

EDITORIAL

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A Solid “Mandate of Trust”: 76 Million People Voted for Vladimir Putin’s Fifth Presidential Term



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Abstract. According to the results of the presidential election held in Russia on March 17, 2024, more than 76 million people voted for the current head of state Vladimir Putin (87% of those who took part in the vote); this is almost twofold greater than in his first presidential election (on March 26, 2000, 40 million, or 53% of the voters who participated in the election, voted for Vladimir Putin). The article analyzes reasons for such a solid “mandate of trust” that the President obtained; they include not only the support of the majority of Russians for the general course of national development implemented by Vladimir Putin, but also the specifics of the historical period during which the 2024 presidential election was held, as well as the results of voting on the territory of the new RF constituent entities that joined Russia after the 2014 coup in Ukraine. In the context of the ongoing special military operation and lingering threats to national security, the internal situation in Russia, which determines popular support for the President, is of particular importance. In this regard, we draw attention to the importance of effective (full-fledged and timely) implementation of the election promises of the

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head of state, which Vladimir Putin announced in his Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on February 29, 2024. The fulfillment of the tasks set by the President for the period up to 2030 largely depends on the elites in the system of public administration; therefore, at the beginning of a new political cycle and Vladimir Putin’s fifth presidential term (2024–2030) a lot will depend on the new Government of the Russian Federation, whose composition will be announced in May 2024, after the presidential inauguration. With the help of expert assessments, statistical data and the results of sociological surveys we analyze reasons for the incomplete fulfillment of instructions and tasks that Vladimir Putin outlined in his previous election speeches, and in relation to the current situation we conclude that the key conditions for further implementation of the national development course are the achievement of all the goals of the special military operation and the continuation of the process of nationalization of the elites. The article presents calculations based on official data of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on the results of the presidential elections of 2024 and 2018 in all constituent entities and federal districts of the Russian Federation. We analyze the all-Russian dynamics of turnout and voting results in all presidential elections in Russia for the period from 2000 to 2024. We make an overview of expert assessments regarding the work of the RF Government headed by M.V. Mishustin. The facts showing the presence of acute unresolved problems in the system of public administration are collected and systematized in key areas of national development.

Key words: RF presidential election, national development course, elites, RF Government, “Time of heroes”.

March 17, 2024, the presidential election was held in Russia; quite expectedly for the vast majority of experts, the current head of state, Vladimir Putin, won a landslide victory.

According to the data of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CEC RF), published on March 21, 2024¹, **more than 76 million people (87% of those who took part in the election) voted for Vladimir Putin.** It is important to note that in comparison with the previous presidential election (March 18, 2018), the share of votes cast for Vladimir Putin increased in almost all constituent entities and federal districts of the Russian Federation (*Appendix; pp. 37–41*).

An analysis of the CEC data for all the presidential elections held in Russia from 2000 to 2024 shows that **in the 24 years since Vladimir Putin**

was first elected head of state, his approval rating in the whole country has actually doubled (by almost 37 million people): from 39.74 to 76.28 million voters (Tab. 1).

In our opinion, there are three constituent elements in the twofold increase in the level of support for Vladimir Putin in the presidential election in 2024 compared to 2000; each of the components is a kind of criterion for the effectiveness of public administration and Vladimir Putin’s work as President of the Russian Federation:

The first element is actual assessment by the Russian society of the course of national development implemented by Vladimir Putin. According to experts, it is “approval of what the President has done in all previous years”².

¹ On the results of the RF presidential election scheduled for March 17, 2024: Resolution 163/1291-8 of the CEC RF, dated March 21, 2024. Available at: <https://rg.ru/documents/2024/03/21/cik-post-resultaty2024-site-dok.html?ysclid=lvc0fiwyop599831692>

² Political scientists discussed the results of the presidential election (opinion of A. Chesnakov, head of the Scientific Council at the Center for Political Conjuncture). Available at: <https://rg.ru/2024/03/19/lider-i-brendy-ocenki.html?ysclid=lugn7jyv3x476786397>

Table 1. Dynamics of voter turnout and approval rating of Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections for the period from 2000 to 2024 (nationwide, data of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation)

Indicator	Presidential election date						Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to ...	
	March 26, 2000	March 14, 2004	March 2, 2008*	March 4, 2012	March 18, 2018	March 17, 2024	2018	2000
Turnout								
abs. million people	75.18	69.50	74.85	71.78	73.63	87.58	+13.95	+12.4
%	68.70	64.38	69.81	65.34	67.54	77.49	+9.95	+8.79
Support for Vladimir Putin								
abs. million people	39.74	49.56	52.53	45.60	56.43	76.28	+19.85	+36.54
%	52.94	71.31	70.28	63.60	76.69	87.28	+10.59	+34.34
* For Dmitry Medvedev. Source: CEC RF.								

The second element is expansion of the territorial borders of the Russian Federation. In total, almost five million people (4.77 million) voted for Vladimir Putin in the new territories of the Russian Federation (including the Republic of Crimea, city of Sevastopol, DPR, LPR, Zaporozhye and Kherson regions).

The third element is specifics of the historical period that Russia has been going through since Vladimir Putin announced the start of the special military operation on the territory of Ukraine (February 24, 2022).

In the context of increasing threats to national security: ongoing economic sanctions, the growth of terrorist activity on the part of the “Kiev regime”³, as well as discussions at the highest level of the political and military leadership of NATO countries on the possibility of sending a military contingent to the zone of SMO, the presidential elections in Russia were considered by

society “as an event of common destiny, on which the future depends”⁴.

V.I. Egorov (Candidate of Sciences (Philology), State Duma deputy):

In the atmosphere of wartime, the election was held in the mode of military mobilization... The logic “for power – or we perish” for many voters turned out to be the main dominant behavior on voting days”.

M. Muzaev (election expert, Moscow): “Surveys investigating the level of support for national leaders show that the rating of the government increases during tragedies and international conflicts... Therefore, indeed, there is the effect of “consolidating around the flag” in the RF presidential election ... to deny the high rating of the President means to look at politics through rose-tinted spectacles. The Russians have given a mandate of support to the head of state against the background of the SMO”⁵.

³ In 2022, the FSB of Russia prevented 34 terrorist attacks, in 2023 – 153 (4.5 times more). Available at: <https://smotrim.ru/video/2787640?ysclid=luqpcxkjob465745053>.

April 9, 2024, FSB Director A. Bortnikov announced that 27 terrorist attacks had been prevented in Russia since the beginning of 2024 alone. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20240409/terrorizm-1938793985.html?ysclid=lusdrpsocp969833006>.

⁴ Political scientists discussed the results of the presidential election (opinion of A. Asafov, deputy chair of the Public Election Observation Headquarters in Moscow). Available at: <https://rg.ru/2024/03/19/lider-i-brendy-ocenki.html?ysclid=lugn7jyv3x476786397>

⁵ The outcome of the presidential election: How can the results obtained by the contenders be assessed and what the prospects for the development of the domestic political situation in the country are: Analytical report of the Center for the Study of Political Culture of Russia. Available at: <https://cipkr.ru/2024/03/26/analiticheskij-doklad-tsipkr-itogi-vyborov-prezidenta-kak-mozhno-osenit-poluchennye-kandidatami-rezultaty-i-kakovy-perspektivy-razvitiya-vnutripoliticheskoi-situatsii-v-strane/>

Therefore, it is no coincidence that among the motives of voters, many experts noted the effect of “consolidation around the flag”, as well as the choice dictated by the logic such as “for power – or we perish”.


This is also evidenced by the results of all-Russian and regional monitoring sociological studies, according to which, **since the beginning of the SMO, Russian society has shown an increased need for a stable and peaceful life.**

According to the Institute of Sociology FCTAS RAS, from 2022 to 2023, the share of Russians for whom stability is more important than change in the country increased by 13 percentage points (from 49 to 62%; *Fig. 1*). According to VoIRC RAS public opinion monitoring, the proportion

of Vologda Region residents who share this point of view increased by 8 percentage points over the period from 2022 to 2024 (from 39 to 47%; *Fig. 2*).


Today, as scientists note, “stability is the main thing that people want with all their heart”⁶; this is quite natural, because the understanding of stability before and during an actual full-fledged war has completely different content: in the first case, it is rather about stagnation, the absence of “new forms of economic and political life in the country”⁷ and “maintaining a reduced standard of living”⁸ (this was the reason for the request for change, which was observed before the start of the SMO); in the second case, stability is understood as the achievement of one of the natural human needs – the need for security.

Figure 1. “What is most important to you?” (IS FCTAS RAS data), % of respondents



Source: Rossiyskaya gazeta, November 22, 2023.

Figure 2. “What is more important for the country today – stability or change?” (VoIRC RAS data), % of respondents



Source: VoIRC RAS public opinion monitoring.

⁶ Chetverikova A. Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: The special operation gave Russians a feeling of belonging to a single people. Available at: <https://rg.ru/2023/11/22/issledovanie-instituta-sociologii-ran-provedenie-specoperacii-porodilo-u-rossiiian-oshchushchenie-prinadlezhnosti-k-edinomu-narodu.html?ysclid=lutg3eczi3112602781>

⁷ Russians want change, but they understand that “stability is what is currently required” (opinion of V. Petukhov, head of the Center for Integrated Social Research at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences). Available at: <https://rg.ru/2019/07/04/vyzhutovich-rossiiiane-hotiat-peremen-no-ponimaiut-cto-nuzhna-stabilnost.html?ysclid=lv685no95k275725863>

⁸ Ibidem (opinion of M.K. Gorshkov, survey supervisor, director of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences).

In conditions of a high level of uncertainty about the future and risks caused by threats to national security from the Collective West, Vladimir Putin's pre-election Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation inspired "confidence and optimism". This was noted by many experts⁹. Moreover, it is very important that **"80% of the Address announced by the head of state on February 29, 2024 was devoted to social policy and measures aimed at improving the quality of life of Russian citizens"**¹⁰. Vladimir

Putin clearly outlined the goals and objectives for the next six years (until 2030) and, thus, let the public know that he understands how and at what expense the country will develop in the current geopolitical context.

At the same time, we should note that almost all pre-election public speeches by the President were oriented toward the future, contained a list of clear priorities for national development and concerned daily life of citizens (Tab. 2).

Some of the tasks set by the President of the Russian Federation in his Address to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024 to be implemented by 2030¹¹:

- ✓ poverty level in Russia should be below 7%; among large families, it should decrease more than twofold, at least to 12%;
- ✓ maternity capital and the family mortgage program should be prolonged;
- ✓ life expectancy in Russia should reach at least 78 years;
- ✓ by 2030 to complete the major repairs of all schools; to open 12 leadership-level educational schools, 25 university campuses; to carry out major repairs of about 800 dormitories of higher education institutions and universities;
- ✓ minimum wage in Russia should increase almost twofold – up to 35 thousand rubles;
- ✓ by 2030 it is necessary to create digital platforms in all key sectors of the economy and social sphere;
- ✓ by 2030 to restore at least a thousand cultural heritage sites, to improve more than 30 thousand public spaces;
- ✓ by 2030 to allocate 4.5 trillion rubles for the modernization of municipal infrastructure;
- ✓ by 2030 the tourist flow should double and reach 140 million people per year; at the same time, the contribution of tourism to Russia's GDP will also double to 5%;
- ✓ in the next six years, more than a trillion rubles should be additionally allocated for the construction, repair and equipping of healthcare facilities;
- ✓ average income per employee in the field of small and medium-sized business in the next six years should grow faster than the rate of GDP growth.

