of Development is impossible without reliance on Tradition. Available at: https://ruskline.ru/analitika/2013/10/16/ideologiya_razvitiya_nevozmozhna_bez_opory_na_tradiciyu/

3. Prokhanov A., Averyanov V., Maslin M. et al. The project “Worldview of Russian civilization” (first presented on December 9, 2023 at the conference of the Izborsk Club at St. Petersburg State University).

4. Dugin A.G. Fundamentals of Russian Ideology. Available at: <https://dzen.ru/a/ZYxP6OEygRpWSRX3?ysclid=mbq6cbnbux502947199>

5. Delyagin M. New Russian ideology. Available at: <https://katehon.com/ru/article/novaya-russkaya-ideologiya>

⁶⁰ For example:

1. Surkov V.Y. The concept of sovereign democracy. Great Russian Encyclopedia. Available at: <https://bigenc.ru/c/suverennaia-demokratiia-c309a5?ysclid=mcd4kotetu819454802>

2. Kharichev A.D. (2025). The civilization of “Russia”. *Bloknot grazhdanskogo prosveshcheniya*, 7, March–April.

Nevertheless, all the proposed projects of ideology, in fact, remained and remain nothing more than projects: discussed, criticized, supported, **but having neither legal force nor the possibility of a large-scale impact on the life of society.** Therefore, the “latent” (as I.V. Radikov calls it) ideology of liberalism for more than three decades since the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993 continued to be the only ideology in Russia in the 1990s and in the 21st century.

And what was its essence? What was the basis of this instrument of “soft power” introduced by the Americans into the Russian Constitution with the aim of imperceptibly and covertly “enslaving” Russian society?

By and large, it was based on the scrapping of the system of moral principles of the “Soviet person” and their transformation into a “Service person”; in fact, a consumer deprived of any identity, self-awareness, passionate energy, and instead completely **dependent** on comfort and digital technologies created (and therefore, controlled) by global elites and multinational corporations.

As Vladimir Putin noted later (on November 7, 2024) during his speech at the Valdai Forum in Sochi, “it was a hidden, veiled intervention against our country”⁶¹. And, unfortunately, it must be admitted that this “intervention” turned out to be very successful...

The results of sociological research show exactly what changes took place in society during the period when it was (and continues to be) under the influence of the “latent” liberal ideology of the “consumer society”. For example, the data from

M.V. Kovalchuk: “The dream of the elites who rule the world has always been to bring out a certain subspecies of “service” people who would have limited self-awareness... Today, for the first time in the history of civilization, the technological possibility of breeding a “service” person has appeared...

What is needed for this? To do this, first it is necessary to fool you: simplify your system to the Unified State Exam of education so that you answer the tests ..., fool you to the maximum, then give you iPhones and provide satellite connection. And what then? That’s it! Any thing is the application of cognitive technologies for mass consciousness management. You can counteract this in a very simple way – a switch. Turn it off and nothing works ... **it is, in fact, like fascism, but you and I must understand that this is the ideology of the modern world, of our dear colleagues and partners.**

The most important thing is to break down the system of basic moral principles and introduce alternative norms of morality to universal human values. This is happening everywhere... You’ve broken the basic system and the person has already been removed... And then you do whatever you want with this... In fact, the technological basis for creating “service” people and ensuring their livelihoods is convergent technologies”⁶².

one of the most long-term monitoring conducted by Vologda Research Center: “The monitoring of labor potential quality”⁶³.

⁶¹ Plenary session of the XXI annual meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club on November 7, 2024. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75521>

⁶² Kaklyugin N.V. Mikhail Kovalchuk’s speech at the Army 2020 Forum, which went unnoticed at the top. Available at: https://ruskline.ru/opp/2022/10/31/neuslyshanno_v_verhah_vystuplenie_mihaila_kovalchuka_na_forume_armiya_2020?yclid=mbnddy5x2z432869895

⁶³ The study has been conducted since 1996 and thus covers the last presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996–1999) and all the presidential terms of Vladimir Putin (as well as the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev in 2007–2011). Most importantly, this study covers almost the entire period of Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The methodology of this study⁶⁴ helps, when analyzing “qualitative characteristics of labor resources”⁶⁵, to pay attention to a wide range of human properties and characteristics and to interpret the results obtained from the broadest positions: a person “**as a subject of public relations**” and only “**in particular**, social and labor relations”.

