

EDITORIAL

DOI: 10.15838/esc.2024.5.95.1

UDC 354, LBC 66.03

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Special Military Operation and the Internal Mobilization of Society and Elites



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Abstract. The article presents our view of the current state of Russian society after almost three years since the start of the special military operation. The objectivity of the results and the scientific novelty of the study are determined by a methodological approach that includes an analysis of federal, regional and municipal elections (according to official data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation), all-Russian and regional sociological surveys, and expert assessments; management decisions made by the President and the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as specific facts reflecting the moral state of a significant part of the elite strata of the population. Based on the above factual basis, a conclusion is drawn about the continuing split of society (primarily elite groups) in relation to the special military operation and to those historical processes that it has triggered. This duality (largely conditioned by the specifics of public administration) can become a serious threat to national security in terms of

For citation: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2024). Special military operation and the internal mobilization of society and elites. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 17(5), 9–39. DOI: 10.15838/esc.2024.5.95.1

implementing Russia's strategic goals in a civilizational conflict with NATO. We conclude that there is a need for internal mobilization of elites in order to bring the system of public administration and key areas of the country's life in line with the high level of threats to national security and the nature of the historical period of time in which the future of Russia is determined.

Key words: society, elites, elections, Single Voting Day, social processes, special military operation.

Two years and eight months have passed since Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the start of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine. Throughout this period, the government and the President personally faced the most difficult task, which was to maintain a balance in the process of public administration between, on the one hand, the highest level of external threats to national security emanating from NATO countries and requiring internal mobilization of all segments of Russian society, and on the other hand, maintaining social stability in the country, taking into account the understanding of the objective fact that modern Russian society, after 30 years of being in the paradigm of Western "consumer society" with its liberal capitalist ideology focused on the priority of material values, is a completely different entity than Soviet society before the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War. There is a "colossal distance" between them, as noted by political scientist S. Kurginyan¹.

The way that the state has solved and continues to solve this truly difficult dilemma has left a certain imprint on the condition of Russian society, and we should note that this "imprint" has its own strengths and weaknesses that pose a certain threat to national security.

To analyze these "strengths" and "weaknesses" of Russian society, which were formed as a result of a certain strategy of internal state policy, we used

three approaches, consisting in analyzing the results of federal, regional and municipal elections held during the period of the SMO; data from all-Russian and regional sociological surveys; and (traditionally) facts and expert assessments, which, in our opinion, most adequately reflect the current situation in the country. These three approaches make it possible to create an objective "picture" of modern Russia, which continues to go through one of the most difficult and most fateful stages of its history.

On September 8, 2024, another Single Voting Day (SVD) took place in Russia; election campaigns of various levels were carried out in 83 regions of the country². We recall that this was the third Single Voting Day, which took place in the context of the special military operation. Each of them had its own characteristics, each marked an increase in voter turnout, and there was also strong support for representatives of the party in power.

The regional elections on September 11, 2022, were the first elections in the conditions of the SMO. They took place at an extremely difficult and dangerous time for Russia: an economic "blitzkrieg" on the part of NATO countries, a difficult situation for the Russian armed forces in the zone of the special military operation, a split within society in relation to the special military operation, the emergence of relocants...

¹ Kurginyan S. There is a huge distance between modern Russia and the USSR of the war period. Available at: <https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/9d79f9e3>

² The elections were held in the period from September 6 to 8, 2024. In 21 regions of the country, direct elections of the highest official of constituent entity of the Russian Federation were held (in 4 more regions – indirect elections, that is, deputies of local legislative bodies voted). Elections of deputies of regional legislative bodies were held in 13 regions. Deputies of the local legislative bodies of the capitals were elected in 21 regions (elections to the Moscow City Duma were held in a special order). There were by-elections to the State Duma in 3 regions..

It is not surprising that the expert community showed no disagreement concerning the key drivers and results of the vote held in 2022: “in all 14 regions, the current governors and acting representatives of United Russia or self-nominated candidates supported by United Russia were re-elected”³, and this (as many experts noted) was “the result of a consensus around the president”⁴.

For the first time the new regions that became part of the Russian Federation took part in the election campaign on September 10, 2023⁵. Their voters demonstrated the highest turnout and support for the President’s representatives in the regions (Tab. 1).

K. Kostin, Chair of the Board of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society, on the 2022 regional elections: **“The patriotic consensus that has emerged as a result of the special military operation and Russia’s opposition to Western sanctions is the main factor in this campaign. It influenced the course of the campaign itself, and will have a decisive impact on the election results...** The main recipients of such an electoral bonus are governors who were either appointed as acting governors by the president or were supported by him when nominated for a new term, and the United Russia party – Putin’s party”⁶.

Table 1. Comparison of the results of the elections on September 10, 2023 in the context of new regions and other constituent entities of the Russian Federation

Elections results	New RF constituent entities	Rest of the RF constituent entities	Dynamics (+/-), new RF constituent entities compared to the rest of the regions
Legislative elections			
Turnout, % of voters	71.14	38.31	+33
Share of votes cast for the United Russia party, % of turnout	77.52	56.52	+21
Elections to representative bodies of municipalities of regional centers of RF constituent entities			
Turnout, % of voters	63.54	33.14	+30
Share of votes cast for the United Russia party, % of turnout	77.46	50.68	+27
Source: calculated according to the official data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru).			

³ Skorobogaty P. (2022). New consolidation: Results of a Single Voting Day. *Ekspert*, no 38, p. 50.

⁴ Experts on the election results: The political system has successfully passed the SVD. Available at: <https://rg.ru/2022/09/12/eksperty-ob-itogah-vyborov-politicheskaia-sistema-usheschno-sdala-edg.html> (opinion of E. Sokolova, head of the Department of Strategic Research and Forecasting at the Expert Institute for Social Research).

⁵ September 30, 2022, the President of the Russian Federation signed agreements on the admission of the DPR, LPR, the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia. October 4, 2022, the relevant federal laws were signed: Federal Law 5 “On the admission of the Donetsk People’s Republic to the Russian Federation and the formation of a new constituent entity in the Russian Federation – the Donetsk People’s Republic”, Federal Law 6 “On the admission of the Lugansk People’s Republic to the Russian Federation and the formation of a new constituent entity in the Russian Federation – the Lugansk People’s Republic”, Federal Law 7 “On the admission of the Zaporozhye Region of Ukraine to the Russian Federation and the formation of a new constituent entity in the Russian Federation – the Zaporozhye Region”, Federal Law 8 “On the admission of the Kherson Region of Ukraine to the Russian Federation and the formation of a new constituent entity in the Russian Federation – the Kherson Region”.

⁶ Round table “Single Voting Day – 2022: Specifics, trends and forecast of results”. Official website of the Foundation for the Development of Civil Society. August 31, 2022. Available at: <http://civilfund.ru/event/146>

At the same time, besides current external threats, there emerged some internal threats to national security: terrorist attacks and sabotage on the territory of Russian regions, an attempt at an armed coup carried out by the Wagner PMC on June 24, 2023. And, as a result, the trend of “unprecedented consolidation of society, unification around the president and the flag”⁷ continued: “All the current governors, as well as the acting governors, have retained their posts. Of these, only two heads of regions were elected from the Communist Party, all the others were from United Russia”⁸.

✓ On September 8, 2024, a Single Voting Day took place against the background of the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the Kursk Region (August 6, 2024) and the increasing likelihood of long-range missile strikes by NATO-made weapons deep into Russian territories, which was followed by a corresponding reaction from the RF President in the form of an initiative to amend the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation, which has been expected by experts for a long time.

“In the updated version of the document [Fundamentals of State Policy in the field of nuclear deterrence], **aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation or support of a nuclear state, is proposed to be considered as their joint attack on the Russian Federation.**

The conditions for Russia’s transition to the use of nuclear weapons are also clearly fixed. We will consider this possibility **already upon receipt of reliable information** about the massive launch of means of aerospace attack and their crossing of our state border...

We reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in case of aggression against **Russia and Belarus** as a member of the Union State”⁹.

S. Karaganov (political scientist, Honorary Chair of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, scientific director of the Faculty of World Economics and World Politics at the Higher School of Economics): **“The main goal of the doctrine should be that all current and future opponents are confident that Russia is ready to use nuclear weapons. This is not only our duty to our country and our citizens, who are now dying on the fronts and even now in peaceful cities, it is our duty to the world.**

If we do not reactivate nuclear deterrence, the world will fall into a series of wars that will inevitably become nuclear and end in World War III. It is a matter of a few years. Russia’s duty is to dramatically activate the nuclear factor in world politics and convince our opponents that we are ready to use nuclear weapons in case of any encroachments on our territory and our citizens. Our opponents should know that our president will make this decision [to launch a nuclear strike]... Being ready for this is his duty to the country, the world and God. If the enemy understands this readiness, then there will almost certainly be no drone strikes against the Kremlin.

We must understand that a war of annihilation is being waged against us. Many people do not fully realize this. Until we are demolished, our Western “partners” will not calm down. Or they will calm down when they realize that it is impossible to demolish us without huge damage to themselves”¹⁰.

⁷ Analysts at the Expert Institute for Social Research called the 2023 elections consolidating Russian society. Available at: <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/09/12/analitiks/>

⁸ Pamfilova called the 46% turnout record-breaking. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/09/2023/6501c3fe9a7947ea85beaf37>

⁹ Speech by the President of the Russian Federation at the meeting of the Permanent Session of the Security Council on Nuclear Deterrence on September 25, 2024. Available at: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75182>

¹⁰ Chernenko E. “The current nuclear doctrine does not fulfill the function of deterrence” (interview with S. Karaganov). Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7059257?ysclid=m2a7iitaxh735976424>

In other words, threats to Russia’s national security continue to grow; there are more and more signs that NATO is preparing to enter into direct conflict with Russia (as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at a meeting of the UN General Assembly held from September 24 to 30, 2024); and the world is “sliding” into a “funnel” of escalation uncontrollably, which may ultimately lead to the Third World Nuclear War...

“With regard to Russia, the goal of inflicting a “strategic defeat” on it has been announced... **the current Anglo-Saxon strategists do not hide their plans.** True, they still expect to defeat Russia with the hands of the illegitimate neo-Nazi Kiev regime, **but they are already preparing Europe to throw itself into a suicidal and reckless scheme**”¹¹.

Naturally, preserving the general conditions for aggravation of the external political situation in the world and around Russia has influenced the continuation of the trends noted by the results of the Single Voting Day in 2024. On average, in 21 regions where direct elections of the heads

of RF constituent entities took place, turnout increased by 3.72% (from 46.8 to 50.5% of the total number of voters; *Tab. 2, Insert 1*), and support for representatives of the party in power or acting ones appointed by the President increased by 3.64% (from 73.36 to 77.0%; *Tab. 2, Insert 2*). At the same time, an increase in turnout and support for acting governors was noted in most of the RF constituent entities where the voting took place (*Insert 1*)¹².

We should also note that in general, over the past 10 years (from 2014 to 2024), the average number of voters in the regions where the elections of the heads of RF constituent entities took place decreased by almost 1 million people (by 957.4 thousand people; from 28.9 to 28 million people), and voter turnout increased by 674.5 thousand people (from 14.0 to 14.6 million people).

Thus, an analysis of the official data of the RF Central Election Commission shows that in all constituent entities where the elections of regional leaders were held, either the acting governors appointed by the RF President or the current governors won; and, as some experts noted, the chairman of the Central Election Commission E. Pamfilova “estimated the results of SVD-2024 as high as possible”¹³.

Table 2. Dynamics of the main results of voting in the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities in 2019 and 2024

Indicator	2019	2024	Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 2019
Number of voters	28351909	28005425	-346484
Abs. turnout	13904891	14632056	+727165
Turnout, %	46.82	50.54	+3.72
Abs. support	10592454	11201409	+608955
Support, %	73.36	77.00	+3.64

Source: own compilation according to the data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. More detailed information is provided in Insert 1.