⁹ For example:

A. Voloshko, chair of the Legislative Assembly of the Primorye Territory. Available at: <https://www.zspk.gov.ru/press-service/press-relizy/599220/?ysclid=lv2036nsw1951237132>; A. Uss, senator of the Russian Federation from the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Available at: <https://krasnoyarsk.er.ru/activity/news/aleksandr-uss-poslanie-prezidenta-vselyaet-uverenost-v-tom-chto-projdyacherez-ispytaniya-rossiya-stanet-eshe-silnee?ysclid=lv202qpjl0673706621>

¹⁰ A modern, comfortable and happy Russia. The President spoke about social policy for the next six years. Available at: <https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2024/03/01/18354896.shtml?ysclid=lv200b20jg406719130&updated>

¹¹ Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, February 29, 2024. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73585>

Table 2. Vladimir Putin’s public speeches before the presidential election

Source	Quote
“Open letter” to voters, February 25, 2000 ¹² (before the RF presidential election on March 26, 2000):	<i>“Our priority is to overcome our own poverty... if we are looking for a slogan for my election position, it is very simple. It’s a decent life; decent in the very sense in which most of my fellow citizens want to see it and believe in it”.</i>
Vladimir Putin’s speech before his trusted representatives, February 12, 2004 ¹³ (before the RF presidential election on March 14, 2004):	<i>“The main goal of all out actions is to improve the quality of life... Today we feel that the time of uncertainty and anxious expectations has passed. A new period has come – a period of work on creating conditions for the transition to a fundamentally better quality of life... it is in our power. And we will do it, we will definitely do it”.</i>
Vladimir Putin’s speech at an expanded meeting of the State Council “On the development strategy of Russia until 2020” February 8, 2008 ¹⁴ (before the RF presidential election on March 2, 2008)	<i>“We need to ensure that all citizens of our country, using their knowledge and skills, and where necessary, state assistance, have the opportunity to receive quality education, maintain their health, purchase housing, and receive decent incomes. That is, to have a standard of living that determines belonging to the so-called middle class... today we set a much more ambitious task – to achieve a qualitative change in life, a qualitative change in the country, its economy and social sphere”.</i>
Vladimir Putin’s speech at the United Russia Party Congress on September 24, 2011 ¹⁵ (before the RF presidential election on March 4, 2012)	<i>“If we really want to succeed, then the focus of our attention should always be on a person – a citizen of Russia! Russian families should feel positive changes in their lives, this is the main meaning and purpose of our entire work ... A lot needs to be changed for the better in our economy, in the social sphere, in the lives of our citizens. I am sure that we are able to do this and will do it on the basis of national consolidation”.</i>
Address to the RF Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018 ¹⁶ (before the RF presidential election on March 18, 2018)	<i>“At the heart of everything lies the preservation of the people of Russia and the well-being of our citizens. It is here that we need to make a decisive breakthrough... I think the main, key driver of development is the well-being of people, prosperity of Russian families...”</i>
Address to the RF Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024 ¹⁷ (before the RF presidential election on March 17, 2024)	<i>“Citizens’ proposals, their aspirations and hopes have become the basis, the core of those projects and initiatives that will be voiced today... The plans are big, the expenses are also significant. Large-scale investments in the social sphere, demography, economics, science, technology, infrastructure are coming... Solutions in the field of financial support for regions, economic growth, should work to improve the quality of life of people in all constituent entities of the Federation... I want to emphasize that the main result of our programs is not measured in tons, kilometers and the amount of money spent. The main thing is assessment given by the people, how their lives are changing for the better”.</i>

¹² Official website of the RF President. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24144>

¹³ Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/community_meetings/22393

¹⁴ Official website of the RF President. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825>

¹⁵ 12th Congress of the United Russia Party (transcript). Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/12802>
At the time of his speech on September 24, 2011, Vladimir Putin held the position of Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation and Chair of the United Russia Party. At the 12th Party Congress, he was nominated as a candidate from United Russia to participate in the RF presidential election on March 4, 2012.

¹⁶ Official website of the RF President. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42902/page/1>

¹⁷ Official website of the RF President. Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/73585>

However, according to experts, many of the goals and objectives that were announced by the head of state on the eve of the presidential elections, were not fully achieved or remained “ink on paper”.

And this is, obviously, due to the people who were entrusted with their implementation; those representatives of the ruling elites who were either unable or not interested in fulfilling the instructions of the head of state.

Many of their names became known after the beginning of the SMO (*Insert 1*), and, in short, **at different periods over the past 24 years, they were responsible for almost all key areas of state national policy: from the military-industrial complex and the economy to social development and interethnic relations.**

We can say that the threats to national security that the country faced after the start of the SMO made the task of achieving sovereignty in all spheres the issue of “life and death”, and it depends primarily on the staffing of the public administration system – the ruling elites of the country, directly involved in the practical implementation of the guidelines designated by the head of state. However, even today, the real facts (*Insert 2*) indicate that elites often conduct their activities guided not by national interests and presidential instructions, but primarily by their own motives and ideological dogmas imposed on them by the Collective West, in particular through the recommendations and rules of international organizations (WTO, IOC, WHO, etc.).

“Activists of the All-Russian Popular Front (ONF) analyzed the implementation of the May decrees of Russian President Vladimir Putin. According to the statement of the head of the executive committee of the ONF A. Anisimova, out of 179 points, only 35 were fulfilled: “The ONF is monitoring the execution of orders based on eight May decrees and instructions for their development. Experts have prepared conclusions on the reports of the Russian government on 179 instructions within the framework of the implementation of the May decrees and in their development. Of these, the ONF considers 35 orders fulfilled, 44 orders are not executed, and 100 orders are partially executed and require revision”¹⁸.

“On the eve of the announcement of the new presidential address to the Federal Assembly, the People’s Front “For Russia” (NF) reported on the execution of the previous two. It turned out that the message of 2023 has been fulfilled by 86% so far, and the message of 2021 – only by 61%”¹⁹.

We emphasize that these facts took place after the start of the SMO and therefore the doubts of experts that the special military operation really changed something in the Russian elites become quite understandable – **so much so that they can match the scale of the challenges and tasks facing the country at such a turning point in history...** Including the implementation of the instructions of the head of state, which were voiced in the Address to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024.

¹⁸ The ONF reported on problems related to the implementation of the president’s instructions. Available at: <https://ura.news/news/1052759228>

¹⁹ That’s what needed to be checked. Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6533586>

Insert 1

Main areas of governmental policy supervised by former members of the Government of the Russian Federation who left the country after February 24, 2022

Former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has left Russia and now lives in Latvia. Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Dvorkovich has left for the United States. Israel was chosen as a place of residence by former deputy heads of government I. Klebanov, A. Khloponin and Ministers Ya. Urinson and M. Akimov. Former head of State Property A. Kokh lives in Germany. V. Khristenko has an apartment in Spain. Former Deputy Prime Minister O. Golodets lives in two countries, one of them is Spain. Former heads of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation live abroad (V. Voloshin, V. Yumashev with B. Yeltsin’s daughter Tatyana), as well as former ministers and their deputies (A. Kozyrev, E. Skrynnik, A. Vavilov, I. Chuyan, A. Reimer, etc.), many former governors and their deputies, hundreds of federal government officials.²⁰*

For reference:

- ✓ M. Kasyanov*: Chair of the Government in 2000–2004;
- ✓ I. Klebanov: Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation, in 2000–2004 supervised issues of the military-industrial complex;
- ✓ V. Khristenko: Minister of Industry and Energy, Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation in 2000–2004;
- ✓ A. Dvorkovich: since 2000, Adviser to the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation G. Gref; since 2008 – Assistant to President Dmitry Medvedev; in 2012–2018 – Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation;
- ✓ E. Skrynnik: Minister of Agriculture of the Russian Federation in 2009–2012;
- ✓ I. Chuyan: from 2009 to 2018 – Head of Rosalkogolregulirovanie (Federal Service for Alcohol Market Regulation);
- ✓ A. Khloponin: Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation from 2010 to 2018, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus Federal District; supervised the sphere of environmental management and turnover of alcoholic beverages, as well as issues of implementation of state national policy, improvement of organizational and legal foundations of national relations;
- ✓ O. Golodets: Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation from 2012 to 2020; supervised issues of healthcare, demography, labor relations, social development;
- ✓ M. Akimov: Deputy Chair of the Government of the Russian Federation from 2018 to 2020; supervised issues of communications, transport and digitalization of the economy...

* Included in the register of foreign agents.

²⁰ Toshchenko Zh.T. Old and new faces of betrayal. *Pravda*, 2023, no. 86, January 30.

Insert 2

Expert opinion on the problems of public administration efficiency

ECONOMY	
<p>S. Anureev (Doctor of Sciences (Economics), professor at the Public Finance Department of the Financial University under the RF Government)²¹</p>	<p>“We have the highest tax burden on the manufacturing industry, and the lowest – on trade, services, banks, metal and coal exporters.... The most serious users of fragmentation and simplified taxation system are Yandex with pseudo-self-employed taxi drivers and delivery agents, as well as Wildberries with its outlets on the franchise. Taxi drivers pay 6% to the budget and 20–28% to Yandex, and if it were the other way around, the tax effect would be comparable, for example, with all federal subsidies to the regions of the North Caucasus. What if the outlets of Wildberries worked on the general tax system, and the branches of the Russian Post worked on the franchise and simplified taxation system? The previously discussed infrastructure fee from marketplaces to support the Russian Post at 0.5% of turnover is negligible. Restaurants and banks clearly earn above average, and taxes are visibly less than average, which can also be calculated from monthly tax statistics. It is easier and more profitable for young people to pour out coffee in Moscow cafés than to work on UAZ conveyor belt, for instance. Restaurants and banks do not officially pay VAT”.</p>
<p>M. Delyagin (RF State Duma deputy)</p>	<p>“The descent into savagery of a significant part of Russia’s top leadership, formed by 36 years of national betrayal that have not yet been completed, is clearly manifested in the fact that Russian bureaucrats are strong advocates of Russia’s WTO membership. Let me remind you that liberals and oligarchs serving the interests of the West dragged our country into the WTO on deliberately enslaving, colonial conditions that exclude the possibility of full-scale development and turn us into an eternal “reliable and conscientious” donor of vital organs – raw materials, finance, brains and young people...”²²</p> <p>“The RF Constitution proclaims the right to life. However, the state guarantees the economic expression of this right – a living wage (and even that is greatly underestimated) – only to pensioners and those officially employed full-time, thereby depriving the rest of the country’s population of the right to life...According to Russian insurers, even at the beginning of coronavirus hysteria, more than 70% of Russians earned less than 25 thousand rubles per month per person (which then roughly corresponded to the real living wage, since the official one, according to estimates, was underestimated by at least half)”²³.</p> <p>“The reorientation of the state from plundering Russia to its re-creation, and the economy from financial speculation to the development of technology requires a new tax system. It is necessary to abolish the monstrous “tax maneuver” (from 2018 in the oil industry, and from 2021 in the ferrous metallurgy), which withdraws the superprofits of the oligarchs not from their pockets, but from the pockets of the people and accelerates inflation...It is reasonable to untie the mineral extraction tax from world prices... We need a progressive scale of individual income tax (including dividends), mandatory social contributions, real estate and inheritance taxes (with exemption of the extremely poor from taxation and reduction of taxation for the poor), as well as fines, following the example of Finland... Instead of more than a decade of empty rhetoric about the “luxury tax”, it is necessary to apply an imputed income tax after the Swiss model, based on the fact that the cost of maintaining a property cannot exceed a quarter of the income of its owner”²⁴.</p>