The results of the monitoring show that over the period from the mid-1990s to the present:

despite a significant increase in the level of trust in all state and public institutions (*Tab. 2*);

“The methodology integrates qualitative components of labor potential that characterize the energy capabilities of an employee (**health, intelligence**) and socio-communicative properties (**cultural and moral level, entrepreneurial and communicative abilities**) that distinguish a person **as a subject of social, in particular socio-labor, relations**”⁶⁶.

Table 2. Dynamics of the level of trust in state and public institutions, %

Institution	1996–1999*	2018–2024	Dynamics (+/-), p.p.	Institution	1996–1999*	2018–2024	Dynamics (+/-), p.p.
President	26.5	55.1	+29	Court	19.8	43.0	+23
Prosecutor's office	18.2	46.1	+28	Region's administration	14.2	37.7	+24
RF Government	18.5	45.1	+27	RF State Duma	14.8	32.4	+18
Police	14.1	44.4	+30	Mass media	15.4	30.9	+16
Army	34.2	43.3	+9	Political parties	6.8	23.0	+16
*The data for 1996 are presented. The survey was conducted in 1996 and annually since 2000. Source: VoIRC RAS data. Ranked according to the average annual data for 2018–2024.							

⁶⁴ More information about the methodology can be found in the monograph: Leonidova G.V., Rossoshanskaya E.A., Popov A.V. (2018). *Monitoring kachestva trudovogo potentsiala: 20 let issledovaniy* [Monitoring the Quality of Labor Potential: Twenty Years of Research]. Vologda: VoIRC RAS.

Brief description of the methodology:

From 1996 to 2018, the monitoring of the quality of labor potential was carried out annually (surveys were not conducted in 2010, 2013 and 2015), since 2018 – once every two years. Monitoring is carried out through a questionnaire survey of the working-age population. That is, when carrying out sociological measurements in the Vologda Region, the object of research, taking into account current legislation, is the population of the region aged 16 to 54 years for women and from 16 to 59 years for men. The surveys are conducted in the cities of Vologda and Cherepovets and in eight districts of the region: Babaevsky, Velikoustyugsky, Vozhegodsky, Gryazovetsky, Kirillovsky, Nikolsky, Tarnogsky and Sheksninsky. Total sample size is 1,500 people. Sampling method: zoning with proportional placement of observation units. Sample type: quota based on gender and age. Random sampling error does not exceed 3–4% with a confidence interval of 4–5%. When calculating the sample, the latest available data on the gender and age structure of the region's population are used.

The basic methodology for collecting data on the quality of labor potential used in the framework of monitoring is based on the concept of qualitative characteristics of the population formed by scientists at the Institute of Socio-Economic Studies of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the leadership of N.M. Rimashevskaya in the early 1990s.

⁶⁵ Ibidem.

⁶⁶ Leonidova G.V., Rossoshanskaya E.A., Popov A.V. (2018). *Monitoring kachestva trudovogo potentsiala: 20 let issledovaniy* [Monitoring the Quality of Labor Potential: Twenty Years of Research]. Vologda: VoIRC RAS. P. 9.

despite the fact that, according to self-assessments, the proportion of people who classify themselves as “poor and extremely poor” has significantly decreased, and their level of material security, on the contrary, has noticeably improved (*Tab. 3*);

and despite the fact that there have been radical positive changes in the dynamics of social mood (psychological well-being) during this period (*Figure*)...


...there are mainly negative trends in the dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people’s attitudes toward Creativity, Knowledge, and moral norms and principles. Moreover, this applies not only to people’s **attitudes** toward Creativity, Knowledge, and moral norms, but also to **specific forms of behavior and actions** that they perform in real everyday life.

Inserts 3–5 provide detailed empirical evidence to prove this thesis. Here, for example, we will cite only some, most convincing, monitoring results,

Table 3. Dynamics of self-assessments of living standards, %

Indicator of self-assessment of living standards	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dynamics (+/-), p.p.
Proportion of people subjectively classifying themselves as ...			
“Poor and extremely poor”	64.0	45.3	-19
“Rich and middle-income people”	27.6	43.5	+16
Manufactured goods that the “poor and extremely poor” people have (self-assessment)			
TV-set	36.0	56.8	+21
Vacuum cleaner	36.6	48.9	+12
Furniture	35.8	48.4	+13
Motor vehicle	8.2	21.7	+14

Source: VoIRC RAS data.