¹¹ Speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the general debate of the 79th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 28, 2024. Available at: https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/video/posledniye_dobavlnenniye/1972774/

¹² Approximately the same picture was observed in the regional centers: compared to the previous elections, voter turnout and support for acting officials, although insignificant, increased (from 41 to 42% and from 70 to 74%, respectively). Voter turnout increased in 9 out of 21 regional centers, and support for acting officials – in 13.

¹³ Rodin I. Pamfilova rejected anti-popular criticism of the elections. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-11/3_9091_campaign.html?ysclid=m1q4r67ynj13324465

Insert 1

Dynamics of voter turnout for the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities in 2014–2024

Territory	2014						2019						2024						Dynamics (+/-)																	
	2014		2019		2024		2014		2019		2024		2014 to 2019		2024 to 2019		2024 to 2014																			
	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %	number of voters	abs. turnout	turnout. %																		
Altai Republic	155946	87507	56.11	162239	80920	49.88	164122	75063	45.74	164122	75063	45.74	+1883	-5857	-4.14	+8176	-12444	-10.37																		
Republic of Bashkortostan	3027300	2267070	74.89	3049196	2189229	71.80	2977026	2153513	72.34	2977026	2153513	72.34	-72170	-35716	+0.54	-50274	-113557	-2.55																		
Republic of Kalmykia	211003	129612	61.43	205823	113537	55.16	203704	124976	61.35	203704	124976	61.35	-2119	+11439	+6.19	-7299	-4636	-0.08																		
Trans-Baikal Territory	814732	304582	37.38	791865	277721	35.07	759657	334158	43.99	759657	334158	43.99	-32208	+56437	+8.92	-55075	+29576	+6.61																		
Stavropol Territory	1958397	937724	47.88	1878050	1256287	66.89	1903514	1093697	57.46	1903514	1093697	57.46	+25464	-162590	-9.43	-54883	+155973	+9.58																		
Khabarovsk Territory	986341	444636	45.08	958412	419941	43.82	955360	314110	32.88	955360	314110	32.88	-3052	-105831	-10.94	-30981	-130526	-12.20																		
Astrakhan Region	755345	306676	40.60	732517	245571	33.52	709760	309438	43.60	709760	309438	43.60	-22757	+63867	+10.08	-45585	+2762	+3.00																		
Volograd Region	1953217	715375	36.63	1843833	760070	41.22	1773458	1094698	61.73	1773458	1094698	61.73	-70375	+334628	+20.51	-179759	+379323	+25.10																		
Vologda Region	968226	287742	29.72	935466	379037	40.52	892898	439137	49.18	892898	439137	49.18	-42568	+60100	+8.66	-75328	+151395	+19.46																		
Kaliningrad Region	786650	311441	39.59	839700	323347	38.51	839206	354176	42.20	839206	354176	42.20	-494	+30829	+3.69	+52556	+42735	+2.61																		
Kemerovo Region – Kuzbass	2012208	1337419	66.47	1912342	1549241	81.01	1896365	1224551	64.57	1896365	1224551	64.57	-15977	-324690	-16.44	-115843	-112868	-1.90																		
Kurgan Region	736261	292845	39.77	696763	296863	42.61	874183	538117	61.56	874183	538117	61.56	-55576	-24386	-0.11	-95074	-20368	+2.73																		
Kursk Region	947084	369073	38.97	922506	383427	41.56	874183	538117	61.56	874183	538117	61.56	-48323	+154690	+20.00	-72901	+169044	+22.59																		
Lipetsk Region	952189	452917	47.57	930421	438260	47.10	892480	511229	57.28	892480	511229	57.28	-37941	+72969	+10.18	-59709	+58312	+9.71																		
Murmansk Region	637201	197658	31.02	578752	207339	35.83	545267	226787	41.59	545267	226787	41.59	-33485	+19448	+5.76	-91934	+29129	+10.57																		
Orenburg Region	1590721	702314	44.15	1557425	616059	39.56	1501118	789382	52.59	1501118	789382	52.59	-56307	+173323	+13.03	-89603	+87068	+8.44																		
Samara Region	2429343	1495989	61.58	2411123	1296989	53.79	2397155	1314708	54.84	2397155	1314708	54.84	-13968	+17719	+1.05	-32188	-181281	-6.74																		
Sakhalin Region	384549	144550	37.59	376850	140828	37.37	375835	157666	41.95	375835	157666	41.95	-1015	+16838	+4.58	-8714	+13116	+4.36																		
Tula Region	1205455	548459	45.50	1150957	608247	52.85	1136990	536561	47.19	1136990	536561	47.19	-13967	-71686	-5.66	-68465	-11898	+1.69																		
Chelyabinsk Region	2720414	1155681	42.48	2602792	1174933	45.14	2574070	1260299	48.96	2574070	1260299	48.96	-28722	+85366	+3.82	-146344	+104618	+6.48																		
Saint Petersburg	3730334	1468292	39.36	3814877	1147045	30.07	3992070	1507313	37.76	3992070	1507313	37.76	+177193	+360268	+7.69	+261736	+39021	-1.60																		
TOTAL	28952916	13957562	45.89	28351909	13904891	46.82	28005425	14632056	50.54	28005425	14632056	50.54	-346484	+727165	+3.72	-957491	+674494	+4.64																		
Total number of regions in which the turnout and the number of voters increased / decreased													3 / 18						15 / 6						13 / 8						14 / 7					

Source: own compilation according to the data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

Compared with the previous elections (for the period from 2019 to 2024), the number of voters in 18 RF constituent entities decreased (by almost 347 thousand people in the whole country). Nevertheless, turnout increased by 4 percentage points (from 47 to 51%), especially in Volgograd (by 21 percentage points) and Kursk (by 20 percentage points) regions. A noticeable decrease in turnout is noted in the Kemerovo Region (by 16 percentage points) and the Khabarovsk Territory (by 11 percentage points).

Insert 2

Dynamics of support for candidates who won the elections of senior officials of RF constituent entities in 2014–2024

Territory	2014			2019			2024			Dynamics (+/-)					
	abs.	% of turnout	% of voters	abs.	% of turnout	% of voters	abs.	% of turnout	% of voters	2024 to 2019		2024 to 2014			
										abs.	% of turnout	abs.	% of turnout	abs.	% of voters
Altai Republic	42746	50.63	27.41	47588	58.82	29.33	55507	74.09	33.82	+7919	+15.27	+4.49	+12761	+23.46	+6.41
Republic of Bashkortostan	1851625	81.71	61.16	1794176	82.02	58.84	1724962	80.21	57.94	-69214	-1.81	-0.90	-126663	-1.50	-3.22
Republic of Kalmykia	107368	82.89	50.88	93704	82.54	45.53	99864	79.95	49.02	+6160	-2.59	+3.49	-7504	-2.94	-1.86
Trans-Baikal Territory	165472	54.39	20.31	248580	89.61	31.39	274444	82.27	36.13	+25864	-7.34	+4.74	+108972	+27.88	+15.82
Stavropol Territory	789502	84.22	40.31	1000074	79.64	53.25	869599	79.61	45.68	-130475	-0.03	-7.57	+80097	-4.61	+5.37
Khabarovsk Territory	325566	69.57	33.01	237818	56.77	24.81	254245	81.03	26.61	+16427	+24.26	+1.80	-71321	+11.46	-6.40
Astrakhan Region	230375	75.28	30.50	185543	75.63	25.33	241585	78.17	34.04	+56042	+2.54	+8.71	+11210	+2.89	+3.54
Volograd Region	632707	88.49	32.39	582848	76.80	31.61	872010	79.68	49.17	+289162	+2.88	+17.56	+239303	-8.81	+16.78
Vologda Region	181047	62.98	18.70	230316	60.79	24.62	273380	63.30	30.62	+43064	+2.51	+6.00	+92333	+0.32	+11.92
Kaliningrad Region	218652	70.41	27.80	259220	80.21	30.87	270919	76.55	32.28	+11699	-3.66	+1.41	+52267	+6.14	+4.48
Kemerovo Region – Kuzbass	1084392	81.29	53.89	1315922	85.23	68.81	949185	78.38	50.05	-366737	-6.85	-18.76	-135207	-2.91	-3.84
Kurgan Region	248323	84.87	33.73	239902	80.86	34.43	231940	85.17	36.17	-7962	+4.31	+1.74	-16383	+0.30	+2.44
Kursk Region	246506	66.81	26.03	310648	81.07	33.67	351040	65.28	40.16	+40392	-15.79	+6.49	+104534	-1.53	+14.13
Lipetsk Region	369997	81.83	38.86	294820	67.28	31.69	414840	81.16	46.48	+120020	+13.88	+14.79	+44843	-0.67	+7.62
Murmansk Region	127539	64.69	20.02	124429	60.07	21.50	167647	73.99	30.75	+43218	+13.92	+9.25	+40108	+9.30	+10.73
Orenburg Region	563451	80.28	35.42	406153	65.94	26.08	616565	78.14	41.07	+210412	+12.20	+14.99	+53114	-2.14	+5.65
Samara Region	1362676	91.35	56.09	1086187	83.83	45.05	1045504	79.56	43.61	-40683	-4.27	-1.44	-317172	-11.79	-12.48
Sakhalin Region	97859	67.8	25.45	78954	56.14	20.95	127336	80.79	33.88	+48382	+24.65	+12.93	+29477	+12.99	+8.43
Tula Region	461411	84.17	38.28	506816	83.58	44.03	441763	78.53	38.85	-65053	-5.05	-5.18	-19648	-5.64	+0.57
Chelyabinsk Region	996347	86.37	36.62	813853	69.30	31.27	1023767	81.28	39.77	+209914	+11.98	+8.50	+27420	-5.09	+3.15
Saint Petersburg	1130199	79.3	30.30	734903	64.43	19.26	895307	59.80	22.43	+160404	-4.63	+3.17	-234892	-19.50	-7.87
TOTAL	11233760	75.68	35.10	10592454	73.36	34.87	11201409	77.00	38.98	+608955	+3.64	+4.11	-32351	+1.31	+3.87
Total number of regions in which the support for the governor has increased / decreased										15 / 6	11 / 10	16 / 5	13 / 8	9 / 12	15 / 6

Source: own compilation according to the data from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.

* Compared with the previous elections, in 2024, the level of support for leaders on average in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in which voting took place increased by 1.31 percentage points (from 75.7 to 77%). In absolute terms, this is 32 thousand fewer people, which is due to a decrease in the number of people of voting age (by 364 thousand people; from 28.4 million people in 2019 to 28 million people in 2024).

Table 3. Dynamics of support for Vladimir Putin and dynamics of voter turnout at the presidential elections (nationwide)*

Indicator	Date of presidential elections			Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to...	
	March 26, 2000	March 18, 2018	March 17, 2024	2018	2000
Turnout					
abs.million people	75.18	73.63	87.58	+13.95	+12.4
%	68.70	67.54	77.49	+9.95	+8.79
Support for Vladimir Putin					
abs.million people	39.74	56.43	76.28	+19.85	+36.54
%	52.94	76.69	87.28	+10.59	+34.34
* Data on the results of the first presidential election in which Vladimir Putin participated and the elections preceding the vote on March 17, 2024 are presented.					
Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.					

At the same time, external threats to national security, which have sharply escalated after the start of the SMO, have a significant impact on the results of both regional and federal elections, as evidenced, for example, by the convincing support of Vladimir Putin in the presidential election on March 17, 2024: in the 24 years since he was first elected head of state, his nationwide approval rating has actually doubled (by almost 37 million people): from 39.74 to 76.28 million voters (*Tab. 3*).

We should emphasize that the growing support of the Russian society for the course of national development implemented by the President,

expressed, among other things, in the support of the party in power, is a phenomenon that was noted before the start of the SMO. The special military operation has only intensified this process. We recall that United Russia has had a constitutional majority in parliament since 2016. And, although, according to the results of the latest election to the State Duma (September 19, 2021), the level of support for United Russia decreased slightly, the share of votes cast for the party in power still prevails over the share of votes cast for all other parliamentary parties combined (50% vs 39%; *Tab. 4*).