²¹ Anureev S. Putin’s Address: Achievable goals without stalling, the “ball” passed to experts and officials. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/poslanie_putina_dostizhimie_teei_bez_raskachki_myach_ekspertam_i_chinovnikam?ysclid=lumlb0h7y1858303711

²² Delyagin M. It’s high time you abandoned the rotting corpse of the WTO at last! Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/da_vjidite_zhe_vi_nakonete_iz_gniyushego_trupa_vto?ysclid=lvbvyallrt798985089

²³ Delyagin M. The right to life is the sacred foundation of economic growth. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/povestka_dnya_-_9_pravo_na_zhizn_svyashennaya_osnova_ekonomicheskogo_rossia?ysclid=lvbyzwlpy452142695

²⁴ Delyagin M. Tax revolution. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/povestka_dnya_-_18_nalogovaya_revolyuciya_vse_dlya_dobavlennoj_stoimosti?ysclid=lvbz0xw12m426740197

EDUCATION, CULTURE, SPORT	
E. Birov (journalist) ²⁵	<p>“...potential reduction in the amount of hours of instructional time spent on the subject “Fundamentals of the spiritual and moral culture of the peoples of the Russian Federation” is far from the worst thing that has happened in education... The school system under Sergey Kravtsov, Minister of Education, is experiencing serious degradation, despite the minister’s bravura reports to the president about a certain moral revival in education. First, despite the beautiful and lofty words, the principle of educational services still prevails in the school... Second, respect toward teachers has not been instilled in the school; teachers do not have real mechanisms for educating and managing unruly children... Third, schools are still overcrowded (in large cities), teachers work at two rates, often in two shifts. There is a huge shortage of personnel; young teachers cannot withstand the crazy load and quickly leave ... Fourth, despite the anthems, conversations about important things and advisers on education, patriotic education is at a very low level. Often all these initiatives are turned into events for show... Fifth, the training programs are still full of oddities and distortions, somewhere there is a huge overload of data, and somewhere there is primitive presentation”.</p> <p>On March 19, 2024, the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation published²⁷ Order 171, according to which, from September 1, 2025, social studies will be excluded from the school curriculum of grades 6–8.</p> <p>The introduction of the initiative can lead to students’ failing main state exams (OGE) and the development of legal illiteracy among teenagers, says Dmitry Kokorikov, a lawyer, tutor, author of the educational project “Our Society”: “Children aged 15–16 study in the ninth grade. So, they only find out at this age that they can be subject to criminal liability for some crimes since the age of 14, and since the age of 16, administrative liability begins... That is, at school we will talk about some super-advantages of the Russian economic system. But at the same time, we will not have to explain what an economic system is in general, that it can be market, traditional and command... Some teachers and school principals, on condition of anonymity, said that despite the changes in the program, they plan to introduce students to social studies on their own. In particular, to touch upon the topics of law and social relations in history lessons, as well as invite ninth graders to additional electives in preparation for the OGE in social studies”.</p> <p>“The “Teacher” trade union has collected almost three thousand signatures against the reduction of the social studies course in schools. The signatures have already been sent to the Ministry of Education. Earlier, other public organizations, such as the Association of Teachers of History and Social Studies, sent appeals on this issue to the Ministry. The main complaint of teachers is the lack of a broad public discussion of such a serious reform, which involves the exclusion of the subject from three grades at once — from 6th to 8th”²⁸.</p>
D. Korikov (lawyer, author of the educational project “Our Society”) ²⁶	

²⁵ Birov E. Patriarch is deservedly dissatisfied with Kravtsov’s work. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/patriarh_zasluzhenno_nedovolen_rabotoj_kravtsova?ysclid=lumcvflmx1313978541

²⁶ Social studies are excluded from secondary school. Experts’ and teachers’ attitude toward the initiative. Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6608740>

²⁷ “On amendments to some orders of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation concerning federal educational programs of primary general education, basic general education and secondary general education”. Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202404120003>

²⁸ Social drop-out: Teachers demand to discuss the reform of social studies. Available at: <https://iz.ru/1667510/sergei-gurianov/deklassirovannyi-element-uchitelia-trebuit-obsudit-reformu-obshchestvoznaniia>

Continuation of Insert 2

<p>A. Goncharov (journalist)²⁹</p>	<p>“Recently, the poetry collection of the Soviet and Russian writer, editor-in-chief of our newspaper Aleksandr Prokhanov was subjected to a hidden liberal obstruction... The commercial site Marketplace LLC did not distribute the book <i>Rasplavlyennyy svinets</i> (“Molten Lead”) (Prokhanov’s poems devoted to the SMO). At the request of the publishers about the reason for the refusal, the following answer was received: “The product is prohibited for placement on the “Megamarket” site. Due to the unstable political situation, goods that may cause internal conflicts are not allowed to be sold on the site...” The OZON site has sent a notice of termination of distribution of this publication “in connection with customer complaints”.</p>
<p>A. Ivanov (journalist)³⁰</p>	<p>On March 7, the Ministry of Sports of the Russian Federation excluded Kamila Valieva from the lists of candidates for the Russian national team. The document of the Ministry of Sports clarifies that the exclusion of seventeen-year-old Kamila was carried out according to the regulations of the department. “Everything has been done in accordance with legislative documents”, A. Kogan, director general of the Russian Figure Skating Federation, told TASS. How should we treat all this? With the deepest contempt, of course. To the bureaucrats (and their lackeys from the media), who, in principle, quite sincerely do not imagine any other form of relationship with Western elites, other than passive participation in doggy style games. It is impossible to reorient officials, and there are a great many of them – far from only in the sports field. They are educated, they owe their careers to this paradigm, within which there is only the almighty West and its lackeys. TV and radio presenter Sergey Mardan: “The situation turns out very ugly. Two years ago, all the Russian media, as well as all official speakers without exception, were foaming at the mouth saying that everything that was happening around Kamila Valieva was a disgrace, Russophobia and, they said, we would stand up for our dear little Kamila. The year 2024 is coming and the head of the Figure Skating Federation excludes Valieva from the national team for violating doping rules. Absolutely everyone who publicly defended Kamila two years ago finds themselves in the position of idiots. And only Aleksandr Kogan is squeaky clean and can safely travel the world as a person who does not violate any sanctions at all”.</p>
<p>SCIENCE</p>	
<p>RAS experts³¹: ✓ G. Chucheva, Chair of the trade union, deputy director for science at Kotelnikov Institute of Radioengineering and Electronics of the Russian Academy of Sciences</p>	<p>“In the vast majority of developed and actively developing countries of the world (USA, China, Western European countries, Japan, South Korea), domestic research and development costs in relation to GDP are growing and exceed 2% of GDP, reaching even 4–5%. In Russia, this indicator has not increased in recent decades, mainly being in the range of 1–1.1% of GDP. And since 2020, it started to fall, and in 2022 it fell to the level of the 1990s – 0.94% of GDP. Budget expenditures on science in relation to GDP, including expenditures on basic research, are also falling. The Russian government ignored the recommendations of the Russian Academy of Sciences to allocate 415 billion rubles for basic research in 2024. It is planned to allocate 261 billion rubles, which is only 3.3% higher than the level of 2023 (with planned inflation at the level of 4.5%)”.</p>

²⁹ Goncharov A. Sabotage without embellishment. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/sabotazh_bez_prikras?ysclid=lumdsai8z997108882

³⁰ Ivanov A. It is necessary to “say out loud: Yes, figure skater Valieva is a Russian soldier at the war with the West”. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/neobhodimo_skazat_vsluh_da_figuristka_valieva_eto_russkij_soldat_na_vojne_s_zapadom?ysclid=lumixbhet9673259839

³¹ Press conference of the Trade Union of Workers of the Russian Academy of Sciences “Bleak financial prospects of Russian science in the year of the 300th anniversary of the Russian Academy of Sciences”. Available at: <https://new.ras.ru/activities/news/press-konferentsiya-profsoyuza-rabotnikov-rossiyskoy-akademii-nauk-bezradostnye-fiansovoye-per-spekti/?ysclid=lv3o7oakgv66483491>

Continuation of Insert 2

	<p>G. Chucheva, Chair of the trade union, deputy director for science at Kotelnikov Institute of Radioengineering and Electronics of the Russian Academy of Sciences: “Basic budgets of most of our institutions are spent mainly on modest salaries of the main staff, utilities and, if there is money left, for housekeeping needs. As for the purchase of consumables and equipment, the maintenance of infrastructure, it is done mainly with the help of grants and contracts, if there are any. In such conditions, it is extremely difficult to attract and retain young people, conduct breakthrough research, and not fall out of the global research mainstream”.</p>
<p>✓ E. Onishchenko, Deputy Chair of the trade union, researcher at P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute</p>	<p>“In recent decades, domestic research and development costs in Russia amounted to about 1% of GDP, and from 2020 they began to decrease, falling to the level of the 1990s. In developed countries, this figure is 2–4 times higher. The situation is no better with the financing of basic research, the responsibility for the development of which lies with the government. In 2024, less than 0.15% of GDP is planned to be allocated from the budget for basic science; it is the lowest figure in the years of modern Russian history. In most developed countries, the figures are many times higher – 0.4–0.6%, and this level of financing is typical for the top thirty countries, and not the top five, which we dream so much of getting into”.</p>
<p>✓ V. Kalinushkin, head of department at General Physics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences</p>	<p>“A huge problem associated with continuous underfunding is the imbalance in salaries of scientists from the central part of the country and regions, as well as in salaries of researchers and other categories of employees of research institutes, which has accumulated over the years of lack of money. How can we retain qualified staff when an engineer who worked at the Research Institute for decades receives three times less than a newly employed junior researcher?... An alarming factor is the researchers’ lack of financial stability. The guaranteed part of remuneration – salaries – is only 20–30% of the money received. Without additional investments it is impossible to introduce a new remuneration system with an increased salary in science, as officials have been promising for several years”.</p>
<p>✓ Academician B. Kashin, Deputy Academician-Secretary of the Department of Mathematical Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Researcher at Steklov Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences</p>	<p>“After the presidential election, a new government will be formed. Therefore, the scientific community needs to think about whether the current form of science management meets the needs of the relevant community and the needs of the state, and in case of a negative answer, raise the question of changing it... From my point of view, the Ministry of Science and Higher Education has shown complete helplessness in terms of science, without solving any of the urgent problems that prevent scientists from working. Instead of developing comprehensive solutions to really important issues, officials are inventing indicators to evaluate the work of scientists”.</p>