Dynamics of social mood, % of respondents

Source: VoIRC RAS data.

reflecting typical trends in public opinion on average presidential term) to 2018–2024 (Vladimir Putin's for the period from 1996 to 1999 (Boris Yeltsin's last fourth presidential term)⁶⁷:

Block 1. Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitude toward Knowledge and Education (*Insert 3*)

- ✓ proportion of people who believe that it is important to «have a good education» decreased by 22 percentage points (from 86 to 64%);
- ✓ proportion of people who agree that «one should make full use of one's learning abilities» decreased by 20 percentage points (from 87 to 67%);
- ✓ proportion of people who believe that «knowledge beautifies a person's life and makes them happier» decreased by 10 percentage points (from 77 to 67%);
- ✓ proportion of people who are interested in or read anything about the problems of «family, relations between a man and a woman» decreased by 15 percentage points (from 75 to 60%);
- ✓ proportion of those who are interested in the topic of «parenting and education of children» decreased by 13 percentage points (from 72 to 59%);
- ✓ proportion of people who are interested in the topic of «morality, morals, rules of human behavior in society» decreased by 12 percentage points – (from 68 to 56%); proportion of people who are interested in «the life of society, the state; history» also decreased by 12 percentage points (from 75 to 63%).

Block 2. Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitude toward Creativity (*Insert 4*)

- ✓ proportion of people who believe that the process of creating new things brings joy in everyday life decreased by 25 percentage points (from 63 to 38%);
- ✓ proportion of people who believe that «creative abilities should be fully realized» decreased by 18 percentage points (from 81 to 63%);
- ✓ proportion of those who believe that «creativity beautifies human life» decreased by 12 percentage points (from 75 to 63%);
- ✓ proportion of people who are positive about being the author of creative work decreased by 14 percentage points (from 64 to 50%);
- ✓ proportion of people who engage in creative activities in everyday life decreased by 6 percentage points (from 58 to 52%);
- ✓ proportion of people who believe that a creative person is distrusted by others has increased by 6 percentage points (from 14 to 20%).

Block 3. Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitude toward the norms of morality (*Insert 5*)

- ✓ importance of such qualities as “mutual assistance and mutual aid” decreased by 8 percentage points (from 86 to 78%), as well as “kind-heartedness toward others” (from 84 to 76%);
- ✓ proportion of people for whom «decency» is important decreased by 6 percentage points (from 91 to 85%);
- ✓ proportion of people who value «self-esteem» decreased by 5 percentage points (from 89 to 84%), «respect for other people's views» (from 83 to 78%), «respect for the team» (from 84 to 79%), «performance of official duties» (from 84 up to 79%).
- ✓ proportion of people experiencing remorse in the case they “break a promise” (from 74 to 58%) or “hurt someone” (from 82 to 66%) decreased by 16 percentage points;
- ✓ by 14 percentage points – in case they show «insufficient attention to parents» (from 61 to 47%);
- ✓ by 12 percentage points – in case they commit an «unfair act» (from 73 to 61%).

⁶⁷ The data are grouped into three main blocks, reflecting, respectively, the dynamics of people's attitude toward Knowledge (block 1), Creativity (block 2), moral norms and values (block 3).

Each block contains six research results that we consider most significant. Each block is divided into two parts:

The first part presents three results that reflect the changes that have taken place in the public consciousness (that is, in people's attitude toward Knowledge, Creativity, and moral norms);

The second part presents three more research results that reflect the changes that have occurred in people's behavior and actions over the same period.

All indicators are ranked within each block. The full research data is presented in Inserts 3–5.