Table 4. Dynamics of support for United Russia and dynamics of voter turnout at the parliamentary elections (nationwide)*

Indicator	Date of the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation					Dynamics (+/-), 2021 to...	
	December 7, 2003	December 2, 2007	December 4, 2011	September 18, 2016	September 19, 2021	2016	2003
Turnout							
abs.million people	60.70	69.61	65.77	52.70	56.49	+3.79	-4.21
%	55.67	63.78	60.21	7.88	51.72	+3.84	-3.95
Support for the United Russia party							
abs.million people	22.78	44.71	32.37	28.53	28.06	-0.47	+5.28
%	37.56	64.30	49.31	54.20	49.82	-4.38	+12.26
* For reference: according to the results of the latest election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (September 19, 2021), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation received 18.93% of the vote, LDPR – 7.55%, Just Russia – 7.46%, New People – 5.32%.							
Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation.							

Due to such consolidated and obvious support for the course of national development shown by Russian society, some experts argue that in force majeure conditions, when the country is actually waging a full-fledged war with the Collective West and is shifting toward the principle of “everything

for the front, everything for Victory”, regional elections are not needed at all. According to experts, one of the reasons why a Single Voting Day is still being held is that this is a definite signal to society from the state that “everything is going according to plan; the situation is under control and no extraordinary measures are required to complete the special military operation victoriously”.

However, the important role of annual regional and municipal elections lies in the fact that they allow us to see trends in the changes in the country’s political system and in the dynamics of public sentiment in the periods between elections at the federal level. And this is especially important in the tense situation that is developing in Russia

M. Delyagin (RF State Duma deputy): “In the context of the special military operation, there should be a regime not “Live as usual, and don’t pay attention”, but a regime “Everything for the front, everything for victory”. And in this case, holding such elections looks a little strange”¹⁴.

I. Grashchenkov (political scientist): “The idea of abandoning the election of heads of regions is not new. Rumors about their cancellation have been circulating throughout the spring of this [2022] year. At that time, it was said that in the conditions of the SMO it would be reasonable to demonstrate internal political unity, and at the same time save budget funds”¹⁵.

S. Mironov: “Why spend all the time and money on this [gubernatorial elections], when it is already clear that the absolute majority supports the special military operation and, in particular, the decisions of the President of Russia”¹⁶.

A. Gallyamov (political scientist): “People don’t like to give up their right to choose their superiors. It turns out that with one hand the authorities calm the population – they say everything is fine with us – and with the other they introduce force majeure. This will strengthen the feeling that something is going wrong in the country”¹⁷.

K. Kostin (President of the Foundation for Civil Society Development): “Two years are left before the elections to the State Duma. Every day for parliamentary parties... is the stage of preparation for these elections. Accordingly, it is worth looking at the ongoing elections from this angle”¹⁸.

A. Chesnakov (Head of the Scientific Council of the Center for Political Conjuncture): “The SVD-2024 should be perceived not only as the beginning of a new electoral cycle, but also as the end of the previous one. In general, we are talking about preparing a longer-term reality that the State Duma, elected in 2026 will work for another five years. The upcoming elections are a prologue to the Duma campaign and the five-year plan, which will take place from 2026 to 2031”¹⁹.

¹⁴ Yentsov Yu. Instead of the call “Everything for the front!”, fellow citizens hear “Everything is fine, beautiful Marchioness” (interview with M. Delyagin). Available at: <https://kprf-saratov.ru/2024/09/mihail-delyagin-vmesto-prizyva-vsyo-dlya-fronta-sograzhdane-slyshat-vsyo-horosho-prekrasnaya-markiza/>

¹⁵ To elect or appoint. Why Russia may cancel the gubernatorial elections in 2023. Available at: <https://www.amic.ru/news/politika/izbirat-ili-naznachat-pochemu-v-rossii-v-2023-godu-mogut-otmenit-vybory-gubernatorov-510924?ysclid=m22xj5t wjh750436221>

¹⁶ The discussion about the possible rejection of direct elections in 2022 has generated intrigue. Available at: <https://mskgazeta.ru/politika/diskussiya-o-vozmozhnom-otkaze-ot-pryamyh-vyborov-v-2022-godu-porodila-intrigu-10172.html?ysclid=m22xrnw0h9238697419>

¹⁷ Ibidem.

¹⁸ Experts consider the SVD-2024 an important stage in the preparation for the State Duma election in 2026. Available at: <https://www.interfax-russia.ru/index.php/moscow/news/eksperty-schitayut-edg-2024-vazhnym-etapom-podgotovki-k-vyboram-v-gosdumu-v-2026-godu>

¹⁹ EISI experts called SVD-2024 a prologue to the 2026 State Duma election. Available at: <https://life.ru/p/1653782?ysclid=m200w8xxg5810090003>

in the context of the SMO. It is no coincidence that a Single Voting Day on September 8, 2024 was considered by some experts exclusively as a “rehearsal” before the election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, which will be held in 2026.

In this sense, regional elections, fulfilling their “diagnostic” function, are an important element in the process of “adjusting the country to achieve Victory”²⁰, which (as the Russian philosopher A. Dugin rightly notes) is currently more important than discussions about the future structure of Russia, its ideology, public administration, etc., that is, first we need to achieve Victory, and then the Victory becomes the “foundation of a new Russian statehood”.

More specifically, the diagnostic function of regional elections is that, using their example, one can see the same trends that are typical for society as a whole and for the public administration system.

“Winning the war with the West in Ukraine is an end and a means. **The exclusivity of the meaning (of this very) Victory in Russian history make us consider the current Russian statehood as a tool, as a method. That is, the modern Russian Federation is a part of Victory, its condition...**

Victory is greater than the entire Russian Federation, because Victory is the essence of Russia in its entirety. **The Russian Federation is only part of the Victory.** Victory is the whole. This is fate and the finale, a triumph...

To achieve Victory, it is necessary to adjust the Russian Federation to it... But then a new hermeneutic turn will come. Victory will be the foundation of a new Russian statehood”²¹.

And these trends are not only about the continued consolidation of society around the President in the face of external threats.

In particular, analyzing the results of a Single Voting Day in 2024, many experts came to the conclusion that a significant part of the population perceives elections as a “political ritual”; their “actual political content does not relate to the will of the masses”, and the political structure in Russia itself is “degrading to the archaic times”, since there is a “compression of political competition”, opposition parties “turn into an object of the political process” and thus there is a “freeze of political and public activity”.

“Against the background of the progress of electoral technologies, **the political structure is degrading to the archaic... they [opposition parties] have finally become the object of the political process.** And its subject is the regional authorities, connected in a single network through political vice-governors, which closes in the relevant departments of the presidential administration”²².

“**It is impossible to expect from the elections a process of collective search for solutions to the most pressing problems of regions/cities/districts/countries if the query is made in such a way.** Because a demand of metaphysical/existential importance is being put forward – the preservation of Russian statehood itself. And people’s current problems seem petty, insignificant, selfish, petty-bourgeois...”²³

“**Elections are perceived rather as a political ritual in which it is customary to participate... That may be enough here and now. But this is hardly enough to effectively govern a large country in the long term, to feel people’s sentiment”²⁴.**

²⁰ Dugin A. Hermeneutical Victory circle. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/germenevticheskij_krug?ysclid=m2012fzi3q255531738

²¹ Ibidem.

²² On the options for the emerging one-party system. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2024-09-11/2_9091_red.html?ysclid=m1ov943beg112335220

²³ Remchukov K. Does our society want change? Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-09/2_9088_1427.html?ysclid=m1ouwv0945994401035

²⁴ On elections as a communication channel. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2024-09-10/2_9090_red.html?ysclid=m1ov3swigc738886871

“The ‘freeze’ of political and public activity will continue. It can be assumed that the party in power in such conditions will continue its course of profanation of elections and purely formal maintenance of legitimacy. As experts are already saying, the real political content of the elections does not relate to the will of the masses...”²⁵

The SVD-2024, according to formal signs, turned out to be a copy of last year’s elections with the compression of the main competition to five parliamentary parties²⁶.

In addition, given the unprecedentedly high level of threats to national security posed by NATO countries in relation to Russia, the domestic political system “requires an alliance of the right and the left against the liberals... both inside and outside Russia”²⁷.

At the same time, the United Russia party is trying to consolidate different strata of Russian society, positioning itself as the “party of Russian civilization”, the “majority party” and the “party of those who work”²⁹; but some experts doubt that the “union of officials and businesspeople, often

“... We need an alliance of the right and the left against the liberals. That’s what we need both inside and outside of Russia. The real right and left represent the people. And the liberals represent the comprador elite. There are no good liberals... And do not try to prove that liberals are not all the same. They are indeed. The right and the left are different. The liberals are all on the same side”²⁸.

ashamed of their past”, is capable of developing or even representing such an “ideology that would be generally understandable and recognized by the majority”.

Thus, analyzing the trends taking place in the country’s political system, experts draw attention to the fact that **against the background of the process of “uniting around the flag”, the institution of elections themselves is being turned into a “routine”, in fact, it is “withering away”;** and in a party that has not had serious competition in the political field for a long time, an ideological component that would turn out to be capable of consolidating all strata of Russian society and ensuring the very “alliance of the right and left against the liberals” is still under discussion.

A. Isaev, deputy head of the United Russia faction in the State Duma: “All other parties are class parties, and the United Russia alone represents the nation as a whole. Meanwhile, class contradictions are receding into the background today because of external challenges and existential contradictions”³⁰.

“If there were a generally understood and recognized ideology in the country, and it were consolidated by the corresponding ruling party, the issue of treason and sabotage would be resolved quickly and everywhere. **But United Russia is not suitable for such purposes, to put it mildly. The Union of officials and businesspeople, often ashamed of their past, is not capable of creative activity”³¹.**

²⁵ Garmonenko D. Party lists for the 2026 State Duma will be retained in the politically necessary volume. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-17/1_9095_elections.html?ysclid=m1ow0bnrrnr730662997 (мнение руководителя аналитического управления КППФ С. Обухова).

²⁶ Kynev A. LDPR, New People and Socialist Revolutionaries claim the same electorate. Available at: <http://club-rf.ru/detail/7425?ysclid=m1uf0lhmgga649045765>

²⁷ Dugin A. We need an alliance of the right and the left against the liberals. Available at: <https://izborsk-club.ru/26065?ysclid=m28pgyevek554015521>

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Isaev V. Primary branches and ideological work of the party. September 22, 2024.

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Sorokin N. Mobilization of the spirit. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_radikalizatsii_vojni_i_soprovozhdayushej_eyo_ideologicheskoy_sferi

And we see about the same situation in Russian society, where, also against the background of sustained support for the President, the governor, the party in power and the state as a whole, people are becoming somewhat “accustomed” to life in the context of the SMO; the understanding of the essence of the historical moment is being lost; the degree of awareness of what is at stake for Russia in this conflict is decreasing.

Thus, according to sociological research, in three years (2022–2024), the level of trust in all major state and non-governmental institutions has increased (which in itself indicates an increase in popular support for the development course implemented by the government; *Insert 3*). Compared with 2021 (the year before the start of the SMO), by 2024, the level of trust in the President increased by 11 percentage points (from 49 to 60%), in the Government – by 13 percentage points (from 40 to 53%), in regional authorities – by 9 percentage points (from 36 to 45%), in municipal authorities – by 12 percentage points (from 32 to 44%). And, last but not least, throughout the entire measurement period (that is, over the past 24 years), the President and the Government of the Russian Federation have always been the institutions that enjoyed the highest trust among the population.

Thus, sociological research data do not allow us to doubt that the course of national development, implemented by the state (and the President personally), finds support in society. And this only confirms the official results of election campaigns (federal, regional, municipal) that took place over the past 24 years.