End of Insert 2

CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM	
<p>RIA-novosti July 24, 2023³²</p>	<p>“Investigators detained K. Polezhaev, former vice governor of the Belgorod Region, on suspicion of receiving a grand bribe – 17 million rubles ... Ex-mayor of Belgorod Anton Ivanov (2021–2022) was detained by FSB officers under a similar article – suspicion of grand bribery. On March 20, another official from Savchenko’s team was detained. He was former mayor of Stary Oskol (2018–2021) A. Sergienko, who was accused of receiving three bribes totaling 15 million rubles”.</p>
<p>RIA-novosti October 19, 2023³³</p>	<p>“The Basmanny Court of Moscow arrested in absentia former top manager of Roscosmos V. Meshkov in the case of a grand fraud... Meshkov is involved in the theft of more than 600 million budget rubles allocated for the reconstruction of stands in the <u>Research Center for the Rocket and Space Industry</u>. This is the main structure of Roscosmos, which is engaged in testing liquid rocket engines... Now the suspect is abroad, he has been put on the international wanted list. Meshkov is valid state councilor of the 3rd class. In 2016, he headed the department of capital construction of Roscosmos and became an adviser to the general director of the state corporation. In 2019, he moved to the position of deputy head of the department in the office of the presidential envoy to the Volga Federal District”.</p>
<p>RIA-novosti December 22, 2023³⁴</p>	<p>“The Main Investigative Department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation is investigating a criminal case against Oleg Frolov, Deputy Director General of the State Corporation for Space Activities Roscosmos, an individual entrepreneur, as well as a representative of a commercial organization. Each of the three defendants has been charged with committing a crime under Part 4 of Article 159 of the Criminal Code of Russia (grand fraud)”.</p>
<p>RIA-novosti April 8, 2024³⁵</p>	<p>“In the Krasnoyarsk Territory, ex-head of the department of JSC Academician M. F. Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems was detained on charges of fraud in excess of 28 million rubles. A criminal case has been launched... According to data from open sources, JSC Academician M. F. Reshetnev Information Satellite Systems is located in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Territory. The company is a leader in the creation of communication, broadcasting, retransmission, navigation, and geodesy spacecraft”.</p>
<p>RBK April 24, 2024³⁶</p>	<p>“The Basmanny Court sent Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov to jail. He was arrested for two months, until June 23. Ivanov was charged under Part 6 of Article 290 of the Criminal Code (receiving a grand bribe) ... In several Russian regions, security forces are conducting dozens of searches related to the case of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov... The materials of the criminal case are related to Ivanov’s official duties. The case may become multi-episode, as the investigation interviews possible participants in criminal activity who give evidence”.</p>

³² Polezhaev, former vice-governor of the Belgorod Region, was detained on bribery charges. Available at: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/07/24/986576-bivshego-vitse-gubernatora-belgorodskoi-oblasti-polezhaeva-zaderzhali-po-delu-o-vzyatke>

³³ In Moscow, former top manager of Roscosmos, Meshkov, was arrested in absentia. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20231019/sud-1903770295.html?in=1>

³⁴ Deputy director-general of Roscosmos was accused of fraud. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20231222/obvinenie-1917585930.html?in=1>


³⁵ Ex-head of the Roscosmos enterprise was suspected of fraud. Available at: <https://ria.ru/20240408/moshennichestvo-1938496833.html?ysclid=lvbzcsp71376950195>

³⁶ The court arrested deputy defense minister Timur Ivanov. Available at: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/04/2024/6628aa7c9a7947bd29bfb8e82?ysclid=lvdj4d6ce4469838502>

However, the issue is not even about achieving the specific indicators contained in the Address. As we noted earlier, many of them had not been achieved before, but this did not affect the stability of such important trends in society as an increase in the level of trust in almost all state and public institutions in the country (including all


authorities), an improvement in the psychological well-being of the population (*Insert 3*), which “largely depends on the degree of resolvability of social problems and contradictions, as well as satisfaction of social interests³⁷), decrease in protest potential (*Fig. 3*), and many others (*Fig. 4*).

Figure 3. Dynamics of social mood (VoIRC RAS average annual data), % of respondents



Wording of the question: “What could you say about your mood in recent days?”

Figure 4. Dynamics of protest potential (VoIRC RAS average annual data), % of respondents



The protest potential is the proportion of respondents who answered the question “What are you ready to do to protect your interests?” as follows: “I will go to a rally, demonstration”; “I will participate in strikes, protest actions”; “If necessary, I will take up arms, I will go to the barricades”.

³⁷ Kharchenko S.V. (2011). Phenomenon and the nature of social attitudes. *Mir nauki, kultury, obrazovaniya*, 1, 168–170.

Insert 3

Dynamics of the level of trust in state and public institutions (VolRC RAS data, % of respondents)

Answer option	Average annual data								Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 1996
	Presidential term of Boris Yeltsin (1996*)	Vladimir Putin's first presidential term (2000–2003)	Vladimir Putin's second presidential term (2004–2007)	Dmitry Medvedev's presidential term (2008–2011)	Vladimir Putin's third presidential term (2012–2017)	Vladimir Putin's fourth presidential term (2018–2023)	Vladimir Putin's fifth presidential term (2024**)		
RF President	26.5	58.2	58.6	56.0	55.3	54.3	59.3	+33	
RF Government	18.5	39.3	39.3	51.7	45.5	43.8	51.9	+33	
Police	14.1	26.0	27.0	33.6	37.2	43.4	49.6	+36	
Prosecutor's Office	18.2	28.9	31.9	36.8	39.5	45.4	49.5	+31	
Church	37.9	42.6	44.3	47.8	44.7	46.8	48.1	+10	
FSB	12.6	32.6	33.4	37.5	38.5	43.7	47.2	+35	
Army	34.2	33.8	27.8	35.0	39.6	42.6	46.8	+13	
Court	19.8	30.9	33.9	37.4	39.1	42.2	46.3	+27	
Leadership of the region	14.2	28.6	35.3	40.3	36.6	36.5	44.0	+30	
Federation Council	13.4	27.9	31.7	39.3	37.4	34.2	43.3	+30	
Local government bodies	-	-	29.5	35.9	32.9	34.3	42.9	-	
Scientific organizations	-	-	-	-	-	34.0	41.2	-	
RF Civic Chamber	-	-	-	27.3	31.2	30.3	39.2	-	
State Duma	14.8	22.5	27.6	35.3	33.1	31.1	38.7	+24	
Civic Chamber of the region	-	-	-	25.3	28.1	28.6	37.6	-	
Mass media	15.4	29.1	29.1	30.5	28.0	29.7	36.9	+22	
Trade unions	20.2	26.0	27.6	31.0	27.4	31.2	36.8	+17	
Public organizations	-	-	22.2	27.5	25.5	28.0	36.3	-	
Directors, CEOs	5.2	20.1	23.8	24.5	23.0	24.1	31.9	+27	
Political parties, movements	6.8	12.9	17.2	23.1	19.5	21.6	30.1	+23	
Bankers, entrepreneurs	8.5	13.9	20.5	22.2	19.4	21.8	29.7	+21	

* The question was asked only in 1996.

** The question is asked twice a year (in April and October). The table shows data for April 2024.

Wording of the question: "Please determine your attitude toward the public structures and institutions of power operating in the country" (answer options: "I fully trust" and "I mostly trust").

In addition, the Government of the Russian Federation, chaired by Mikhail Mishustin (whose candidacy was proposed by the President on January 15, 2020), has managed to do a lot in four years to ensure that the Russian economy could develop successfully, and in extremely difficult conditions associated first with the COVID-19 epidemic, and then with the special military operation (*Insert 4*).

Today, the President and the Government continue to actively take measures aimed at strengthening the Russian economy, supporting the population and restoring order in the country, which ultimately allows Russia to continue to fight for its national sovereignty, or rather for the preservation of its statehood, culture, and territorial borders (*Insert 5*).

Thus, we cannot but agree that “currently, the immune system of our country is mobilized and is functioning at its peak³⁸ and that it has **“a large number of real patriots; a relatively large healthy**

core that is pulling the country out of the abyss”. But given the unprecedented threats to national security that Russia has faced since February 24, 2022, it would be short-sighted and simply dangerous to look at the situation in the country through rose-tinted spectacles.

The problem, as we have already said, is not that some of the goals outlined in the Address have been achieved, and some have not, but that today for Russia there arises a question of “to be or not to be”: the country must make a full-fledged U-turn from the liberal past in which it has existed for the last 30 years and which has produced not just a generation of elites, but an entire generation of Russian society. Therefore, the reversal should be appropriate in scale: starting from the everyday consciousness of ordinary citizens and ending with the conceptual, system-forming principles of economic development, culture, domestic and foreign policy, moral guidelines.

It is a big question whether the current ruling elite, in which “a critical mass of people who are incapable of mobilization and historical breakthrough, has accumulated over the previous ... decades”⁴⁰, will be capable of making such a U-turn. This, of course, arouses concern for the future of the country in the external context in which it found itself after February 24, 2022.

“... We cannot say that the entire current dominant social stratum is totally affected by vices, there is also a relatively large healthy core in it. This very core is now pulling the country out of the abyss, pushing through the measures necessary for its survival and development... There are many statespeople who, due to the circumstances, had to hide their patriotic views for a long time, adapt and work within the framework of the liberal matrix program imposed on the country and the total dominance of its bearers in government. In addition, both at the lower and middle levels, there are still a large number of real patriots in power”³⁹.

“The presence of a large “liberal tumor” that has formed over decades significantly complicates and hinders the implementation of solutions necessary for the survival and development of the country... **There are not so many outright enemies, as they say, but they are well placed**”⁴¹.

³⁸ Shkolnikov A. The immune system does not understand jokes. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/immunnaya_sistema_shutok_ne_ponimaet?ysclid=lumdm3w0t9636788891

³⁹ Kassin O. On the “political oncology” of the modern “elite” and measures for its treatment. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_politicheskoi_onkologii_sovremennoj_eliti_i_merakh_eyo_lecheniya?ysclid=lumf3jtu5x135750817

⁴⁰ Dugin A. We need an image of the Victory. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/nam_neobhodim_obraz_pobedi?ysclid=luqleyu8z777167398

⁴¹ Kassin O. On the “political oncology” of the modern “elite” and measures for its treatment. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_politicheskoi_onkologii_sovremennoj_eliti_i_merakh_eyo_lecheniya?ysclid=lumf3jtu5x135750817

Insert 4

Experts on the work of the Mishustin Government

<p>M.G. Delyagin (RF State Duma deputy)</p>	<p>“During the four years of its work, the Government of Mikhail Mishustin has demonstrated outstanding abilities to stabilize the socio-economic situation ...”⁴²</p> <p>“The Mishustin Government had to act, in fact, in extraordinary circumstances, solving the tasks primarily of stabilizing, adapting a highly integrated economy to fundamentally new conditions of the collapse of global markets and the formation of macro regions... And we must pay tribute – the Mishustin Government has demonstrated outstanding abilities to stabilize the socio-economic situation... the main success factor is the organization of the socio-economic sphere by the Mishustin Government”⁴³.</p> <p>“The Mishustin Government as a whole, being unable to call the Ministry of Finance to order (due to its exceptional political influence), is forced to compensate for the consequences of its policy, in fact, with the help of emergency measures, which in today’s situation are fully justified... It should be noted that Prime Minister Mishustin has become a true virtuoso in the way he responds to the current situation. It is thanks to his efforts that the Russian economy as a whole is developing quite stably and successfully, and its key areas receive timely protection from the destructive actions of the liberal financial authorities”⁴⁴.</p> <p>“Investment growth in 2023 amounted to 9.8%. This is only slightly less than at the beginning of the 2000s, when, after the impetus given to the Russian economy by the concerted efforts of the Primakov – Masyukov Government and the Central Bank headed by Geraschenko, investments, despite all the efforts of the liberals, who regained economic power in May 1999, increased by 10% for two years in a row. The current achievement is all the more valuable because it was achieved in incomparably less favorable conditions such as direct opposition to the investment process by the leadership of the Ministry of Finance and a number of other liberal-led public administration structures...”⁴⁵</p>
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⁴² Delyagin M. From stabilization to modernization. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/ot_stabilizatsii_k_modernizatsii_ob_ektivnie_zadachi_pravitel_stva_mishustina?ysclid=lvbzst7kg0396933428