Insert 3

Insert 3. Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitude toward Knowledge and Education

Table 3(A). "People have different attitudes toward book knowledge and learning in general. Some people are ready to study all their lives, and it gives them pleasure, others think differently... What is your opinion on this?" (proportion of people who agree with the listed statements; % of respondents)						Table 3(B). "From what sources do you get most of your knowledge about the areas of society, man, and nature listed in the table?" (proportion of those who "read and are interested" in various spheres of society; % of respondents)					
Statement	%			People		Topic	%			People	
	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics	1996–1999	2018–2024		1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics	1996–1999	2018–2024
Knowledge beautifies a person's life, makes them happier	77.1	67.6	-10	1157	1014	The life of society: internal politics, law, government, state structure, management, history, etc.	74.5	62.8	-12	1118	942
If you have the ability to learn, you need to use it fully	86.7	67.0	-20	1301	1005	Healthy lifestyle: nutrition, alcohol consumption, drugs, personal hygiene, etc.	71.4	60.9	-11	1071	914
It's better to have a good education than not to have one	86.7	64.4	-22	1301	966	Family: relationship between a man and a woman, sexual problems	75.2	59.8	-15	1128	897
If I could start my life over, I would do(a) do everything possible to get a good education	70.8	47.5	-23	1062	713	Parenting and education of children	71.5	59.0	-13	1073	885
Studying takes up too much time	53.7	45.5	-8	806	683	Structure of the human body (human physiology), health, diseases, etc.	72.4	58.3	-14	1086	875
You can get a good job in life without special knowledge, and be useful to people	47.9	40.4	-8	719	606	International politics and international relations	65.6	58.3	-7	984	875
Learning something new by reflecting on what you've read – what could be more enjoyable!	61.8	38.7	-23	927	581	Aesthetics and culture: painting, music, literature, architecture, cinema, theater, etc.	67.8	57.2	-11	1017	858
There are many more pleasant things in life than hitting books	24.9	30.7	+6	374	461	Relationships between people, in teams (psychology and social psychology)	63.5	56.8	-7	953	852
Others can't but wonder at a person who is always reading books. They call him/her a bookworm	22.7	24.6	+2	341	369	Economics: finance, budget, organization of labor and production, etc	61.6	56.0	-6	924	840
An educated person is distrusted by others – he/she is perceived as being a "smart alec"	17.6	20.7	+3	264	311	Morality, morality, religion, rules of human behavior in society	67.8	55.5	-12	1017	833
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes					8 / 0 / 2	TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes					11 / 0 / 1
For each of the listed statements, the respondent was asked to express the degree of his/her agreement or disagreement with it. Options: "I fully disagree", "I disagree", "It's hard to say", "I agree", "I fully agree".						The respondents were asked to assess the degree of interest in information on 12 topics from the sphere of society, man and nature. Table 3 (B) shows the proportion of respondents who chose the answer options "I read only what is found in newspapers, socio-political magazines, TV and radio, news on the Internet", "I read popular science literature, I read, if necessary, textbooks and encyclopedias (including online)" or "I regularly read specialized, scientific and other literature, communicate with specialists, etc. (including on the Internet)."					
Table 3 (A) shows the percentage of respondents who chose the answer option "I agree" or "I fully agree."											
The average annual data for the last presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996–1999) and the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2018–2024) are presented. Ranked in descending order according to the data for 2018–2024; 1,500 people of working age are interviewed in each round of the of monitoring.											

Insert 4

Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitude toward Creativity

Table 4(A). "People have different attitudes toward life. Some people endlessly compose and invent something, finding pleasure in it, others don't care. Below are a few judgments about creativity and creative people. Which of them reflect your point of view?" (proportion of those who agree with the listed statements, % of respondents)				
Statement	People			
	%	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dynamics
If you have creative abilities, you need to fully realize them		80.9	63.2	-18
Creativity beautifies a person's life, makes them happier		75.0	63.0	-12
Having your own works, cars, etc. is more pleasant than not having		63.8	49.5	-14
Coming up with something new is at least some joy and solace in our everyday lives		63.2	38.2	-25
There are many more pleasant things in life than puzzling over all sorts of problems		31.6	31.9	0
If I could start my life from the beginning, I would certainly get carried away with inventing and writing		18.5	29.7	+11
We've already thought of enough, we need to work, we need to get things done		24.9	26.2	+1
A creative person limits his life, loses a lot		20.5	23.1	+3
An inventor, a creative person, causes distrust of others		14.7	20.3	+6
A man who is always running around with their ideas, prevents others from living and working normally		17.5	20.3	+3
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes			8 / 1 / 1	8 / 1 / 1

The respondents were asked to rate the degree of agreement with 10 statements reflecting attitudes toward creativity and creative people.
For each of these statements, the respondent was asked to assess the degree of their agreement or disagreement with it. Options: "I fully disagree", "I disagree", "it's hard to say", "I agree", "I fully agree".
Table 4 (A) shows the percentage of respondents who chose the answer option "I agree" or "I fully agree".
Ranked in descending order according to 2018–2024 data.