However, despite the fact that the level of citizens’ trust in state and non-governmental institutions is strong and growing with the increasing threats to national security, many experts now talk about “the decreasing sensitivity” of the society: that “no one seriously believes that Ukraine can invade Russia, as Germany tried to do in the Great Patriotic War; neither do they believe in the fact that NATO or the United States will shift from a half-hearted assistance to Ukraine to seizing the territories of the Russian Federation... people tend to think about the SMO as little as possible and take it as a reality and not a threat to their existence”³².

“More than 2.5 years have passed since the beginning of the open phase of confrontation between Russia and the West, **temporary structures and supports have become permanent**. The consequences of drastic changes and shocks **have become commonplace, sensitivity has dropped, people have learned to live with all this, taking what is happening for granted, doing their usual things. The increased level of uncertainty has been reduced due to routine and adaptation...**”³³

“**People are used to it, they have adapted, they have no desire to dramatically change their lives...** The paradigm “rise up, huge country” could still be carried out in the spring of 2022, now it’s too late. There are no such vivid emotions anymore”³⁴.

“The paradigm “life goes on as usual” is likely to continue unless something extraordinary or crucial happens. Individual patriotic speakers, as well as military commanders, like to talk about a huge country, **but they do not make up the majority... People react to what has already happened, not to what might happen**”³⁵.

³² Garmonenko D. Sociologists of the Russian Academy of Sciences calculate the “SMO coefficient”. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-29/1_3_9103_sociology.html?ysclid=m28po0qyxc81413058 (opinion of K. Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group).

³³ Shkolnikov A. Crisis of the genre in information policy. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/v_paradigme_oko_za_oko?ysclid=m20an03sng103241729

³⁴ Garmonenko D. Sociologists of the Russian Academy of Sciences calculate the “SMO coefficient”. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-29/1_3_9103_sociology.html?ysclid=m28po0qyxc81413058 (opinion of A. Makarkin, first vice-president of the Center for Political Technologies).

³⁵ Ibidem. Opinion of K. Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group.

Insert 3

Dynamics of trust in state and non-governmental institutions for the period from 1996 to 2024*
(VoIRC RAS data for the Vologda Region; % of respondents)

State and non-governmental institutions	For reference	Average annual data for presidential cycles										Dynamics (+/-), p.p.		Average annual data					Dynamics (+/-), p.p.					
		2000–2003		2004–2007		2008–2011		2012–2017		2018–2023		1996		2000–2003		3 years before the start of the SMO					2024 to 2022		2024 to 2019–2021	
		2000–2003	2004–2007	2008–2011	2012–2017	2018–2023	1996	2000–2003	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2024 to 2022	2024 to 2019–2021		
RF President	26.5	58.2	58.6	56.0	55.3	54.3	+28	-4	52.4	51.6	49.1	55.7	56.2	60.4	+5	+6					+5	+6		
RF Government	18.5	39.3	39.3	51.7	45.5	43.8	+25	+5	41.0	41.0	40.1	45.6	47.5	52.9	+7	+8					+7	+8		
Police	14.1	26.0	27.0	33.6	37.2	43.4	+29	+17	40.7	41.6	43.9	44.1	45.7	50.5	+6	+5					+6	+5		
Prosecutor's Office	18.2	28.9	31.9	36.8	39.5	45.4	+27	+17	43.6	43.1	44.6	46.7	47.0	50.5	+4	+4					+4	+4		
Church	37.9	42.6	44.3	47.8	44.7	46.8	+9	+4	46.5	45.5	46.6	46.7	45.5	49.4	+3	+1					+3	+1		
FSB	12.6	32.6	33.4	37.5	38.5	43.7	+31	+11	41.0	42.7	43.9	44.4	45.1	48.7	+4	+4					+4	+4		
Court	19.8	30.9	33.9	37.4	39.1	42.2	+22	+11	39.4	38.1	42.1	44.5	43.9	47.7	+3	+6					+3	+6		
Army	34.2	33.8	27.8	35.0	39.6	42.6	+8	+9	40.8	38.5	43.0	42.5	43.7	47.3	+5	+4					+5	+4		
Regional leadership	14.2	28.6	35.3	40.3	36.6	36.5	+22	+8	33.5	34.2	35.6	38.5	41.5	45.3	+7	+7					+7	+7		
Federation Council	13.4	27.9	31.7	39.3	37.4	34.2	+21	+6	32.2	31.9	30.3	34.9	38.7	45.2	+10	+8					+10	+8		
Local government bodies	no data	no data	29.5	35.9	32.9	34.3	no data	no data	31.6	30.3	32.3	36.7	40.5	44.3	+8	+9					+8	+9		
State Duma	14.8	22.5	27.6	35.3	33.1	31.1	+16	+9	28.6	27.7	29.0	32.7	34.6	40.2	+8	+7					+8	+7		
Mass media	15.4	29.1	29.1	30.5	28.0	29.7	+14	+1	26.7	26.9	29.5	31.6	33.7	38.4	+7	+7					+7	+7		
Trade unions	20.2	26.0	27.6	31.0	27.4	31.2	+11	+5	29.7	28.4	31.8	30.6	33.3	38.3	+8	+4					+8	+4		
Non-governmental organizations	no data	no data	22.2	27.5	25.5	28.0	no data	no data	24.9	24.7	28.5	29.4	32.5	37.3	+8	+7					+8	+7		
Directors, heads of enterprises	5.2	20.1	23.8	24.5	23.0	24.1	+19	+4	20.5	21.2	24.4	24.7	28.5	33.4	+9	+7					+9	+7		
Political parties, movements	6.8	12.9	17.2	23.1	19.5	21.6	+15	+9	19.7	18.7	20.0	21.7	26.9	31.6	+10	+7					+10	+7		
Banking, business circles	8.5	13.9	20.5	22.2	19.4	21.8	+13	+8	17.6	18.9	22.8	23.9	26.8	30.7	+7	+7					+7	+7		

* The wording of the question: "Please determine your attitude toward the non-governmental structures and institutions of power operating in the country" (response option is "I fully and mostly trust"). The question has been asked since 1996. In 1997–1999 the question was not asked. The answer options "local self-government" and "non-governmental organizations" have been included in the question since 2006.

The table provides data on the dynamics of trust in state and non-governmental institutions for the period since 1996 (the year of Boris Yeltsin's first presidential term) and for presidential cycles from 2000 to 2024. Ranked according to data for 2024.

The main data are for the three years before and after the start of the SMO, which indicate that during all three years of the special military operation, citizens' trust in the main state and non-governmental institutions in the country grew annually. In particular, this applies to authorities at all levels – federal, regional, and municipal (they are highlighted in bold). From 2022 to 2024 (the period of SMO implementation), the level of trust in the President of the Russian Federation increased by 5 percentage points (from 55 to 60%), the Government of the Russian Federation – by 7 percentage points (from 46 to 53%), the Federation Council – by 10 percentage points (from 35 to 45%), the State Duma of the Russian Federation – by 8 percentage points (from 32 to 40%), the leadership of the region – by 7 percentage points (from 38 to 45%), local self-government bodies – by 8 percentage points (from 36 to 44%).

This is evidenced, for example, by data from sociological surveys of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), according to which, during the period of the special military operation, the proportion of people purposefully interested in information about the SMO decreased, and annually (in general, for the period from 2022 to 2024 – by 13 percentage points, from 41 to 28% *Tab. 5*). In turn, the share of Russians who are completely uninterested in information about the SMO or pay attention to it only randomly has increased by 12 percentage points over the past three years (from 58 to 70%). Approximately the same ratio of public opinion assessments was shown by the results of a sociological survey by Vologda Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (VoIRC RAS), conducted in September – October 2024 in the Vologda Region³⁶.

In addition, at the same time as this “drop in sensitivity” (noted by experts), just as there is no single consolidating ideology either inside the party

in power or, by and large, in the President³⁷, the future life trajectories of Russians, according to sociologists, have a mixture of traditional Russian and liberal pro-Western values, or, in other words, **there have been no changes compared to the situation before the beginning of the SMO.**

In support of this thesis, we present two quotes from a recent study conducted by a team of scientists from the Center for Social Forecasting and Marketing (CSFM) and the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Sociological Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IS FCTAS RAS) in May 2024. In their forecast for the period up to 2045, dealing with the “trends in changes in mass consciousness in terms of life attitudes, **i.e. those values according to which people try to build their lives**”³⁸, sociologists note that, on the one hand, “*the value system of the absolute majority of the population will definitely be dominated by adherence to the traditional form of the family as a marriage union of man and woman, rejection of*

Table 5. Distribution of responses to the question “To what extent are you interested in information about Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine?”, % of respondents

Response	2022	2023	2024	Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 2022, p.p.
I purposefully search for, read, watch, listen to information about the current situation	41	35	28	-13
I don’t specifically search for information, but if I come across it, I read, watch, listen	47	51	53	+6
I don’t search for, read, or watch information about the special military operation	11	13	17	+6
I’m not sure	1	1	2	+1

Sources: VCIOM, VoIRC RAS.

³⁶ According to VoIRC RAS, 19% of residents of the Vologda Region are specifically interested in information about the SMO; 44% do not specifically look for it, but pay attention to it; 20% do not look for, read or watch information of this kind.

The survey was conducted from September 19 to October 9, 2024 in 8 municipal districts and okrugs of the Vologda Region, as well as in the cities of Vologda and Cherepovets. The survey method is a questionnaire at the place of residence of respondents. Sample size is 1,500 people aged 18 and older. Sampling error does not exceed 3%.

Some difference with VCIOM data is most likely due to a higher proportion of those who “found it difficult to answer” (18% according to VoIRC RAS, 1–2% according to VCIOM). This may be due to the specifics of the survey methodology (VCIOM – telephone interview; VoIRC RAS – questionnaire survey at the respondents’ place of residence).

³⁷ For more information, see the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2024). The fifth political cycle of Russian President Vladimir Putin: “Cosmetic repairs” for crony capitalism or a transition to “social capitalism”? *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 17(3), 9–35.

³⁸ Sheregi F.E., Privedentseva O.S. (2024). Medium-term forecast of the dynamics of Russians’ life attitudes. *Vestnik Instituta sotsiologii*, 15(3), p. 13.

family models of a sexual minority, rejection of LGBT propaganda and ‘woke’ ideology³⁹ in general”; on the other hand, **“it is likely that the moral character of a relatively large part of the population will be burdened by the priority of material values, the source of which will not always be legitimate, especially in the business environment, as well as a liberal attitude toward corrupt methods of solving personal problems”¹⁸.**

This forecast is given by the experts of CSFM and IS FCTAS RAS for the next 20 years, and, in fact, the grounds for these (very alarming, in our opinion) expectations have been traced for a long time. “Ultra-high earnings” (as a moral category, that is, regardless of what amount is behind them), “the desire to work less and earn more”, “arrogance”, “bribes” – society has become more

relaxed about all this (according to the results of the monitoring conducted by VoIRC RAS) than before the beginning of the SMO and even than in the 1990s (Tab. 6).

In particular, according to the latest data (for 2023), “the desire to work less and earn more” and “ultra-high earnings” are “acceptable and quite normal” for more than half of respondents (51 and 56%, respectively). For comparison: in 1996, 36 and 53% thought so, in 2018 (the last round of polls before the start of the SMO) – 49 and 54%.