⁴³ Delyagin M. The Government of stability yesterday and development tomorrow. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_pravitel_stvo_stabil_nosti_vehera_i_razvitiya_zavtra?ysclid=lvbztmh5re435989899

⁴⁴ Delyagin M. The Mishustin Government is saving the oil products market. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_spasaet_rinok_nefteproduktov?ysclid=lvbzudxlyu518349934

⁴⁵ Delyagin M. The miracle of Prime Minister Mishustin: Investments are growing faster than after Primakov. What’s ahead? Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/chudo_prem_mishustina_investitsii_rastut_bistree_chem_posle_primakova_chno_vperedil?ysclid=lvcl5py1o9147800141

Continuation of Insert 4

	<p>“Amazing data on the execution of the federal budget in the first quarter of 2024 have been published: its deficit collapsed from last year’s 2.1 trillion rubles by 3.5 times – to 0.6 trillion, that is, to 0.3% of GDP (which is four times lower than the level of the first quarter of 2023 – 1.2% of GDP and three times the annual deficit of 2024, approved by law in the amount of 0.9% of GDP)... Thus, the federal budget of 2024 is practically stabilized against the background (and to a decisive extent due to) steadily accelerating economic growth, which is the result of the consistent policy of Prime Minister Mishustin”⁴⁶.</p> <p>“Despite Western sanctions and liberal financial policies that keep Russia in a state of artificially created “money hunger”, the Mishustin Government ensured not only stabilization of the socio-economic situation, but also economic growth (accelerated, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, from last year’s 3.6% to 4.6% in January and 7.7% in February), and an increase in investments by almost 10%. Now, on the basis of the achieved results, confident social development is ensured”⁴⁷.</p> <p>“The Government of Mikhail Mishustin had to deal with two of the largest socio-economic shocks in the last quarter of a century: the pandemic, which many now call an act of biological warfare, and the aggression of NATO countries with the aim of defeating our country. Out of a thousand days of his work, there is hardly a single quiet week. The Cabinet of Ministers withstood the “test of strength” with honor. The fight against the coronavirus pandemic, which required mobilization of all health care resources, medical science and social services, and the adoption of many non-trivial decisions, was followed by the closure of Russia’s main foreign market, the European Union market, along with the seizure of foreign exchange assets and the beginning of a hybrid war of the West against Russia. Timely and adequate responses were given to all these challenges. Already in 2021, it was possible to fully catch up with the decline in economic activity caused by forced measures of social isolation. Thanks to the promptly taken measures of state support, hundreds of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises were saved and resumed their work, construction and the service sector were restored. Real GDP growth amounted to 4.7% in 2021, industrial production – 5.3%, investment – 7.7%.</p>
<p>S. Yu. Glazyev⁴⁸ (RAS Academician, member of the Board for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission)</p>	

⁴⁶ Delyagin M. Effective policy. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_sokratilo_byudzhetnij_deficit_v_35_raza_i_uskorilo_ekonomicheskij_rost_do_77

⁴⁷ Delyagin M. The Mishustin Government ensures the development of the social sphere. Available at: https://www.zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_obespechivaet_razvitiye_sotsialnoj_sferi

⁴⁸ Glazyev S. Yu. Oil, and guns, and vaccines. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2023-01-19/5_8639_government.html

End of Insert 4

	<p><i>As a result of timely and competent actions, Russia's economy has not collapsed; moreover, new opportunities for its development have opened up. Russian enterprises have rushed to the fast-growing markets of Southeast Asia, which has become a new center for the development of the global economy. In trade with foreign partners, the transition to national currencies has been carried out. The use of Russian payment systems and digital currency assets protected from sanctions threats is expanding. Despite the closure of Western markets, last year ended with a record trade surplus, and the ruble exchange rate strengthened. Real wages have increased, pensions and social benefits have been indexed.</i></p> <p><i>Despite all the difficulties of the turbulence regime in which the economy is now operating, the main thing in the current management of the economy was ensured – vertical (with regions and municipalities) and horizontal (between different government bodies) coordination, both in the case of the pandemic and in the last year of the economy's adaptation to unprecedented sanctions. The productivity of executive authorities has more than doubled: in the period from 2000 to 2020, an average of 950 acts (resolutions) of the Russian government were adopted annually, while in 2020–2022 – more than 2 thousand acts per year; The budget execution of national projects has increased dramatically – from 90% of the plan in 2019 to 97% or more in 2020 and 2021. Schemes and procedures for project and program financing, public-private partnerships, and interactive strategic planning are being worked out”.</i></p>
<p>V. Volodin (RF State Duma Chair)⁴⁹</p>	<p><i>“The political system and economic model created by President Vladimir Putin have shown their effectiveness, despite the 19 thousand sanctions that have been imposed against our country. And this is a great merit of the Government of the Russian Federation”.</i></p>
<p>M. Shchepov⁵⁰ (RF State Duma deputy)</p>	<p><i>“The Mishustin Government is distinguished by the fact that, on the whole, it has coped with two major crises provoked by external conditions at once: the pandemic and the sanctions war”.</i></p>
<p>S. Razvorotneva⁵¹ (RF State Duma deputy)</p>	<p><i>“Mikhail Mishustin has proved himself to be the most effective prime minister since the new Russia... He was lucky to work during a difficult period. First the pandemic, then the imposition of sanctions. But the government is doing well. The country is developing, economic growth is underway, social programs are being implemented... full-scale modernization of housing and communal services began only under Mishustin. And there has never been such a road and housing construction either. We started investing in our manufacturing sector”.</i></p>

⁴⁹ Solovyova O. The outgoing government sets its own goals for the future. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2024-04-03/1_8986_future.html?ysclid=lv55ldr2f2575049498

⁵⁰ Ibidem.

⁵¹ Ibidem.

Insert 5

**The monitoring of regulatory legal acts (laws, decrees) signed by the RF President
in the period from February 29 to April 21, 2024⁵²**

**MEASURES TO SUPPORT THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE SMO AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS,
TO DEVELOP THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX, MEASURES ON MOBILIZATION,
ORGANIZATION OF MARTIAL LAW, IMPROVEMENT OF ANTI-TERRORIST PROTECTION OF FACILITIES**

March 11 – Decree 171 “On additional social guarantees for certain categories of persons”. In case of death or injury, additional social support measures (one-time payments) are established for civilian personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, federal state civil servants and employees of federal executive authorities (federal state bodies) in which military service is provided by federal law, internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation, institutions and bodies of the penal enforcement system of the Russian Federation Of the Russian Federation, bodies of compulsory enforcement of the Russian Federation, bodies of the federal courier service, customs authorities of the Russian Federation, organizations of the Federal Customs Service and their family members.

March 23 – Federal Law 61 “On amendments to the Federal Law “On mobilization training and mobilization in the Russian Federation”, Article 34 of the Federal Law “On military duty and military service” and invalidation of the Federal Law “On the specifics of criminal liability of persons involved in the special military operation””. The conditions for concluding contracts on military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during mobilization, during martial law and during wartime with citizens in respect of whom a preliminary investigation is being carried out or who have a criminal record are being clarified. At the same time, the powers of federal executive authorities are established to determine the procedure for interaction on issues related to conscription during mobilization or during wartime of citizens with a criminal record, as well as on issues related to the conclusion of contracts with such citizens on military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during mobilization, martial law and in wartime.

⁵² The insert is a continuation of the monitoring of the most important regulatory legal acts signed by the RF President; we have been conducting the monitoring since June 2022. Thus, it has been going on for 19 months; its results have been published in 10 articles (the first issue of the monitoring is presented in the article: Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). A difficult road after the Rubicon. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(3), 9–41).

March 23 – Federal Law 64 “On amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation”. The grounds and procedure for exemption from criminal liability and punishment of persons called up for military service during mobilization or during wartime in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or who concluded a contract for military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during mobilization, during martial law or during wartime, as well as the grounds for having their conviction expunged in relation to such persons.

March 23 – Federal Law 65 “On amendments to Article 333-35 of Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation”. The state duty for registration of vehicles transferred free of charge to the SMO zone is canceled.

April 6 – Federal Law 70 “On amendments to the Labor Code of the Russian Federation”. It is prohibited to terminate, at the initiative of the employer, an employment contract with the spouse of a deceased combat veteran who has not remarried within one year from the date of death of a combat veteran (except in cases of liquidation of an organization or termination of activity by an individual entrepreneur, as well as committing some types of guilty actions by the employee).

April 6 – Federal Law 72 “On amendments to Article 1 of the Federal Law “On the specifics of fulfilling obligations under loan agreements by persons called up for military service on mobilization into the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, persons taking part in the special military operation, as well as their family members, and on amendments to certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. It is envisaged that under loan agreements, with the exception of loan agreements, the obligations under which are secured by a mortgage, concluded with persons taking part in the special military operation, interest accrued during the grace period is not payable.

April 16 – Decree 262 “On amendments to Presidential Decree 582, dated August 3, 2023 “On measures to ensure compulsory state life and health insurance for citizens of the Russian Federation participating in volunteer formations”. Insurance guarantees in the form of compensation for members of volunteer formations are extended to citizens who joined such formations to facilitate the fulfillment of tasks assigned to the National Guard troops. Now the Rosguard volunteers will be able to receive compensation for injury or disability. In case of death of a fighter, it will be paid to their relatives. Such payments will be made by Rosguard or an insurer that has concluded a compulsory state insurance contract with it.