Figure 4 (B). "To what extent do you currently engage in creative (innovation, inventive, etc.) activities? (% of respondents)"

* In 1996–1999, the proportion of those who noted that they tended to engage in creative activity was 21 percentage points higher than the proportion of people for whom creative activity was not typical. In 2018–2024, this gap decreased to 2 percentage points

** People who do not tend to engage in creative activity – answer option "I never do anything, I do what I was taught before, or what others tell me, what I can read in books, reference books."
People who tend to engage in creative activity – all the other combined answers ("I'm constantly inventing something, writing, composing, etc. – this is my lifestyle", "I invent something when I have a practical need to do something, but I don't know how, there are no ready-made solutions", "I invent, compose, etc., when I receive the appropriate assignment from my superiors").

The average annual data for the last presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996–1999) and the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2018–2024) are presented.
Ranked in descending order according to the data for 2018–2024; 1,500 people of working age are interviewed in each round of the of monitoring.

Dynamics of self-assessments reflecting people's attitudes toward moral norms

Table 5(A). "People evaluate different life phenomena in different ways. For some, one thing is important, for others – another... Which of the following is important to you and which is not?" (the proportion of those for whom the listed life phenomena are important; % of respondents)									
Value, trait	%				People				
	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics		1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics		
Justice	87.3	86.8	0		1310	1302	-8		
Respect for elders	84.6	86.2	+2		1269	1293	+24		
Honesty, truthfulness	88.4	85.2	-3		1326	1278	-48		
Decency	90.6	84.6	-6		1359	1269	-90		
Self-esteem	89.3	84.0	-5		1340	1260	-80		
Respect for the team	84.4	79.7	-5		1266	1196	-71		
Performance of official duties	84.0	79.1	-5		1260	1187	-74		
Mutual assistance and mutual assistance	86.2	78.0	-8		1293	1170	-123		
Tolerance, respect for the views and opinions of others	82.7	77.6	-5		1241	1164	-77		
Law enforcement, law-abiding conduct	76.0	77.3	+1		1140	1160	+20		
High professionalism	81.2	76.8	-4		1218	1152	-66		
Responsiveness, sensitivity to other people	84.0	76.0	-8		1260	1140	-120		
Show compassion, mercy	77.9	74.3	-4		1169	1115	-54		
Respect for other people's (private, state) property	72.5	73.7	+1		1088	1106	+18		
Equality between people	63.4	73.0	+10		951	1095	+144		
To be useful to society, to fulfill the duties of a citizen	68.5	72.2	+4		1028	1083	+56		
Respect for people of other ethnicities	59.4	68.7	+9		891	1031	+140		
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes				10 / 1 / 6	10 / 1 / 6				
The respondents were asked to assess the degree of importance of the listed 18 vital phenomena and human qualities for them. For each of the listed qualities, the respondent was asked to assess their importance. The options are: "Not important at all", "More or less important", "Quite important", "Very important".									
Table 5 (A) shows the percentage of respondents who chose the option "Very important" or "Quite important".									