As for the values associated with the form of family relations, gender tolerance, etc., it is worth noting that in Russia, **even before the SMO**, there was the lowest and at the same time decreasing (unlike most European countries) level of tolerance

Table 6. Proportion of people for whom the listed moral and ethical phenomena and actions are “acceptable, quite normal”, % of respondents

Phenomena / actions	Year					Dynamics (+/-), 2023 to..., p.p.		
	1996	2000	2018	2022	2023	1996	2000	2018
Smoking	64.9	65.6	59.4	63.3	63.7	-1	-2	+4
Passion for things	56.8	60.9	53.8	60.9	61.4	+5	+1	+8
Ultra-high earnings	53.4	62.6	54.4	56.0	55.9	+3	-7	+2
The desire to work less and earn more	36.1	46.1	48.5	52.2	51.3	+15	+5	+3
Refusal to undergo military service	40.2	47.4	43.9	45.1	45.0	+5	-2	+1
Life by the principle of “roll my log and I’ll roll yours”	46.4	48.9	40.4	45.1	44.8	-2	-4	+4
Laziness	22.3	27.4	34.7	42.6	39.8	+18	+12	+5
Alcohol addiction	19.6	13.3	18.6	20.9	22.2	+3	+9	+4
Arrogance	10.9	13.9	19.6	22.0	21.9	+11	+8	+2
Toadyism, sycophancy	9.0	10.4	15.6	19.0	17.0	+8	+7	+1
Bribes	10.7	9.3	13.4	15.5	13.8	+3	+5	0
Disrespectful attitude toward women	5.6	6.7	9.6	12.1	11.5	+6	+5	+2
Theft	7.8	6.0	4.8	9.7	9.7	+2	+4	+5
Drug addiction	2.0	2.0	5.1	6.6	7.1	+5	+5	+2

Ranked according to data for 2023.
Source: VoIRC RAS public opinion monitoring.

³⁹ Woke, Wokeism (English: woke culture, woke), or the culture of engagement is a modern ideological movement that emerged in the United States in the 2010s on the wave of the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. Its supporters are characterized by heightened attention to racial prejudice, any form of discrimination, socio-economic inequality, sexism, infringement of the rights of minorities, and demand active, sharp condemnation and persecution of such manifestations (Source: The Great Russian Encyclopedia. Available at: <https://bigenc.ru/c/kul-tura-vovlechnosti-df058f>).

⁴⁰ Sheregi F.E., Privedentseva O.S. (2024). Medium-term forecast of the dynamics of Russians’ life attitudes. *Vestnik Instituta sotsiologii*, 15(3), p. 34.

toward non-traditional pro-Western orientations⁴¹. Back in 2021, Vladimir Putin called it the “internal moral protection” of Russian society, the “deep immune system” that will protect us “from this obscurantism”.

Excerpt from Vladimir Putin’s press conference on December 23, 2021:

M. Gadziyev (“Russia Today” reporter): “...the culture of cancellation, the rejection of familiar concepts like ‘mom’, ‘dad’, ‘family’ or even ‘gender’.. What is your attitude toward the new ethics? Will this ‘carriage of values’ come to Russia?”

Vladimir Putin: “This carriage will move toward us, inevitably ... I hope that our society has internal moral protection dictated by the traditional confessions of the Russian Federation... All the peoples of the Russian Federation – I want to emphasize, all of them – have a certain internal moral protection against such obscurantism... Yes, let them do what they want there. We must take everything progressive and the best that helps to develop... but I hope that our peoples, the peoples of Russia, will have enough internal deep immune systems to protect against this, as I said, obscurantism”⁴².

Thus, the meaning of the internal changes in the country expected from the SMO, the essence of the changes, which consist in ridding Russia of liberal dogmas and a semi-colonial state in relation to the Collective West, is not only to preserve traditional values in the face of the “surge” of non-traditional values of gender equality and tolerance coming from the West, **but above all in that thing which expresses the meaning of capitalism as the ideology of the Western “consumer society”**.

And it expresses exactly what sociologists at IS RAS say in the second part of their forecast for Russian society for the next 20 years – “a moral image burdened with the priority of material values, the source of which will not always be legitimate ..., as well as a liberal attitude toward corrupt methods of solving personal problems”.

“Capitalism is exactly **the same historical socio-economic formation, that is, the political state system in which we live and prosper, although with a caveat, not everyone prospers in it**, but only those who are lucky, that is, who managed to grab a fat piece and now will not give it to anyone, if anyone by force or cunning, will not take this fat piece away from him... The ideology of capitalism in a simple and understandable expression for everyone – this is **to capture, appropriate, suppress, subjugate, dominate, endlessly satiate oneself, this is permissiveness under the brand of freedom, but only for the elect, the rich and successful, the rest eat crumbs from the master’s table; in short, it is injustice in all its unsightly ugly beauty**”⁴³.

“Modern capitalist ideology is a complex multi-level structure. It is based on a common ethics for all, based **on commodity-money relations, individualism, on the principle of ‘purchasability’ of everything** and the desire for total digitization, i.e. putting a price tag on everything that is done by a person. And at the top there are various variations of ideologies for every taste, even outwardly opposite, **but fundamentally and essentially not leading anywhere beyond them**”⁴⁴.

⁴¹ Between 2006 and 2018, the proportion of people who believe that “gays and lesbians should have the right to lead a lifestyle that corresponds to their views” in Russia decreased from 26 to 17%. For comparison: in Germany, over the same period, it increased from 71 to 87%, in the UK – from 78 to 88%, in France – from 77 to 89%, etc. (Source: European Social Survey data. Available at: <http://www.ess-ru.ru>).

⁴² Vladimir Putin’s big press conference. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67438>

⁴³ Popov V. (2021). Ideology of capitalism. Available at: <https://proza.ru/2021/12/29/769>

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

V. Katasonov: “The main goal of life, according to the ideology of capitalism, is **material prosperity, profit, acquiring money and capital by any possible means, and above all through deception and exploitation of weaker peoples and members of society...** Wealth is an expression of being chosen. A rich man is blessed by God, and all who have no money must serve the ‘chosen ones’. **The disintegration of Western Christianity at the end of the Middle Ages became the starting point for the creation of capitalist ideology and economic means of enslaving humanity**”⁴⁵.

Thus, the disturbing moments observed by experts in Russian society, associated with getting used to life in conditions of the SMO and in some ways even the loss of fear, which is quite natural and very useful for understanding the essence of the historical moment and, as a result, for an adequate response to possible “unpopular”, but forced and necessary decisions of the President, correlate with the tendency toward routinization of local (regional and municipal) elections and are largely a consequence of a “paradigm” that the authorities

“The public administration system is consistently adapting to the existing realities. **Thus, it cannot be excluded that at some point the fundamental paradigm that the government had previously dictated to society will also be changed. They say that most people should stay somewhat away from the event that military professionals will brilliantly conduct on their own**”⁴⁶.

adhere to from the very beginning of the SMO, the paradigm according to which “life goes on as usual”.

Similar processes can be observed in the effectiveness of the public administration system itself, where the role of “positive trends” is played by the ongoing active measures of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation to bring living conditions in the country in line with the essence of the historical period of time that Russia is passing through (including the increase in external threats, and the forced need for complex internal changes in the country). And the role of “disturbing moments” is played by numerous evidence that some of the elite still have not shifted toward the military “rails”, continuing to live as if there were no SMO.

Some of the management decisions made by the head of state and the Government of the Russian Federation are presented in *Insert 4*. We would like to pay special attention to a number of personnel appointments made by Vladimir Putin in order to ensure real (and not “on paper”) work of the personnel program “Time of Heroes”.

In December 2022 experts at Nezavisimaya gazeta newspaper noted that the Kremlin “in every possible way distances itself from any emergency situation, emphasizing that civil and political life inside the country, despite the SMO, goes on as usual”⁴⁷.

In September 2024 K. Kalachev, head of the Political Expert Group, said that “the ‘life goes on as usual’ paradigm is likely to continue unless something extraordinary or crucial happens”⁴⁸.

⁴⁵ Katasonov V.Yu. (2013). *Kapitalizm. Istoriya i ideologiya “denezhnoi tsivilizatsii”* [Capitalism. The History and Ideology of the “Monetary Civilization”]. Moscow: Institut russkoi tsivilizatsii. Pp. 144, 522.

⁴⁶ Rodin I. Public administration adapts to the realities of the SMO. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-19/1_3_9097_veterans.html

⁴⁷ Garmonenko D. The Socialist Revolutionaries will prepare for the elections just in case. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2022-12-15/3_8617_candidates.html

⁴⁸ Garmonenko D. Sociologists of the Russian Academy of Sciences calculate the “SMO coefficient”. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-09-29/1_3_9103_sociology.html?ysclid=m28po0qyxc81413058

“By now, **10 participants** of the educational program “Time of Heroes” initiated by the President have received new appointments to responsible positions. According to the decree of the head of state:

- ✓ Hero of the DPR Artyom Zhoga has been appointed plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Ural Federal District.

- ✓ Hero of Russia Artur Orlov was appointed head of the “Movement of the First” by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation.

- ✓ Alexey Kondratiev became a senator of the Russian Federation.

- ✓ Hero of Russia Igor Yurgin headed the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Social Communications of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).

- ✓ Alexander Surazov headed the Committee on Physical Culture and Sports of the Altai Republic.

- ✓ Evgeny Chintsov headed the Nizhny Novgorod City Duma.

- ✓ Zaur Gurtsiev became first deputy head of the city of Stavropol.

- ✓ Hero of Russia Roman Kulakov became a deputy of the Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol.

- ✓ Konstantin Yashin headed the Samara Research and Production Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems.

- ✓ Hero of Russia Vladimir Saibel became Deputy Head of the Social Development Department of Russian Railways JSC.

Another 10 participants of the “Time of Heroes” program received personnel offers to move to new jobs in the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, federal and regional authorities, and state-owned companies”⁴⁹.

According to experts, the “Time of Heroes” program “sets a powerful trend for the formation of a qualitatively new class of managerial elite”⁵⁰, and in this sense, one can only express the hope that the passion, moral qualities and qualifications of its graduates will be enough for them to avoid becoming “victims” of “representatives of liberal circles who are still in power”⁵¹.

“The state system is a single organism in order to reject everything alien that gets into it. Once in power, a representative of the counter-elite must **either assimilate into the system, or it will reject him**, and even not without losses for himself, because an intelligent idealistic passionary is dangerous for a stupid, lazy, money-hungry official”⁵².

However, despite all these measures, which are taken on a daily basis by the head of state and the government virtually throughout the entire period of SMO implementation, specific facts and episodes are still noted in Russia, which indicate either an inadequate perception (underestimation) by a significant part of the elites of the essence of the historical moment, or their deliberate sabotage of those transformational processes inside Russia, which were launched together with the beginning of the SMO (*Insert 5A*).

Such facts, on the one hand, are criteria for the effectiveness of public administration, since they are a consequence of the general (organizational, administrative, political, economic, ideological) conditions created in the country; on the other hand, they do not fit into the process of “adjusting Russia to achieve Victory”.

⁴⁹ 20 participants of the “Time of Heroes” program have taken up new positions and are preparing to move to more responsible areas of work. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/6195>

⁵⁰ Isaichenko O. The Time of Heroes has come in Russian Government. Available at: <https://vz.ru/society/2024/10/3/1290528.html?ysclid=m28q6ov8q7136017831>

⁵¹ The time of liberals is over. The new elite will consist of those who did not engage in betrayal. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/news/vremja-liberalov-proshlo-novaja-jelita-budet-sostojat-iz-teh-kto-ne-predal_967197?ysclid=m2a716tt1y880320580

⁵² Korovin V. Where are you, Putin’s commissars? Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/gde_vi_komissari_putina

Insert 4

**The monitoring of regulatory legal acts (laws, decrees) signed by the President of the Russian Federation
in the period from August 15 to October 19, 2024⁵³**

**MEASURES TO SUPPORT SMO PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS, TO DEVELOP THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX,
MEASURES RELATED TO MOBILIZATION, ORGANIZATION OF MARTIAL LAW, INCREASE IN THE ANTI-TERRORIST PROTECTION OF
FACILITIES**

September 16 – Decree 792 “On establishing the regular strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. The staffing of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been established in the amount of 2,389,130 units, including 1,500,000 military personnel.