End of Insert 5

<p>MEASURES TO PROTECT INFORMATION SECURITY AND REGULATE THE ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS, MEASURES AIMED AT THE EDUCATION AND UPBRINGING OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION</p>	<p>March 11 – Federal Law 42 “On amendments to Article 11 of the Federal Law “On control over the activities of persons under foreign influence” and certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. It is prohibited to advertise information resources of foreign agents in the mass media and in messages and materials of the mass media in information and telecommunication networks. In addition, according to the Federal Law, it is not allowed to distribute advertising on the information resource of a foreign agent.</p> <p>March 23 – Federal Constitutional Law 1 “On amendments to Article 4 of the Federal Constitutional Law “On the State Flag of the Russian Federation”. In accordance with the Federal Constitutional Law, the State Flag of the Russian Federation must be permanently displayed on the buildings of educational organizations, regardless of ownership forms, or permanently installed on their territories.</p>
<p>MEASURES TO PROVIDE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE GENERAL POPULATION, STRENGTHEN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, INCLUDING IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA</p>	<p>March 11 – Federal Law 47 “On amendments to Articles 10 and 17 of the Federal Law “On insurance pensions”. It is envisaged to increase the fixed payment to the old-age insurance pension and disability insurance pension to persons providing for great-grandchildren who have not reached the age of 18 or have reached the specified age and are studying full-time in educational organizations until they complete such training, but no longer than until they reach the age of 23 or older of this age, if they have become disabled before the age of 18. The specified increase is established in the amount of one third of the fixed amount of payment to the old-age insurance pension or disability insurance pension for each disabled family member (but not more than three family members).</p> <p>March 23 – Federal Law 56 “On amendments to Article 7–1 of the Federal Law “On the Special Economic Zone in the Magadan Region and in the territories of the South Kuril, Kuril and North Kuril urban districts of the Sakhalin Region” and Article 2 of the Federal Law :On state support for entrepreneurial activity in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation”. The term of operation of the special economic zone on the territory of Magadan within its administrative borders is extended until December 31, 2046. In addition, the municipalities of Beloyarsky Municipal District and Berezovsky Municipal District of Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area – Yugra are classified as land territories of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.</p>

Much in this matter will depend on the composition of the new Government of the Russian Federation, which will be announced in May 2024 after the presidential inauguration. Will the head of state really succeed “in determining who and in what position will work most effectively so that the overall result and teamwork are most effective”⁵³, or will the Cabinet of Ministers be filled by people who exclude the social studies course from the school curriculum, and include courses such as golf and cheerleading in the junior school physical education program, allegedly forming in students “a sense of patriotism, moral qualities ... a manifestation of a sense of pride for their Homeland, the Russian people and the history of Russia...”⁵⁴ (as some experts have noted, “... it is very difficult to comment on this without using swearwords. It turns out that in our country, in the current conditions, a sense of patriotism and collectivism can and should be fostered through golf classes. But here we are...”⁵⁵

“What kind of patriotism is this and in the interests of whose country, may I ask?... If the minister, based on personal relationships and an understanding of values, needs to introduce golf classes in some specific elite school on Rublevka or Novorizhskoye highway at a budget expense, then it is not necessary to mix this Western American culture with our domestic patriotism... The Ministry of Education becomes completely non-Russian and completely toxic. We believe that it is high time for the bodies responsible for the protection of state sovereignty to become interested in his activities” (Kirill Kabanov, member of the Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation)⁵⁶.

“Since when has the favorite game of Deputy Prime Minister Golikova’s husband Viktor Khristenko and other Russian and Western oligarchs become a measure of morality and patriotism? Many notable Russian oligarchs promote the development of golf: Oleg Deripaska, Roman Abramovich, Vladimir Potanin and others. Of course, the digital transformer globalist German Gref is also very fond of golf. In 2017, an auction was held in Ljubljana (Slovenia), at which Sberbank bought a golf club previously owned by Golf Projekti for 5.78 million euros. **The common people have no money for this sport, and in our country it has never been popular – for obvious reasons. Moreover, golf has little to do with physical development... As you can see, Kravtsov’s office is not at all embarrassed by all this. And what kind of collectivism is there in golf, and what are our traditional values – who can explain it clearly?** And most importantly, how can you give the opportunity to conduct “golf classes” as part of the main physical education classes? **During the war with the Collective West, this looks like outright mockery and a demonstration of the complete isolation of the government from the people. So, for them, a patriot is not a guy who gave his life “for his friends”, but a member of an elite golf club from a family of oligarchs**” (RIA “Katyusha”).

“I consider this initiative unjustified, hasty and as if from another space that is not even in the neighborhood of the field of education” (A. Snegurov, Honored Teacher of the Russian Federation, historian, Candidate of Sciences (Psychology), Professor of the Moscow State Pedagogical University)⁵⁷.

⁵³ Vladimir Putin’s press conference on the election day, March 18, 2024. Available at: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6579136?ysclid=lutu4bywzz143534713>

⁵⁴ “On amendments to some orders of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation concerning federal educational programs of primary general education, basic general education and secondary general education”: Order 171 of the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, dated March 19, 2024. Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202404120003?pageSize=100&index=1>

⁵⁵ The Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation has included golf and cheerleading in the school physical education program. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/minprosvesheniya_rf_vklyuchilo_gol_f_i_chirliding_v_shkol_nuyu_programmu_po_fizkul_ture (comment by the presenter of Vesti-fm G. Saralidze).

⁵⁶ The HRC sharply criticized the inclusion of golf in the school curriculum. Available at: <https://www.nakanune.ru/news/2024/04/18/22766947/?ysclid=lv6jhir551601714254>

⁵⁷ Teachers criticized the idea of the Ministry of Education to introduce golf classes in schools. Available at: <https://radio1.ru/news/obschestvo/pochemu-ne-hokkei-ne-sambo-ne-borba-ekspert-schitaet-golf-v-shkolah-pitkoi/>

The importance of personnel decisions that the President will make in May can be judged, for example, by the “intensity” of publications of M.G. Delyagin, one of the experts whose opinion we often refer to in our articles and who pays considerable attention to the analysis of Government activities and is himself part of the public administration system – an economist, a deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation from the party “The Just Russia – For the Truth”.

Since March 15, 2024 (that is, literally on the eve of the presidential election), he engaged in harsh criticism of “*fictitious managers*” and “*young technology thieves*” nurtured by the country, which are the fruits of 37 years of national betrayal that have not yet come to an end”⁵⁸, as well as calls to “bring a decisive end to the 37-year era of national betrayal”⁵⁹, “purify public administration from the slaves of the West... and, most importantly, to change the colonial economic mechanism created in the late 1980s – early 1990s”⁶⁰.

However, even despite the considerable attention and hopes that experts express regarding the formation of a new cabinet of ministers, many of them are very skeptical about this. They do not see “any hints of abandoning the liberal paradigm” do not expect serious changes in the Government and, on the contrary, predict a strategy of “sweeping problems under the carpet”.

And this, unfortunately, creates risks for the full-fledged implementation of the elite change

mechanism, the establishment of which was initiated by Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly on February 29, 2024; this mechanism is the educational program Time of Heroes”.

D.A. Bulanov (election analyst, Saratov Region Duma deputy, editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Kommunist – Vek XX–XXI”): “Now the Kremlin is able to maintain a balance, but no one knows what will happen in the future – **the planning horizon in the country is at critically low values... we should not wait for a “thaw” and reforms, but on the contrary – there will be a continuation of “tightening the screws” and sweeping problems under the carpet**”.

N.I. Popov (publicist, election analyst): “**As for the changes in the country after the presidential election, there will be tactical changes, but not strategical ones**”.

A.M. Safronov (specialist in election processes, Krasnodar City Duma deputy): “**As long as there are no economic grounds for the ruling elite to change something, there will be no changes.** Any changes in the field of politics are the result of an awareness of mistakes and a desire to improve the effectiveness of the management system. So far, there is clearly no such desire in the highest echelons of power... There are no hints of a change in the liberal paradigm; the main vector of development of the Russian economy remains unchanged. And if there are no changes in economic sphere, then they are unlikely to be in politics either”⁶¹.

⁵⁸ Delyagin M. Stop considering impotence as a foreign policy! Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/povestka_dnya_22_hvatit_schitat_impotentciyu_vneshnej_politikoj?ysclid=lvcl4ttlfx733325148

⁵⁹ Delyagin M. The miracle of Prime Minister Mishustin: Investments are growing faster than after Primakov. What’s ahead? Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/chudo_prem_era_mishustina_investitcii_rastut_bistree_chem_posle_primakova_chno_vpe_redi?ysclid=lvcl5py1o9147800141

⁶⁰ Delyagin M. What should be done to banks and factories controlled by the enemy? Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/povestka_dnya_23_chno_delat_s_vragami_naroda_i_s_bankami_i_zavodami_kotorie_kontroliruet_vrag?ysclid=lvcl6mgqm6758130589

⁶¹ The Center for Research on Political Culture of Russia held an expert discussion on the results of the presidential election. Available at: <https://kprf.ru/activity/elections/225253.html?ysclid=lugn8iew3a892753371>

The program was developed by the Higher School of Public Administration at the Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). Its purpose is to “train high-skilled, competent managers from among the participants of the SMO for subsequent work in state and municipal authorities, as well as state-owned companies”⁶². And this, according to RANEPA rector A. Komissarov, will take “about two years”⁶³.

Information from the official website of the educational program “Time of Heroes”:

“Registration of participants in the selection for the educational program “Time of Heroes” ended on April 8, 2024. **More than 44 thousand fighters and veterans of the special military operation** will take part in the selection.

Applications were received from representatives of all age groups. **The largest share falls on the group of participants aged 35 to 40 years – 23.14%; 20.17% of applications were received from participants aged 30 to 35 years. These age groups make up almost half of the participants in the selection**”⁶⁴.

However, according to some experts, it will take much longer to achieve real changes in the management level: “Who knows, maybe in 10–15 years these fighters and officers will be mayors, governors»⁶⁵. Moreover, there are fears that the

liberal part of the public administration system that has developed over the decades will not give new, patriotic managers the opportunity to prove themselves at all: the system will either assimilate them or reject them.

“... with all due respect to the participants of the SMO, they are only part of the general patriotic Russian society, which has been strenuously suppressed in recent decades by liberals in power, **who are very adept at this process**. A reliable umbrella of “protection” for patriots going to power has not yet been created. Therefore, **the existing system rejects most of these people or rebuilds their behavior to fit its vicious old ideological matrix...**”⁶⁶

Thus, today, at the beginning of a new political cycle and V.V. Putin’s fifth presidential term, we are forced to state the inconsistency of the situation: **hope, but also the uncertainty of the prospects for internal development**.

So far, the President, “responsible for everything in the country”⁶⁷, has not given an answer to the main question: “What kind of state are we building?”: **a liberal one, with the preservation of “crony capitalism, focused on embedding into the Western “civilizational” world, or a nationally oriented, sovereign social state based on traditional values and the opinion of the majority of the population?**

⁶² Official website of the “Time of Heroes” program. Available at: <https://xn--b1aachba0csne6n.xn--p1ai/news>

⁶³ The duration of the training program “Time of Heroes” will be about two years. Available at: <https://объясняем.рф/articles/news/srok-obucheniya-po-programme-vremya-geroev-sostavit-okolo-dvukh-let/?ysclid=lv5agepkf0193119432>

⁶⁴ Almost half of the applications for participation in the selection for the “Time of Heroes” program are from people aged 30 to 40 years. Available at: <https://xn--b1aachba0csne6n.xn--p1ai/news/tpost/br0x3u4z81-pochti-polovina-zayavok-na-uchastie-v-ot>

⁶⁵ Time of Heroes. How the Russian elite will be formed from now on. *Regnum*. April 29, 2024. Available at: <https://regnum.ru/opinion/3870717?ysclid=lv5axk4yqm719888159> (opinion of G. Mirzayan, political scientist, associate professor of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation).