Table 5(B). "Have you ever felt guilt or remorse in the cases listed below?" (proportion of those who feel remorse; % of respondents)									
Deed	%				People				
	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics		1996–1999	2018–2024	Dyna- mics		
Unwittingly (or consciously) you have offended another, were rude	81.6	65.8	-16		1224	987	-237		
Involuntary or conscious deception of someone in something	70.3	62.0	-8		1055	930	-125		
Under the pressure of circumstances or out of good will, you have committed an injustice	72.8	60.5	-12		1092	908	-185		
Poor performance of official duties for any reason	69.5	58.4	-11		1043	876	-167		
An unfulfilled promise made to someone	73.9	58.2	-16		1109	873	-236		
Refusal to help someone in a critical situation for any reason.	55.0	58.1	+3		825	872	+47		
Unintentionally (or knowingly) caused damage to other people's property, breaking something, etc.	61.1	56.3	-5		917	845	-72		
Unintentionally (or knowingly) inflicted damage to state property	42.3	50.0	+8		635	750	+116		
Insufficient attention to parents (mother, father)	61.5	47.2	-14		923	708	-215		
Bad attitude toward children (one's own or others')	42.6	32.8	-10		639	492	-147		
Cheating on your wife, husband, boyfriend, girlfriend	36.2	28.8	-7		543	432	-111		
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes				9 / 0 / 2	9 / 0 / 2				
The respondents were asked to evaluate their moral experiences in various life situations. For each of the listed situations, the respondent was asked to assess his/her attitude toward them. Options: "I can't blame myself for this, there was no case", "There is no remorse", "I worry, but everything passes quickly", "I worry a lot". Table 5 (B) shows the proportion of respondents who chose the option "I worry a lot" or "I worry, but everything passes quickly".									

The average annual data for the last presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996–1999) and the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2018–2024) are presented. Ranked in descending order according to the data for 2018–2024; 1,500 people of working age are interviewed in each round of the of monitoring.

The presented empirical data clearly demonstrate the negative trends that have developed and continue to develop in Russian society under the conditions of the “latent” liberal ideology of the “consumer society”: **it can be said that since the mid-1990s, the process of intellectual, creative and moral decline has been going on at the systemic level.**

And this process, stretched over time, went almost unnoticed, since it did not actually affect people’s self-assessment of their external condition; how they look, communicate in a team, express their thoughts, organize recreation, etc. Thus, with the identified negative trends in the dynamics of intellectual, creative and moral level, during the

period under review there has been an increase in the proportion of those who are characterized by the ability to:

✓ “speak well, express one’s thoughts beautifully” (by 19 percentage points, from 33 to 52%);

✓ “look good” (by 15 percentage points, from 44 to 59%);

✓ “engage in a conversation” (by 13 percentage points, from 50% to 63%);

✓ “express one’s thoughts competently on paper” (by 13 percentage points, from 41 to 54%);

✓ “organize one’s leisure time” (by 10 percentage points, from 49 to 59%), etc. (Tab. 4).

Table 4. Proportion of those who possess certain positive qualities of existence and interaction in society, % of respondents

Characteristics of human interaction in society	%			People		
	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dynamics	1996–1999	2018–2024	Dynamics
Politeness, courtesy, good manners, knowledge of etiquette (how to behave at a table, at a party, in a theater, at a banquet, etc.)	55,1	69,3	+14	827	1040	+213
Friendliness	72,3	68,9	-3	1085	1034	-51
Ability to do your job well	64,5	66,1	+2	968	992	+24
Ability to keep up a conversation in any company	49,9	63,3	+13	749	950	+201
Ability to listen to the interlocutor, to understand the meaning of his/her statements	62,8	61,7	-1	942	926	-17
Ability to behave oneself in society, company	48,2	61,4	+13	723	921	+198
Tact, ability not to hurt other people's self-esteem	60,4	61,4	+1	906	921	+15
Ability to organize one's own leisure time, rest	49,2	59,4	+10	738	891	+153
Ability to always look good	43,5	58,7	+15	653	881	+228
Ability to maintain one's own health	36,9	58,2	+21	554	873	+320
Ability to compromise with other people, to give in	44,3	58,0	+14	665	870	+206
Ability to dress with taste	41,9	57,8	+16	629	867	+239
Ability to restrain oneself in any critical situation, “not to lose face”	42,8	57,1	+14	642	857	+215
Ability to express your thoughts competently and well on paper	41,2	54,7	+13	618	821	+203
Ability to convince others that you are right	44,4	53,6	+9	666	804	+138
Extensive knowledge, erudition	31,5	53,1	+22	473	797	+324
The ability to speak well, express your thoughts beautifully	32,8	51,9	+19	492	779	+287
TOTAL: Total number of negative changes / no changes / positive changes			2 / 0 / 15		2 / 0 / 15	
The average annual data for the last presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996–1999) and the fourth presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2018–2024) are presented.						
Ranked in descending order according to the data for 2018–2024; 1,500 people of working age are interviewed in each round of the of monitoring.						
The question was asked in tabular form. Wording of the question: «Not all people have the same qualities, it is natural and normal. The various qualities of a person are listed below. Which of them are characteristic of you and to what extent?»						
The respondents were asked to give a self-assessment of the manifestation of each of the 17 listed qualities (either “Little, not enough”, or “Generally enough”, or “Sufficiently”, or “Fully”).						
The table shows the combined options: “Sufficiently”, “Fully”.						