September 20 – Decree “On the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on the recruitment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with military personnel undergoing military service under contract”. The Provisions and composition of the Commission have been approved. The Commission will, among other things, coordinate the activities of government agencies and organizations for the selection of candidates for military service under a contract; analyze the recruitment process of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation by contractors; evaluate measures implemented to attract citizens to volunteer formations that assist the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during mobilization, martial law, wartime, in the event of armed conflicts, the conduct of military operations and the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation outside the country; consider proposals on measures of material remuneration for contractors and social protection of their families. The commission’s meetings will be held at least once a month.

September 30 – Federal Law 336 “On amendments to Article 6 of the Federal Law, on amendments to Articles 966 and 2201 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation, suspension of certain provisions of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation and on establishing the specifics of budget execution of the budgetary system of the Russian Federation in 2024”. It provides for the possibility of providing intergovernmental transfers to the budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to co-finance expenditure obligations for the provision of medical care to military personnel by medical organizations of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation during the period of SMO implementation; the specifics of performing state (municipal) tasks in certain territories (facilities) with an increased level of terrorist danger are established.

October 2 – Federal Law 340 “On amendments to Article 781 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation”. It provides for the possibility of suspension by the court of proceedings in a criminal case, cancellation of a preventive measure and subsequent release from criminal liability of defendants, release from punishment of convicted persons in case of their conscription during mobilization or during wartime into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or their conclusion during mobilization, during martial law or during wartime of a contract on military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as persons suspected or accused of committing crimes, during military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during mobilization, during martial law or during wartime.

⁵³ This insert is a continuation of the monitoring of the most important regulatory legal acts signed by the President of the Russian Federation, which we have been conducting since June 2022. Thus, this monitoring has been ongoing for 19 months, its results have been published in 10 articles (the first issue of the monitoring is presented in the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). A difficult road after the Rubicon. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(3), 9–41).

MEASURES TO PROTECT INFORMATION SECURITY, REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS, AND UPBRING AND EDUCATE THE YOUNGER GENERATIONS

August 22 – Decree 716 “On the Council under the President of the Russian Federation for the Implementation of State Policy in the field of support for the Russian language and the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation”. According to the Provision, the Council is an advisory and coordinating body established in order to preserve, develop, support the Russian language and the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, promote and strengthen the position of the Russian language in the world, ensure the rights of citizens of the Russian Federation to use Russian as the official language of the Russian Federation and the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, as well as to coordinate the activities of federal state bodies authorities, public authorities, of the subjects of the Russian Federation, local governments, public associations, cultural and art organizations, scientific, educational and other organizations, including non-profit organizations that carry out activities in the field of international humanitarian cooperation, on issues related to the preservation, development, support of the Russian language and the languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation, promotion and strengthening of the position of the Russian language in the world.

MEASURES TO PROVIDE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL POPULATION, STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY, INCLUDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

September 6 – Decree 755 “On approval of the composition of the Commission under the President of the Russian Federation on the strategy for development of the fuel and energy complex and environmental safety”. The power bloc has become much more widely represented in the Commission. The new composition includes the head of the Ministry of Defense A. Belousov, Director of the FSB A. Bortnikov, head of the Rosgvardiya V. Zolotov, head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations A. Kurenkov, Secretary of the Security Council S. Shoigu (previously, only Director of the SVR S. Naryshkin and Interior Minister V. Kolokol'tsev were in the commission, they retained their posts). From the civilian part of the government, the new members of the commission were Deputy Prime Ministers D. Grigorenko and V. Saveliev, Head of the Ministry of Energy S. Tsviliev, Minister of Health M. Murashko and head of the Federal Customs Service V. Pikalov.

September 18 – Decree 807 “On the extension of certain special economic measures in order to ensure the security of the Russian Federation”. Counter-sanctions related to the ban on the import of certain types of agricultural products, raw materials and food from states that have imposed economic sanctions against our country have been extended until the end of 2026.

Elites “getting high”⁵⁴

April 22, V. Potanin, president of Norilsk Nickel, announced plans to transfer the plant’s facilities to China by 2027. The billionaire stressed that this “will allow us to avoid large losses caused by the current difficulties”, and also linked the transfer of production to China with the President’s order to improve the environment in Norilsk.

A. Drozdov (State Duma deputy from the Krasnoyarsk Territory): “We are talking not only about possible negative consequences of a financial nature, but also about the curtailment of strategically important processing plants that were built by the whole country in its most difficult years...A dangerous precedent is being created when irreversible decisions can be made under a plausible pretext (overcoming sanctions pressure, improving the environment), instead of following the course outlined by the President to deepen high-tech development; the decisions which lead to the loss of existing competitive advantages in the use of natural resources”⁵⁵.

V.A. Kryukov (Academician, director of the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering within the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences): “The Russian Federation does not impose any conditions and obligations on scientific and technical policy upon obtaining licenses (for the right to use the subsoil) on Norilsk Nickel, as well as on all other domestic subsoil users. This is nonsense. There are such encumbrances from the owner of the subsoil in every country with a powerful mining sector... The market itself does not initiate, regulate or launch such issues. This is the task and responsibility of the state – the owner of the subsoil”⁵⁶.

April 28, the newspaper *Zavtra* published an article by I. Shishkin, Russian historian, political scientist, head of the Working Group of the Institute of CIS Countries on Countering the Distortion of History, which notes that the information resource “Legacy of the Empire” supervised by General L.P. Reshetnikov accused Stalin of forcing Hitler to attack the USSR in 1941 for the sake of the triumph of his aggressive plans, and then – of a “treacherous” attack on Japan. According to the editorial board of the newspaper *Zavtra*, “it is quite obvious that the “Legacy of the Empire” broadcasts the basic postulate of Western propaganda, adopted by the Kiev regime and the Baltic ethnocracies. We are talking about the formula according to which the Soviet Union and the Third Reich bear equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II”⁵⁷.

⁵⁴ Kurginyan S. Ukraine expects to collapse the doctrine of a Russia getting high and a fighting Russia. Available at: [https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/caa70312?ysclid=m204snstfk186009988](https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/caa70312https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/caa70312?ysclid=m204snstfk186009988)

⁵⁵ The State Duma has demanded public hearings on the relocation of the Norilsk Nickel plant to China. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/problemi_nornikeklya

⁵⁶ Getmanov V. Problems of Norilsk Nickel. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/ataka_na_pobedu?ysclid=m24fp006po210446049

⁵⁷ Shishkin I. Attack on Victory. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/ataka_na_pobedu?ysclid=m24fp006po210446049

August 21, A. Korobeynikov, deputy of the Sverdlovsk Region announced that he had signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense and left as a volunteer for the zone of his military training. September 5, it was discovered that the people's deputy was "serving" in the federal state institution "66th Financial and Economic Service" of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, which is stationed in Yekaterinburg and is engaged in public procurement. As noted by N. Mikhalkov in the Besogon program, "the purpose of the deputy's public activity is to obtain the status of a SMO participant in order to receive a 25% discount on participation in the primaries of United Russia and then get into the State Duma in this way... in wartime it is a crime".

August 29, former Deputy Defense Minister P. Popov was sent to jail for a particularly large-scale fraud; "he was one of the people closest to S. Shoigu in the military department. According to the investigation, he organized the execution of construction and repair work, and the supply of material assets to his suburban plot at the expense of the Patriot Park. In addition, through his subordinates, he forced the heads of commercial organizations that have contractual relations with the Patriot Park to carry out construction and installation works in his suburb apartments without paying for them. After the construction of the house and landscaping of the site, Popov continued to provide technical and economic maintenance of his plot of about 3 hectares at the expense of the park. In 2021–2024, Popov, responsible for the development, maintenance and operation of the Patriot Park, enriched himself at the expense of this institution, acting jointly with the Park's director V. Akhmedov and deputy head of the Main Department of Innovative Development of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation V. Shesterov ..."⁵⁸ "There is an opinion that the charges against Popov are only the tip of the iceberg. They say that it was he, as the curator of the innovative development of the Ministry of Defense, who was supposed to lead and promote the introduction of drones"⁵⁹.

September 12, A. Doroshenko, student of the Faculty of Computer Science at the Higher School of Economics, posted a video online where she spits (literally) on a poster about contract service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In court, the girl stated that she was intoxicated at the time of the spit and allegedly did not give an account of her actions. The court imposed a fine of 40 thousand rubles on her. Soon, the HSE student "recorded a new video in which she continued her mockery; she made it clear that she did not take the incident seriously, insulted Russia and the President".

A. Ivanov (expert of the newspaper *Zavtra*): **"Why such a cheekiness? It is because Doroshenko turned out to be a typical representative of the 'golden youth', accustomed to permissiveness.** The daughter of a major businessman in the capital, media manager Roman Doroshenko, whose company previously distributed the magazine *Burda*. M. Akhmedova (editor-in-chief of IA Regnum, member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights): **"...40 thousand rubles is nothing to her. She will even welcome this kind of advertising herself"**⁶⁰.

⁵⁷ Former Army General Pavel Popov sentenced to pretrial detention. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-08-29/2_9082_news1.html

⁵⁸ Did "Prigozhin's portfolio" work again? Arrest of General Popov. Unknown facts about Shoigu's former deputy. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/news/snova-srabortal-papochka-prigozhina-arrest-general-popova-neizvestnye-fakty-o-byvshem-zame-shoigu_1047416

⁵⁹ Ivanov A. The HSE student who spat on a poster depicting Russian military is the daughter of a major businessman. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/plyunuvshaya_na_plakat_s_izobrazheniem_rossijskih_voennih_studentska_vshe_doch_krupnogo_biznesmena

End of Insert 5A

September 18, shooting was opened at the head office of Wildberries, which is located in the Romanov Dvor business center opposite the Kremlin (2 people were killed, 7 injured). Everything happened in the style of the showdown of the 1990s, which caused a wide public outcry.

K. Kabanov (Head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, member of the HRC): “The battle for Wildberries has revealed a serious problem. **Businesspeople again felt impunity and reached lawlessness. In the very center of Moscow, literally near the Kremlin, organized and armed groups of people staged a gang shootout in the spirit of the 1990s.**” “I understand intellectually that a multibillion-dollar business is being divided (the marketplace ended last year with revenue of 539 billion rubles), **powerful parties have converged, which do not care about the law at all and nothing matters to them.** But I cannot and do not want to accept this, because **this is a complete mess, more outrageous than in the 1990s.** This is a lawlessness in which random people in the center of the capital become hostages of these greedy gang fights”⁶¹.

September 21 – the son of D. Pasler, governor of the Orenburg Region (who sharply criticizes the West, stating that “all my personal assets – family, home, friends, work – are in Russia” and has access to state secrets), flew to the United States to play hockey for the American team (previously, another son of Governor Pasler studied at London.). According to experts, “Denis is only 16, and, of course, he could not make such a decision himself without the permission of his parents”.

Ya. Poplavskaya (actress): “How do officials of the Orenburg Region instill patriotism in their children? The son of Kozupica, former mayor of Orsk, is buying an apartment in Dubai. The son of Governor Pasler plays for the American team. Are things really so bad in Orenburg that children are leaving not only the region, but also the country? **Then how did Pasler get re-elected as governor with a 70 percent result?** It is somewhat suspicious!”

October 18, Ye. Startsev, deputy chief of Police for operational work of the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs, and A. Lebedev, head of the Drug Control Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the Tula Region were arrested. Both were detained on suspicion of organizing illegal migration⁶².

October 24 – Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation S. Mochalnikov and his predecessor A. Mochalnikov were detained in a criminal case of fraud in the liquidation of unprofitable mines and open-cut mines in Kuzbass. Yanovsky served as Deputy Minister of Energy for almost two decades... The direct damage in the case so far amounts to 500 million rubles, the indirect damage is more than 12 billion rubles. As noted by political scientist M. Bashirov, “this is only the first step and there will be more events shaking the industry”¹⁰.