⁶⁶ Kassin O. On the “political oncology” of the modern “elite” and measures for its treatment. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_politicheskoy_onkologii_sovremennoj_eliti_i_merah_eyo_lecheniya?ysclid=lumf3jtu5x135750817

⁶⁷ Vladimir Putin’s address to Russians during the inauguration on May 1, 2000. Available at: https://www.mn.ru/blogs/blog_reference/80928

“The number of billionaires from Russia in the Forbes ranking increased in 2024 to a record 125 people, which is 15 more people than in 2023. The combined wealth of Russian billionaires increased from 505 billion USD in 2023 to 577 billion USD⁶⁸”.

“The Russian economy is characterized by abnormally high income inequality and over-concentration of wealth. More than half of the country’s total assets belong to several hundred families... The number of Russian dollar billionaires has increased by almost 40% during the special military operation (SMO). And their wealth has increased by 63% over the period of the SMO, according to the compilers of the Forbes rating. The number of billionaires in Russia could be even higher, but 10 of them renounced their Russian citizenship.

Despite the increase in numbers, the group of super-rich Russians remains extremely small. **Only less than 0.0001% of the adult population of the Russian Federation – or about 500 super-rich families own 40% of all financial assets of our country today...**

After the start of the special military operation, the public perception of the main contradictions has changed dramatically. In particular, **the negative attitudes of the population toward those who are called oligarchs have reached a maximum. More than a third (36%) of Russians said in 2023 that oligarchs were hindering national development**⁶⁹.

“The welfare state, as defined by the author of this term, the German historian, philosopher and economist of the 19th century Lorenz von Stein, is obliged to promote the economic and social progress **of all its citizens**, because ultimately the development of one is a condition for the development of the other... The function of the state is to maintain **absolute equality of rights for all different social classes**, for an individual through its power”⁷⁰.

However, today Russia is still characterized by an “abnormally high level of income inequality” and “over-concentration of wealth”. During the period of the SMO, the number of dollar billionaires in the country increased by 40%, and their wealth increased by 63%.

According to the results of sociological research, the contradiction between the poor and the rich is “the most acute” for the majority of citizens; this fact correlates with the same high level of need for social justice in society: in almost all major population groups (especially among low-income groups and people with secondary education), more than 50% of people say that that “modern Russian society is organized unfairly” and that the contradiction “between the poor and the rich” is the most acute for the country today (*Tab. 3*).

⁶⁸ 125 billionaires of Russia. Forbes Rating – 2024. Available at: <https://www.forbes.ru/milliardery/510650-125-milliardero-rossii-rejting-forbes-2024>

⁶⁹ The super-rich Russians suffer from inequality in the same way as the general population. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2024-04-11/4_8992_inequality.html?ysclid=lv3n2iw56i350395280

⁷⁰ Roik V.D. Conceptual foundations of the formation of a social state in Russia: Issues of income and social budgeting. Online publication “Information and analytical portal “VIPERSON”. October 20, 2010. Available at: <http://viperson.ru/>

Table 3. Assessment of the most acute social contradictions and the degree of justice of the structure of modern Russian society (VoIRC RAS data as of December 2023), % of respondents

Population group	Proportion of those who believe that the most acute contradictions today exist between the rich and the poor*	Proportion of those who believe that modern Russian society is organized unfairly**
Sex		
Men	52.4	56.9
Women	54.7	52.5
Age		
Under 30	56.1	54.7
30–55	50.1	54.9
Over 55	57.2	53.9
Education		
Secondary and incomplete secondary	59.5	60.2
Secondary vocational	56.2	53.1
Higher and incomplete higher	44.7	51.4
Income group		
Bottom 20%	61.4	55.6
Middle 60%	51.1	54.6
Top 20%	52.9	49.3
Territory		
Vologda	51.0	54.8
Cherepovets	48.1	59.5
Districts	58.4	51.4
Region	53.7	54.5
* Wording of the question: “The contradictions between which groups of Russian society, in your opinion, are the most acute today?”.		
** Wording of the question: “Do you think modern Russian society as a whole is organized fairly or unfairly?”		

At the same time, we should note that the most important steps taken by the President over the past almost 25 years (the 1999 article “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium”, the 2007 Munich speech, accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation in 2014, amendments to the Constitution in 2020, protection of Donbass, beginning of the SMO in 2022) prove that he aims to follow the path of building Russia as a sovereign national welfare state.

One way or another, it can only be stated that while the goals of the SMO have not been achieved and while the existing Russian elites have a preponderance of the old (liberal) generation

“Degradation of the modern world is most noticeable in the degradation of its elites... The spiritual world, the hierarchical world, the cultural world, a world in which the concepts of honor, dignity, and duty have not yet lost their meaning. **And of course, to build such a world, we need a new elite:** cultural, intellectual, creative, but even more so the military elite, the military aristocracy, which becomes the white bone of the military empire. The normal aristocratic elite of traditional society. For every real empire begins with the military elite”⁷¹.

⁷¹ Mozhegov V. Russia is a military empire, and it needs a military elite. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/rossiya_-_voinskaya_imperiya_i_ej_nuzhna_voinskaya_elita?ysclid=lumebkg22o16212706

compared to the new (patriotic) one, there remain the risks of failing to achieve the goals and objectives for the next six years, as well as targets for the longer term.

Without these two conditions, the path toward achieving full national sovereignty, which Russia embarked on at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s first presidential term, will not be completed, which means that the President cannot hand the country over to his successor. At the same time, taking into account the current geopolitical situation and the civilizational conflict between Russia and the Collective West, the question should be put more strictly: **without achieving the goals of the SMO and nationalizing the elites, Russia has no future, because only under these conditions can full national sovereignty be achieved, and returning to the “bosom” of the West (which promised to “tear the Russian economy to pieces” to dismember the country itself in order to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia, from which our country will no longer be able to recover) will simply be impossible.**

In conclusion, we note one more point, which inspires hope and which seems to us very important and aimed at the future that will come after the end of the special military operation: in the election

on March 17, 2024, Vladimir Putin received a very high, one might say, the maximum level of support from Russian society. It will be extremely difficult, and maybe even impossible, to maintain this level; and it is quite natural, since sooner or later the goals of the SMO will be achieved, the level of international tension (primarily around our country) will decrease, and the factor such as “consolidating around the flag” will give way to the most mundane, everyday needs of citizens in solving social problems, improving the quality of life, etc...

We hope that this period will not become a “stumbling block” in relations between society and the state, so that Russians’ trust in the authorities and in the course of national development implemented by Vladimir Putin were dictated not only by the unprecedented nature of threats to national security, but first of all by the real satisfaction of the majority of the country’s citizens with the activities of the entire public administration system: all its representatives at all levels of public authority – federal, regional, municipal... This is, of course, an ideal and most likely unattainable formula, but as the President says, **“without ambitious goals we will never achieve anything”⁷².**

⁷² Vladimir Putin’s annual news conference, December 20, 2018: Available at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455/videos>

APPENDIX

Data of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation on the turnout and support for Vladimir Putin in the presidential elections of 2018 and 2024

RF constituent entity	RF presidential election (March 18, 2018)				RF presidential election (March 17, 2024)				Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 2018			
	Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin	
	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%
Russian Federation	73.62	67.54	56.43	76.69	87.58	77.49	76.28	87.28	+13.96	+9.95	+19.85	+10.59
North Caucasus Federal District	4.85	86.28	4.21	86.92	5.41	91.13	4.97	91.80	+0.56	+4.85	+0.76	+4.88
Chechen Republic	0.65	91.54	0.59	91.44	0.79	97.05	0.78	98.99	+0.14	+5.51	+0.19	+7.55
Kabardino-Balkarian Republic	0.49	91.80	0.45	93.38	0.52	95.87	0.49	94.21	+0.03	+4.07	+0.04	+0.83
Republic of Dagestan	1.43	87.47	1.30	90.76	1.55	90.82	1.43	92.12	+0.12	+3.35	+0.13	+1.36
Karachayvo-Circassian Republic	0.26	87.40	0.22	87.64	0.27	90.03	0.24	90.07	+0.01	+2.63	+0.02	+2.43
Republic of Ingushetia	0.18	81.95	0.15	83.17	0.22	87.43	0.19	89.61	+0.04	+5.48	+0.04	+6.44
Republic of North Ossetia – Alania	0.46	89.98	0.38	81.51	0.47	91.79	0.42	89.01	+0.01	+1.81	+0.04	+7.50
Stavropol Territory	1.39	73.84	1.12	80.55	1.60	84.95	1.42	88.56	+0.21	+11.11	+0.30	+8.01
Southern Federal District	8.59	69.76	7.01	82.50	14.90	84.95	13.68	91.06	+6.31	+15.19	+6.67	+8.56
Donetsk People's Republic	–	–	–	–	1.79	88.25	1.71	95.23	–	–	–	–
Lugansk People's Republic	–	–	–	–	1.54	87.12	1.44	94.12	–	–	–	–
Republic of Crimea	1.08	71.55	0.99	92.15	1.35	89.75	1.26	93.60	+0.27	+18.20	+0.27	+1.45
Zaporozhye Region	–	–	–	–	0.46	85.49	0.42	92.83	–	–	–	–
City of Sevastopol	0.24	71.43	0.22	90.19	0.29	81.78	0.27	92.60	+0.05	+10.35	+0.05	+2.41
Krasnodar Territory	3.15	77.86	2.56	81.35	4.01	90.59	3.71	92.59	+0.86	+12.73	+1.15	+11.24
Rostov Region	2.08	64.77	1.64	78.97	2.57	81.27	2.32	90.81	+0.49	+16.5	+0.68	+11.84
Republic of Adygea	0.25	74.31	0.20	81.17	0.29	84.76	0.26	90.18	+0.04	+10.45	+0.06	+9.01

RF constituent entity	RF presidential election (March 18, 2018)				RF presidential election (March 17, 2024)				Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 2018			
	Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin	
	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%
Kherson Region	—	—	—	83.86	0.36	88.12	—	—	—	—	—	—
Volgograd Region	1.20	68.13	0.93	77.55	1.27	88.00	+0.24	+13.69	+0.34	+10.45	+0.34	+10.45
Astrakhan Region	0.44	60.42	0.34	76.95	0.52	87.45	+0.15	+23.78	+0.18	+10.50	+0.18	+10.50
Republic of Kalmykia	0.14	69.64	0.11	81.66	0.14	87.17	+0.02	+10.86	+0.03	+5.51	+0.03	+5.51
Far Eastern Federal District	3.89	66.82	2.63	69.70	4.24	75.89	+0.35	+9.07	+1.04	+17.39	+1.04	+17.39
Jewish Autonomous Region	0.08	60.24	0.05	67.48	0.10	92.35	+0.03	+31.51	+0.05	+24.87	+0.05	+24.87
Chukotka Autonomous Area	0.03	82.28	0.02	82.31	0.03	91.03	+0.00	+8.75	+0.01	+8.18	+0.01	+8.18
Primorye Territory	0.90	61.11	0.59	65.26	1.07	75.06	+0.17	+13.95	+0.36	+23.08	+0.36	+23.08
Republic of Buryatia	0.45	75.19	0.33	73.72	0.50	73.71	+0.05	-1.48	+0.11	+14.24	+0.11	+14.24
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)	0.46	70.99	0.29	64.38	0.45	71.57	-0.01	+0.58	+0.11	+23.41	+0.11	+23.41
Trans-Baikal Territory	0.46	57.98	0.33	72.03	0.49	65.40	+0.03	+7.42	+0.10	+15.68	+0.10	+15.68
Amur Region	0.39	62.14	0.26	67.04	0.44	73.69	+0.05	+11.55	+0.12	+19.93	+0.12	+19.93
Sakhalin Region	0.23	61.21	0.15	66.92	0.29	78.92	+0.06	+17.71	+0.10	+19.45	+0.10	+19.45
Kamchatka Territory	0.16	67.74	0.11	69.44	0.17	73.56	+0.01	+5.82	+0.04	+15.59	+0.04	+15.59
Magadan Region	0.07	71.91	0.05	72.30	0.08	75.42	+0.01	+3.51	+0.02	+12.59	+0.02	+12.59
Khabarovsk Territory	0.65	64.22	0.43	65.78	0.61	64.69	-0.04	+0.47	+0.06	+14.28	+0.06	+14.28
Volga Federal District	15.87	64.24	12.27	76.93	17.34	76.75	+1.47	+12.51	+2.86	+9.58	+2.86	+9.58
Saratov Region	1.26	66.49	0.99	78.33	1.37	76.50	+0.11	+10.01	+0.26	+13.33	+0.26	+13.33
Republic of Bashkortostan	2.30	75.44	1.78	77.69	2.47	83.72	+0.17	+8.28	+0.46	+13.21	+0.46	+13.21
Penza Region	0.78	73.74	0.63	79.98	0.83	82.92	+0.05	+9.18	+0.12	+9.99	+0.12	+9.99
Republic of Mordovia	0.48	77.85	0.41	85.35	0.48	84.96	0.00	+7.11	+0.02	+4.22	+0.02	+4.22