We should note that the results of the study conducted on the territory of the Vologda Region reflect the picture typical for many regions of Russia. For example, experts from the Institute of Sociology – Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IS FCTAS RAS) based on sociological research conducted in 2003–2020 in Moscow, Pskov, Omsk, Smolensk, Saratov, Bryansk, Kirov, Vladimir, came to the conclusion that there is an *“emerging tendency to blur ideas about qualities-virtues and moral qualities”*, which *“may lead society in the opposite direction from traditional spiritual and moral values”*.

Thus, the negative trends in the dynamics of people’s attitudes toward knowledge, creativity, education, and a decrease in the importance of moral standards identified in the Vologda Region are quite typical and in themselves pose a threat to national security, since *“the ability of the state to*

*“The level of the spiritual and intellectual potential of the people, the level of their spiritual forces and the ability to solve strategic tasks of state building directly depends on how much the cultural basis of their development and cultural continuity is preserved. **The ability of the state to maintain continuity in state building directly depends on this**”*⁶⁸.

maintain continuity in state-building” largely depends on this.

And it is quite natural that such trends in society as a whole could not contribute to the “recovery” of its elite part. Rather, on the contrary, they consolidated in it the key tenets of liberal ideology – *“the ideas of consumerism and money as the leading values in life... the understanding of profit as the only driving force of social development”*⁶⁹.

*“... In general, the direction of the dynamics indicates an **emerging tendency to blur ideas about virtue qualities and negative moral qualities**, as a norm and a departure from it. **This negative trend requires attention. It seems that with the further weakening of religious feeling, such a dynamic of moral meanings can lead society in the opposite direction from traditional spiritual and moral values...***

The results of the analysis show that ***the semantic guidelines bear the stamp of a somewhat distorted understanding of the main moral meanings of human life, the spread of which has not been suspended...*** there is a sharply negative trend – *“... literally a collapse of the qualities traditionally inherent, and perhaps (judging by these data) attributed to Russians – **benevolence, cordiality, sincerity, selflessness. The weakening of such qualities was noted by 59–61% of respondents.*** At the same time, according to the overwhelming number of respondents, there was an ***increase in aggression and an increase in cynicism.*** Although it should be noted that there is a slowdown in such trends in the mass consciousness”⁷⁰.

⁶⁸ Shashkin P.A., Rudakov A.B., Volobuev S.G. (2023). *Pokazateli effektivnosti gosudarstvennoi politiki v oblasti zashchity traditsionnykh rossiiskikh dukhovno-nravstvennykh tsennostei, kul'tury i istoricheskoi pamyati* [Indicators of the Effectiveness of State Policy in the Field of Protection of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values, Culture and Historical Memory]. Moscow: Institut Naslediya. P. 38.

⁶⁹ Radikov I.V. (2019). The search for ideological orientation in post-Soviet Russia. *Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki*, 1(834), p. 56.

⁷⁰ Bessokirnaya G.P., Bolshakova O.A., Karakhanova T.M. (2023). Experience of investigating the spiritual and moral state of Russian society. *Sociologicheskaja nauka i social'naja praktika*, 11(3), 6–36.

Excerpt from Vladimir Putin's speech on February 9, 2012 at the congress of the Union of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs:

"... what happened in the 1990s. We've talked a lot about this, when business was often reduced to a simple division of the state pie... of course, we need to turn this page, too... **we need to end this period...** so that society really accepts these options for closing the problems of the 1990s: unfair, frankly speaking, privatization, all kinds of auctions.... I think that society as a whole and the entrepreneurial class are primarily interested in this. **This topic should be closed**"⁷¹.

Excerpt from Vladimir Putin's speech on June 20, 2025 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum:

"During the privatization [in the 1990s], of course, a lot of injustice was committed. For one ruble, something worth maybe millions was privatized. All this is understandable. And from the point of view of social justice, these were far from the best decisions... Therefore, in my opinion, **it is necessary to finally develop a regulatory framework for the limitation periods of all events of this kind and close this topic once and for all**"⁷².