⁶¹ 1990s-style showdown. The battle for Wildberries has revealed a serious problem. There are two solutions. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/news/razborki-v-stile-90-h-bitva-za-wildberries-pokazala-sejzoznuju-problemu-est-dva-resheniya_1056443

⁶² Migration scandal in the Tula Police: Another colonel was arrested. Available at: <https://myslo.ru/news/tula/2024-10-18-migracionnyj-skandal-v-tul-skoj-policii-eshe-odin-polkovnik-arestovan>

⁶³ Ivanov A. On Thursday, FSB officers arrested the former and current deputy heads of the Russian Ministry of Energy. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/v_chetverg_sotrudniki_fsb_skrutiti_bivshego_i_dejstvuyushhego_zamov_glavi_minenergo_rf

By and large, the facts presented in *Insert 5A* are clear evidence of the attitude of a significant part of the “getting high” elite (as political scientist S. Kurginyan calls it) toward the SMO and toward the country as a whole; toward its present and future. And it is this attitude that in many ways forms the basis of deeper, systemic problems of public administration (some of them are presented in *Insert 5B*).

As a result, we get a direct proof and disclosure of the essence of the thesis of one of the experts of the newspaper *Zavtra* N. Sorokin who said that most of the representatives of the elites who did not flee the country after the start of the SMO “remained in their places and continue to undermine the state and society from the inside”⁶⁴. And this is exactly what A. Dugin is talking about, pointing out the urgent need to “adjust the country to achieve Victory”.

The above facts showing the behavior of elites and systemic problems of public administration, which experts pay attention to, quite logically explain the reason for the growth of Joseph Stalin’s popularity in Russian society.

Against the background of the special military operation, more and more attention is focused on this historical figure: monuments are being erected, museums are being opened⁶⁵, etc. As we noted in one of the previous articles⁶⁶, this is largely due to the fact that “the current situation in Russia turned out to be similar to the situation in the mid-1930s in the USSR”⁶⁷, and then only a “strong hand”, strict measures and discipline in all spheres of life, starting with the public administration system, allowed the Soviet Union to prepare and eventually preserve the state in the event of an attack by Nazi Germany (by the way, actively funded by large corporations of Western countries such as the United States, the UK, etc.⁶⁸).

⁶⁴ Sorokin N. Mobilization of the spirit. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_radikalizacii_vojni_i_soprovozhdayushej_eyo_ideologicheskoy_sferi?ysclid=m24gthpfc362121921

⁶⁵ Cities and localities where monuments to Joseph Stalin were erected after the start of the special military operation:
September 15, 2022 – rural settlement of Ashukino, Moscow Region;
December 6, 2022 – Naberezhnye Chelny, Republic of Tatarstan;
February 1, 2023 – Volgograd, Volgograd Region;
May 9, 2023 – Krasnodar Territory, Sochi;
June 23, 2023 – Zvenigorod, Moscow Region;
June 28, 2023 – construction of the Stalin Center began in Nizhny Novgorod Region;
August 15, 2023 – Velikiye Luki, Pskov Region;
October 6, 2023 – Pervomaysk, Republic of Mordovia;
October 24, 2023 – Orlov, Kirov Region;
December 16, 2023 – Stalin Center was opened in Barnaul (Altai Territory);
August 20, 2024 – rural settlement of Kureika, Krasnoyarsk Territory;
October 11, 2024 – Vologda Region Governor announced the upcoming installation of monuments to Joseph Stalin and Ivan the Terrible in Vologda.

²⁴ Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2023). The system of oligarchic capitalism in Russia is inconsistent with the achievement of the goals of the special military operation. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 16(4), 9–37.

²⁵ Gaponenko A. Stalin’s revolution. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/voprosi_stalinizma_8

²⁶ Many experts, relying on specific historical facts and evidence, have long been saying that “Hitler was taken into the care by the Americans” (commentary by writer and public figure N. Starikov) and “he was an obvious protégé of the Anglo-Saxon elite and world capital” (commentary by Colonel General and President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems L. Ivashov). Source: comments to the article by R. Gorevoy “The Hitler Project. How London and Washington created the Third Reich”. Available at: <https://nstarikov.ru/proekt-gitler-kak-london-i-vashington-sozdali-tretij-rejh-112122>

Some systemic problems of public administration

1. “Migrants-related lobby”. K. Kabanov, chair of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, member of the HRC, pointed out that as soon as Russia started talking about a tightened migration regulation regime, business circles immediately started exerting pressure: “The opposition of lobbyists went strong. We have literally adopted a number of laws with great difficulty, with great effort ... ‘the golden billion’, those of its representatives who live in Russia, are in favor of migrants. The elite in Russia have already, in fact, revealed their cards... They believe that it doesn’t matter who Russia will be populated by. We have such people in power who de facto say the following: “We are the top, part, of the golden billion”, and who is at the bottom doesn’t matter. Whether there will be more Russians or someone else, it doesn’t matter”⁶⁹ According to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, “in 8 months of 2024, foreigners committed more than 26 thousand crimes (for all law enforcement agencies), while compared to the same period last year, there was an increase of 12% in the number of grave crimes by visitors. The number of crimes committed by illegal immigrants has almost tripled: from 2,880 to 8,059. The number of criminal assaults by migrant workers also increased from 5868 to 9708. In addition, the number of crimes of visitors who received Russian citizenship less than ten years ago increased from 7 to 11 thousand. This year, 73 extremist acts were committed by migrants, while a year earlier their number was 59 crimes”⁷⁰.

2. “Confusion in the formation of educational policy”. Since September 1, 2024, golf, cheerleading, roller sports and gorodki have been added to the school physical education curriculum by the decision of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation ... a number of innovations did not even have time to take root, as an order was issued to cancel them... The Ministry of Education of Russia is going to remove golf and cheer sports from school physical education lessons from the next academic year, as they do not correspond to the national historical experience and traditions.” All this unwittingly gives rise to suspicions about the confusion in the affairs and thoughts of those who are responsible for shaping educational policy in the country today... we have to state that the hemming and hawing of the Ministry of Education, – to include golf and cheer sports in the curricula – then to exclude them; to exclude astronomy – then to include it again; to abandon drawing – then to return it again; to remove labor education from the schedule – to include it again... – all this indicates that our educational policy cannot yet boast of a clear vision of the goal”⁷¹.

3. “The growth of civil engineering in wartime”. “People are asking questions about where the concrete structures for storing ammunition that withstand a nuclear explosion are. The answer is: they are in the same place as concrete caponiers to protect aircraft and concrete fortifications of defense lines are. And it’s not just about corruption, but the fact that the country has not yet transferred the structure of the economy to a military track. For the mass construction of concrete structures for military purposes, the same concrete is needed, but where can it come from if it is almost completely used by the abnormally growing civil construction industry. The growth of the civil construction sector in wartime is a deviation. This has never happened in any country waging a large-scale war. Because in wartime, the civilian sector is frozen in favor of the front. It’s like the law of conservation of energy – the amount of concrete is limited and the question is in the distribution of priorities”⁷².

⁶⁹ “Golden Billion” favors migrants. The elite in Russia has revealed its cards: “We are the top, and don’t care who is at the bottom”. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/zolotoj-milliard-za-migrantov-jelita-v-rossii-raskryla-karty-my-verhushka-ko-vnizu-bez-raznicy_1046577

⁷⁰ Ivanov A. The Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation reported an almost threefold increase in the number of crimes committed by illegal migrants. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/skr_soobshil_o_pochti_tryohkratnom_roste_chisla_prestuplenij_nelegal_nih_migrantov?ysclid=m24lopr9d9277636059

⁷¹ Savitskaya N. Cheer-sports, bullying, gender – these words are no longer in the school curriculum. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/vision/2024-09-25/8_9101_program.html?ysclid=m1owchuh9j879626704

⁷² Ivanov A. The growth of the civil construction sector in wartime is a deviation. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/rost_grazhdanskogo_stroitel_nogo_sektora_v_voennoe_vremya_eto_deviatciya?ysclid=m24lyxcbt0252785921

4. “The problems of the Russian economy are the result of the ambiguous activities of the financial block of our own government”. Economist A. Podoinitsyn drew attention to two multidirectional vectors in the intra-economic space: “The strategies signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin set such tasks as outpacing economic growth, eliminating the technological gap with the developed part of the Western and Eastern world, 33 square meters per person by 2030 and 38 by 2036. And so on... But, on the other hand, there is a large block of documents authored by our liberal economists, primarily from the Central Bank. They talk about the need to achieve balanced growth rates — from 0.5 to 1.5%. De facto, they talk about the alleged epic overheating of the economy, the most serious in the last 16 years. About excessive wage growth, about the lack of everything: labor resources, production capacity... If we look at these two blocks of documents, we will see that they are in planes perpendicular to each other... As a result, we have a situation where the Central Bank, in fact, blocks the implementation of the Kremlin’s policy”⁷³. Economist A. Lezhava: “After the increase in the key rate, people carried savings to banks ... For banks, this is an ideal scheme: to take money from the population and get a guaranteed profit without effort and risks. It turns out that the real sector of the economy is being cut down, because it is extremely difficult, if not pointless, for enterprises to lend at new rates”⁷⁴.

5. “Closing of the Great Russian Encyclopedia”.

“The Government of the Russian Federation has decided to close the Great Russian Encyclopedia (GRE), which has been created for almost two decades ... the database of accumulated materials will be transferred to the Internet encyclopedia Ruwiki. It is the Russian-language equivalent of the global Wikipedia system. Hundreds of thousands of GRE publications, becoming part of Ruwiki, will dissolve into a million other texts. It is simply impossible to imagine that the academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences will be able to keep up with the pace of Internet enthusiasts replenishing the womb of Ruwiki: any scientific verification takes time... It is wrong to assume that Ruwiki can compensate for GRE: they have different tasks. One resource accumulates a lot of knowledge, the other systematizes and verifies... To imagine that the British will close Britannica, because there is Wikipedia, is naive and even ridiculous”⁷⁵.

6. “The share of the domestic electronic component base (ECB) is measured by only a few percent. Russian telecommunications are based almost exclusively on imports”. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, “from 2026, at least 10% of the domestic electronic component base should be in Russian telecommunications equipment (TCE) (MSW), in 2028 — already 30%, and from 2030 — 60%. It can be assumed that today the share of domestic ECB is measured by only a few percent. All our telecommunications today are based almost exclusively on imports! Domestic experts have been warning for many years that purchases of imported electronics are extremely dangerous for our security... they can give the command to block the operation of equipment, stop the operation of an entire enterprise, disable compressors on pipelines. And even disrupt the management of our military equipment and weapons. And not only to disrupt or stop it, but simply to blow it up, to tear it to shreds” (just as TCE exploded in Lebanon on September 17–18, 2024)⁷⁶.

⁷³ Malofeev K. Not again! Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/slovo/nu-skolko-mozhno_1037701

⁷⁴ Banishevskaya Yu. Robbing the people with the help of inflation: People brought money to banks, which will be taken away by monetary reform? Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/ograblenie-naroda-s-pomoshhju-infljacii-ljudi-ponesli-dengi-v-banki-kotorye-otnimet-denezhnaja-reforma_1042508

⁷⁵ Internet enthusiasts are push doctors of sciences away from the Russian encyclopedia. Available at: https://nvo.ng.ru/editorial/2024-10-09/2_9111_red.html?ysclid=m28lafsv7266760168

⁷⁶ Katasonov V. “Digital demining” of Russia is necessary. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/neobhodimo_srochnoe_tcifrovoe_razminirovanie_rossii_iii_budet_kuda_strashnee_chem_v_bejruite?ysclid=m28qa98ay369795740


But we should note that the growth of Stalin’s popularity in modern Russian society began long before February 2022. According to all-Russian sociological research, over the period from 2001 to 2021 (that is, before the start of the SMO), the share of Russians who have a positive attitude toward Stalin increased by 22 percentage points (from 38 to 60%); the proportion of those whose attitude toward him is negative decreased by 32 percentage points (from 43 to 11%; *Figure*).