RF constituent entity	RF presidential election (March 18, 2018)				RF presidential election (March 17, 2024)				Dynamics (+/-), 2024 to 2018			
	Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin		Turnout		For V.V. Putin	
	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%
Republic of Tatarstan	2.26	7.42	1.85	82.09	2.48	84.61	2.20	88.74	+0.22	+77.19	+0.35	+6.65
Orenburg Region	1.00	66.08	0.73	72.97	1.12	75.18	0.97	87.05	+0.12	+9.10	+0.24	+14.08
Samara Region	1.63	66.90	1.23	75.82	1.88	78.86	1.63	86.76	+0.25	+11.96	+0.40	+10.94
Nizhny Novgorod Region	1.73	65.98	1.33	77.27	2.03	81.63	1.75	86.40	+0.30	+15.65	+0.42	+9.13
Chuvash Republic	0.70	76.22	0.54	77.29	0.67	74.13	0.57	85.49	-0.03	-2.09	+0.03	+8.20
Perm Territory	1.32	66.51	0.99	75.35	1.59	80.90	1.35	84.65	+0.27	+14.39	+0.36	+9.30
Republic of Mari El	0.36	66.43	0.26	73.99	0.36	68.91	0.30	84.24	0.00	+2.48	+0.04	+10.25
Ulyanovsk Region	0.64	64.33	0.48	74.27	0.68	73.20	0.57	83.85	+0.04	+8.87	+0.09	+9.58
Republic of Udmurtia	0.75	63.27	0.57	76.23	0.72	62.54	0.59	81.83	-0.03	-0.73	+0.02	+5.60
Kirov Region	0.66	62.72	0.47	70.41	0.65	66.48	0.52	80.08	-0.01	+3.76	+0.05	+9.67
Siberian Federal District	8.38	66.91	6.17	73.88	8.93	73.21	7.72	86.46	+0.55	+6.3	+1.55	+12.58
Kemerovo Region	1.67	83.22	1.42	85.42	1.81	96.40	1.73	95.72	+0.14	+13.18	+0.31	+10.30
Republic of Tyva	0.16	93.66	0.15	91.98	0.19	95.58	0.18	95.37	+0.03	+1.92	+0.03	+3.39
Republic of Altai	0.10	64.77	0.07	70.62	0.11	71.28	0.10	86.49	+0.01	+6.51	+0.03	+15.87
Republic of Khakassia	0.25	65.86	0.17	69.16	0.29	74.37	0.24	85.28	+0.04	+8.51	+0.07	+16.12
Altai Territory	1.19	65.39	0.77	64.66	1.05	59.89	0.89	84.88	-0.14	-5.50	+0.12	+20.22
Krasnoyarsk Territory	1.27	60.33	0.94	74.28	1.45	77.26	1.22	84.12	+0.18	+16.93	+0.28	+9.84
Irkutsk Region	1.05	55.69	0.76	73.06	1.15	63.17	0.96	83.89	+0.10	+7.48	+0.20	+10.83
Novosibirsk Region	1.30	60.40	0.93	71.06	1.39	63.18	1.17	83.88	+0.09	+2.78	+0.24	+12.82
Omsk Region	0.93	60.48	0.62	67.31	1.03	70.84	0.85	82.77	+0.10	+10.36	+0.23	+15.46
Tomsk Region	0.46	59.27	0.33	71.23	0.46	60.11	0.38	82.15	+0.00	+0.84	+0.05	+10.92

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	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%
Ural Federal District	6.24	71.84	4.71	77.07	7.21	82.13	6.09	85.88	+0.97	+10.29	+1.38	+8.81
Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area	0.34	91.90	0.29	85.54	0.35	94.11	0.32	91.75	+0.01	+2.21	+0.03	+6.21
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area – Yúgra	0.79	69.71	0.60	76.20	0.99	87.13	0.86	86.71	+0.20	+17.42	+0.26	+10.51
Kurgan Region	0.43	61.73	0.32	73.30	0.49	77.23	0.42	85.63	+0.06	+15.50	+0.10	+12.33
Tyumen Region	0.84	78.92	0.67	79.75	1.00	84.28	0.84	84.76	+0.16	+5.36	+0.17	+5.01
Chelyabinsk Region	1.75	66.41	1.28	73.00	2.03	79.02	1.71	84.32	+0.28	+12.61	+0.43	+11.32
Sverdlovsk Region	2.09	62.34	1.56	74.60	2.35	71.00	1.93	82.10	+0.26	+8.66	+0.37	+7.50
Central Federal District	18.69	66.16	14.03	76.18	21.61	75.84	18.55	85.79	+2.92	+9.68	+4.52	+9.61
Belgorod Region	0.89	73.24	0.71	79.71	1.06	87.00	0.95	90.66	+0.17	+13.76	+0.24	+10.95
Bryansk Region	0.78	79.70	0.64	81.60	0.82	87.28	0.74	89.97	+0.04	+7.58	+0.10	+8.37
Voronezh Region	1.21	64.56	0.95	78.88	1.42	77.51	1.25	88.83	+0.21	+12.95	+0.30	+9.95
Kursk Region	0.60	64.48	0.48	81.01	0.67	75.24	0.59	88.51	+0.07	+10.76	+0.11	+7.50
Ryazan Region	0.60	65.13	0.46	76.34	0.66	75.77	0.58	87.93	+0.06	+10.64	+0.12	+11.59
Tula Region	0.82	68.65	0.65	79.20	0.87	77.05	0.76	87.29	+0.05	+8.40	+0.11	+8.09
Lipetsk Region	0.67	72.16	0.54	80.83	0.69	77.49	0.60	86.99	+0.02	+5.33	+0.06	+6.16
Ivanovo Region	0.47	58.55	0.34	71.37	0.61	81.25	0.53	86.88	+0.14	+22.70	+0.19	+15.51
Moscow Region	3.71	63.59	2.76	74.49	4.80	77.01	4.13	86.50	+1.09	+13.42	+1.37	+12.01
Tambov Region	0.61	72.04	0.49	81.81	0.61	77.72	0.52	85.59	+0.00	+5.68	+0.03	+3.78
Smolensk Region	0.47	61.26	0.35	73.49	0.54	74.91	0.46	85.26	+0.07	+13.65	+0.11	+11.77
City of Moscow	4.52	59.93	3.20	70.87	5.41	66.73	4.58	85.13	+0.89	+6.80	+1.38	+14.26
Vladimir Region	0.74	65.01	0.55	73.65	0.75	69.26	0.63	84.93	+0.01	+4.25	+0.08	+11.28
Tver Region	0.62	57.58	0.46	74.55	0.72	72.20	0.61	84.38	+0.10	+14.62	+0.15	+9.83

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	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%	abs. million people	%
Kaluga Region	0.54	68.16	0.41	76.16	0.53	68.25	0.44	83.79	-0.01	+0.09	+0.03	+7.63
Yaroslavl Region	0.66	64.12	0.47	71.84	0.65	72.56	0.52	80.84	-0.01	+8.44	+0.05	+9.00
Kostroma Region	0.32	60.51	0.22	68.71	0.34	69.17	0.27	80.52	+0.02	+8.66	+0.05	+11.81
Orel Region	0.46	72.17	0.35	76.77	0.46	78.69	0.37	80.23	0.00	+6.52	+0.02	+3.46
Northwestern Federal District	6.63	62.59	4.97	74.34	7.53	69.14	6.19	81.96	+0.90	+6.55	+1.22	+7.62
Leningrad Region	0.89	66.88	0.70	79.01	1.16	80.63	1.00	86.36	+0.27	+13.75	+0.30	+7.35
Kaliningrad Region	0.50	62.18	0.38	76.34	0.60	70.74	0.51	85.44	+0.10	+8.56	+0.13	+9.10
Pskov Region	0.34	65.33	0.26	75.05	0.34	68.59	0.29	84.70	0.00	+3.26	+0.03	+9.65
Murmansk Region	0.40	66.35	0.30	76.37	0.38	71.24	0.31	83.21	-0.02	+4.89	+0.01	+6.84
Novgorod Region	0.29	57.30	0.21	72.65	0.32	66.58	0.26	82.06	+0.03	+9.28	+0.05	+9.41
City of Saint Petersburg	2.32	63.87	1.74	75.01	2.86	74.38	2.32	81.65	+0.54	+10.51	+0.58	+6.64
Komi Republic	0.41	60.39	0.29	71.44	0.36	58.52	0.29	80.49	-0.05	-1.87	0.00	+9.05
Vologda Region	0.63	66.20	0.45	72.41	0.65	73.53	0.52	79.74	+0.02	+7.33	+0.07	+7.33
Republic of Karelia	0.30	57.19	0.22	73.04	0.29	60.08	0.23	79.53	-0.01	+2.89	+0.01	+6.49
Arkhangelsk Region	0.54	59.19	0.41	75.27	0.55	65.59	0.44	79.25	+0.01	+6.40	+0.03	+3.98
Nenets Autonomous Area	0.03	63.61	0.02	71.15	0.03	70.70	0.02	79.08	0.00	+7.09	0.00	+7.93
City of Baikonur (Republic of Kazakhstan)	0.01	66.27	0.01	78.35	0.01	59.93	0.01	84.25	0.00	-6.34	0.00	+5.90
Territory outside the Russian Federation	0.47	98.06	0.40	85.02	0.38	99.32	0.28	72.30	-0.09	+1.26	-0.12	-12.72

Federal districts, as well as constituent entities of the Russian Federation within federal districts, are ranked in descending order of the share of votes cast for Vladimir Putin in the 2024 presidential election.
 Source: information on elections and referendums. CEC of the Russian Federation. Available at: <http://www.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom>

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