In conclusion, we should note that the President of the Russian Federation has repeatedly drawn attention to the influence of liberal ideology on the economic foundations of the state, "when business was reduced to a simple division of the state pie", and that it is necessary to close this issue "once and for all".

He first identified this problem on February 9, 2012 at the congress of the Union of Russian Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, and raised it again on June 20, 2025 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. But the question remains: 13 years have passed and it is still unclear when real steps will be taken in this direction.

⁷¹ Speech by the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs on February 9, 2012. Available at: <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/events/news/18052/>

⁷² Vladimir Putin's speech at the plenary session of the XXVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 20, 2025. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/77222>

Returning to the headline of the article — “*The constitutional ban on state ideology means a ban on revising the ideological tenets of liberalism*” — we would like to emphasize that now experts are raising the question “What kind of state are we building?” in forums and in the media more and more often.

External conditions, especially after three and a half years of the special military operation, require Russia (as the Hero of Labor writer A. Prokhanov writes) to “mobilize, put an end to flabbiness, laxity, fearfulness, timidity”. And for this, according to political scientist S. Karaganov, “*we need to have our own new humane state ideology ..., which should be promoted at all levels, starting from school*”^{73, 74}.

“If what we encounter in life is in stark contrast to the ideological model, the best theoretical endeavors

A. Prokhanov: “... And again, for the umpteenth time, events ... confirm the need for modern Russia to mobilize, to put an end to flabbiness, laxity, fearfulness, timidity. A demobilized Russia is a tasty morsel for hostile intelligence services...”⁷⁴

will be criticized and perceived negatively. In recent years, the state has done a lot for people, despite its efforts, but the most sensitive issue of social justice has not been resolved and it is not clear how it will be resolved... If we are trying to formulate an ideology, then the mechanism of its execution must be truly spelled out. Procrastination is fraught with the most unpredictable consequences”⁷⁵.

References

- Bessokirnaya G.P., Bolshakova O.A., Karakhanova T.M. (2023). Experience of investigating the spiritual and moral state of Russian society. *Sociologicheskaja nauka i social'naja praktika*, 11(3), 6–36 (in Russian).
- Kireev M., Koreneva E., Kireeva N. (2024). The cultural code of Russia and its evolution. *Nauka, iskusstvo, kul'tura=Science, Arts, Culture*, 3(43), 22–35 (in Russian).
- Leonidova G.V., Rossoshanskaya E.A., Popov A.V. (2018). *Monitoring kachestva trudovogo potentsiala: 20 let issledovanii* [Monitoring the Quality of Labor Potential: Twenty Years of Research]. Vologda: VolRC RAS.
- Radikov I.V. (2019). The search for ideological orientation in post-Soviet Russia. *Vestnik Moskovskogo gosudarstvennogo lingvisticheskogo universiteta. Obshchestvennye nauki*, 1(834), 54–75 (in Russian).
- Shashkin P.A., Rudakov A.B., Volobuev S.G. (2023). *Pokazateli effektivnosti gosudarstvennoi politiki v oblasti zashchity traditsionnykh rossiiskikh dukhovno-nravstvennykh tsennostei, kul'tury i istoricheskoi pamyati* [Indicators of the Effectiveness of State Policy in the Field of Protection of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values, Culture and Historical Memory]. Moscow: Institut Naslediya.

⁷³ Karaganov S. Interview on November 24, 2024. Available at: <https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/655229>

⁷⁴ Prokhanov A. We love you, FSB! Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/lyubim_tebya_fsb

⁷⁵ Klyuchnikov S. Civilization-State and traditional values. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/gosudarstvo-tcivilizatciya_i_tradicionnye_tsennostiya?ysclid=mcd57lu0n1708683973

Information about the Authors

Vladimir A. Ilyin – RAS Corresponding Member, Doctor of Sciences (Economics), Professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation, scientific director, Vologda Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (56A, Gorky Street, Vologda, 160014, Russian Federation; e-mail: ilin@vscc.ac.ru)

Mikhail V. Morev – Candidate of Sciences (Economics), Leading Researcher, Vologda Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (56A, Gorky Street, Vologda, 160014, Russian Federation; e-mail: 379post@mail.ru)