In other words, people’s growing need for a “strong hand” and an “iron fist”, which is (as experts note) “not for everyone, but for the top; for the oligarchs and ministers who steal”, reflects people’s opinion **about the effectiveness of public administration in general, and not only about how it should be in the face of unprecedented external threats from the Collective West**. External circumstances (pandemic, SMO) have only strengthened this assessment of society.

“Russia currently has **110 monuments dedicated to Joseph Stalin**, installed in public places, with the exception of museums. At the same time, only nine of them have survived from Soviet times, five were installed in the 1990s, and **96 of them appeared already in the 21st century**”⁷⁷.

“People say: there was no such corruption under Stalin, the top officials did not spend their vacation in the Maldives, they did not have these houses, rooms full of money. **This idea is also about a strong hand, an iron fist**. People say: a strong hand is not for everyone, it’s for the top. **Today, a strong hand is needed, again, not for everyone, repression is needed against those who steal: oligarchs, ministers**”⁷⁸.

The attitude of Russian society toward the figure of Joseph Stalin, % of respondents



The wording of the question is: “How do you personally feel about Stalin in general?”. There are nine possible responses to the question. This graph shows the combined options (excluding those who noted “indifferently”, “I’m not sure” and “I don’t know who Stalin is”):

positively – responses “with respect”, “with sympathy”, “with admiration”;

negatively – “with rejection, irritation”, “with fear”, “with disgust, hatred”.

Source: Levada-Center* (press release of August 15, 2023 “Attitude toward Stalin”. Available at: <https://www.levada.ru/2023/08/15/otnoshenie-k-stalinu/>).

⁷⁷ “Stalin Center” and 96 more monuments to the leader. Why do people need so much Stalin? Available at: <https://newizv.ru/news/2023-12-20/drugoy-stalin-chto-na-samom-dele-kroetsya-za-volnoy-populyarnosti-otssa-naroda-425354>

⁷⁸ Commentary on the results of the study by Levada-Center* director D. Volkov (Source: The Return of the Generalissimo. Press release of Levada-Center*. September 13, 2021. Available at: <https://www.levada.ru/2021/09/13/vozvrashhenie-generalissimusa/>).

* Listed in the register of foreign agents.

Thus, there is a close connection between the processes that experts note following the results of regional elections, between what sociologists record in the dynamics of changes in the social mood of Russian society, and between specific facts reflecting the processes that characterize the effectiveness of the public administration system.

This makes regional elections a kind of model of public relations and assessment of the effectiveness of public administration. But the main question, of course, is not how necessary or unnecessary regional elections with their diagnostic function are in the current conditions, but **what exactly they show, what processes are taking place in our country against the background of the ongoing special military operation and the gradual increase in the threat of direct conflict with NATO.**

All three analyzed “planes” (or “spheres”) indicate that in Russia the division of the country into two parts – a “fighting” Russia and a Russia that is “getting high” (as Russian political scientist, active public figure S. Kurginyan says) – still remains (and maybe even grows stronger). And this is its most vulnerable side, since it is precisely on the use of this duality, the inconsistency of our country that the Collective West is “betting” in its proxy war using the “Kiev regime”.

The fact that a significant part of Russian society, and above all its elite circles, has not yet “woken up” has good reason: **“The sharpness of awakening is conditioned by the depth of sleep... and for too long we have lived in a distorted view of the world, of ourselves, of the West and its universality. For too long we have been lulled to sleep by false fables about world peace and careless and purely material development”**⁷⁹.

Under these conditions, the key responsibility falls on the legislative power, which has real tools,

S. Kurginyan: “The Ukrainian enemy and the Collective West supporting it are working hard to destroy the existing concept of “two Russias” – “a Russia that is getting high” and “a Russia that is fighting”... The country’s current “tactical program”, according to which some are fighting, and in Russian regions people live as before – “has its advantages”. If the tactics change, then the “highly capricious part of the population”, accustomed to living in very good conditions, “may kick over the traces”...

And they [Ukrainians] are working on this, they say it bluntly that their task in the end is not military successes, that they will burn down a lot more people in the Kursk direction, that they understand its local nature, that they have not achieved a damn thing there in a big way, and that it will all be erased. But they believe that at this moment they will change this concept of a high-strung and belligerent Russia, showing the high-strung Russia that it is bad for it, and create internal political instability. And they will compromise, on the one hand, the radical forces, on the other hand, the liberal ones.

Our response to this can only be one thing – our transformation of our country into a “unified and popularly supported concept of a warring Russia”, which is intensively preparing for future, even bigger troubles”⁸⁰.

on the one hand, **to tighten discipline and increase personal responsibility** in all major spheres of life (primarily in those that can potentially create the most significant threats to national security), and on the other hand, **to reduce the possibilities of influence and lobbying its own interests of the most diverse elite groups** in these areas.

⁷⁹ Dugin A. Russia needs total militarization. Available at: <https://izborsk-club.ru/25427>

⁸⁰ Kurginyan S. Ukraine expects to collapse the doctrine of a Russia getting high and a fighting Russia. Available at: <https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/caa70312https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/caa70312?ysclid=m204snstfk186009988>

A striking example is the tightening of migration legislation. Back in 2022, Interior Minister V. Kolokoltsev said that “there are 16 departments that are interested in migrant labor”⁸¹. In 2024, K. Kabanov, member of the Presidential Council for Human Rights (HRC), head of the National Anti-Corruption Committee, stated that the “subversive” activities of migration lobbyists, who mainly include construction oligarchs, ethno-oligarchs – owners of the largest markets, various services, marketplaces, housing and communal services dealers and some heads of regions, go on quite successfully”⁸².

Since the beginning of 2024, the State Duma of the Russian Federation has adopted seven laws in the field of migration control⁸³. October 16, 2024, two draft laws from the “migration package” were unanimously adopted in the first reading, according to which criminal liability for organizing illegal migration will increase, and illegal stay in Russia will become an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crimes. In addition, Chair of the State Duma of the Russian Federation V. Volodin proposed to exclude healthcare and education from the list of areas, working in which gives a person the right to obtain a simplified residence permit⁸⁴.

State Duma deputy S. Obukhov noted that the legislator acts “exclusively in the interests of our voters, protecting them from crooks and rascals”⁸⁵, and this becomes a clear example of how the state, at

*S. Obukhov (RF State Duma deputy): “...until recently, there was a legal ‘vacuum’ in Russia, numerous gaps in legislation. And illegal migration must definitely be stopped – and the sooner the better. She needs to put barriers on all floors of government... **And first of all, due to tougher penalties – both for illegal migrants themselves and for the organizers of their legitimization**”⁸⁶.*

the expense of its existing mechanisms and tools, is able to take control of those areas that are systemically important for protecting the national interests of the country. However, we must not forget that many of these areas are extremely “sensitive” for society, and therefore (which the President regularly focuses on⁸⁷) in legislative initiatives on the part of the state, it is very important “not to overdo it”.

Thus, at present (since the beginning of the SMO), the course of national development that Russia has been following since Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term is undergoing its, perhaps, most serious “strength test”. Our country has already proved the inconsistency of the ideas of the Collective West that only in alliance with Ukraine it can be an empire⁸⁸, or a “civilization-state” (as noted in the updated Foreign Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation⁸⁹). According to experts, “today it is obvious that Russia exists in the world regardless of the degree

⁸¹ Gorevoy R. Gaster-roof. Available at: <https://versia.ru/rabochej-sile-iz-srednej-azii-pokrovitelstvuyut-16-vedomstv?ysclid=m2efacjvfq302434325>

⁸² “The subversive activities of migration lobbyists in Russia are quite successful”. Available at: <https://newdaynews.ru/authors/831404.html?ysclid=m2ef6nua79393811603>

⁸³ Veretennikova K. And let no one go unpunished. Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7232760?ysclid=m2egb6pr13295480662>

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ Obukhov S. The systemic crisis in migration policy is obvious, it cannot be dealt with by just “patching holes”. Available at: <https://kprf.ru/dep/gosduma/activities/229535.html?ysclid=m2efhns8g47870165>

⁸⁶ Ibidem.

⁸⁷ See, for example: meeting on the development of the transport industry, May 1, 2020; annual press conference, December 17, 2020; meeting of the Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights, December 9, 2021; Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, February 21, 2023; meeting on the development of the defense-industrial complex, May 15, 2024; meeting with laureates of all-Russian competitions in the field of education, October 3, 2024.

⁸⁸ “Russia can be either an empire or a democracy, but it cannot be both... **Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire**”. (Source: Brzezinski Z. (1994). The premature partnership. *Foreign Affairs*, 73(2), p. 71).

⁸⁹ On approval of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Presidential Decree 229, dated March 31, 2023.

of proximity to any country or group of countries ... this is a powerful factor in normalizing the development process and assessing fundamental risks and opportunities. **Russia can be a great and important power regardless of the degree of integration with other countries**⁹⁰.

S.Yu. Glazyev: **“The front should not be perceived as something far away, not happening to us. The front must pass through every enterprise, every government agency, and through the heart of every Russian. Soldiers do their duty on the front line, officers do everything to win at headquarters, and every citizen should bring victory closer by hard work at their workplace. Citizens who do not want to work should be equated with deserters at the front and receive no pity. The director of an enterprise that has not fulfilled the plan approved by the government should be punished. Moreover, the penalties should be tightened at times. Liberalism must be ended, it has no place in the conditions of the total war that the West is waging against Russian civilization”**⁹¹.

N.S. Mikhalkov: **“The most important thing is that if there is no internal mobilization, then universal mobilization cannot be avoided”**⁹².

However, the “test of strength” has not yet been completely passed, and much of its successful passage depends on the internal situation in the country, on the ability of the state to bring all key areas of life in line with the challenges of this “turning point” in history.

In fact, this means overcoming the contradiction that still persists in our country between, on the one hand, a completely unambiguous and obvious threat to its existence, and, on the other hand, the duality

“The main enemy of Russia is the “desire to maintain its own welfare” on the part of the elite. The neurosis of well-being among the Russian elite is expressed in the desire to cling to any circumstances that give hope for the restoration of relations with the West... one can cling to ‘prosperity’, expressed by the idea that, despite the fighting, ‘everything is good’, only if one is in a neurotic state. And in a neurotic state, one does not survive or win, but dies”⁹³.

of the division into the part of society (especially its elite circles) which is “getting high” and the part of society which is “fighting”.

The state has mechanisms and tools for this, and has practical experience as well. The main difficulty (or rather, even art) is to timely diagnose “sore spots” and in the process of “treatment” to maintain a balance between the intensity of managerial decision-making sufficient to limit the private interests of elite groups in favor of national security interests, and the caution necessary to preserve social stability in the country.

And as for society, it has repeatedly proved and continues to prove (as evidenced by the election results and the results of sociological research) its support for the course of national development, as well as decisions taken by the head of state, including in difficult times for the country, and in the context of the SMO. And this support, of course, will be even more tangible if the broad strata of the population can actually feel and see in practical changes in their daily lives, the results of the effectiveness of public administration in bringing the part of the elites that is “getting high” to their senses, so to speak.

⁹⁰ Remchukov K. About Putin and Russia today. What Western countries need to keep in mind. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2024-10-16/1_9116_ed.html?ysclid=m2eesrvb7693691085

⁹¹ Glazyev S. Restoration of the empire – salvation for Russia. Available at: <https://glazyev.ru/articles/11-analitika-i-prognozy/112466-vosstanovlenie-imperii-spasenie-dlja-rossii?ysclid=m1ovswgvzn635766457>

⁹² Mikhalkov N. Besogon “It is not allowed to lie, but what is allowed?” Available at: <https://besogontv.ru/videos/vrat-nelzya-a-chto-mozhno/>

⁹³ Kurginyan S. Interview with BelTA TV channel. July 13, 2024. Available at: https://vk.com/wall-29411306_601947

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