EDITORIAL

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A Difficult Road after the Rubicon



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Abstract. February 24, 2022, the RF President announced the beginning of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, which entailed large-scale geopolitical changes and, among other things, became a Rubicon for the internal development of the Russian Federation. The article analyzes a number of complex implications that resulted from the events occurring after February 24, 2022, and which had a significant impact on the state of Russian society. We consider in detail the dynamics of the moral state of Russian society for the period from 1996 to 2020, which (as shown by the results of the conducted research) over the past almost 25 years were negative and were developing within the framework of the existing liberal model. Analyzing the data of official statistics and sociological surveys, we rely on the assessments of experts, who, in many respects, agree that after February 2022, a new, albeit difficult, road opens up before Russia; the country has to travel this path one way or another, in order to achieve full (internal and external) national sovereignty in the contours and rules of the new geopolitical reality that are forming before our eyes.

Key words: special operation, President, the Russian idea, moral state of society, public administration efficiency.

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Fruitful creative work, which our Fatherland needs so much, is impossible in a society that is in a state of schism, that is internally divided. In a society where the main social strata, political forces adhere to various basic values and fundamental ideological guidelines...

Vladimir Putin "Russia at the turn of the Millennium" (1999)

In the Munich speech delivered in February 2007 the President of the Russian Federation announced to the international community that "Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today"¹. Starting from this speech, Russia tried to convince the world community and the Collective West² (which includes about 40 states³)

that the idea of a unipolar world is hopeless and futile, and that it is necessary to be guided by the norms of international law (enshrined in the UN Charter (1945), the Yalta and Postdam agreements (1945), the charters of regional collective security organizations) and take into account the national interests of all countries, including Russia.

However, these diplomatic steps were not heeded. Since 2007, the hybrid war with the Collective West has continued. In 2014, it reached

¹ Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034

² Some assessments of Russian and foreign experts about which countries belong to the Western world:

^{1. &}quot;... for us in Russia, the notion "West" includes both the USA (number one) and Western Europe, or the European Union (number two). Therefore, we often use the term "Collective West", that is, **the USA**, **Western European countries (including Southern European countries)**, **Northern European (Scandinavian) countries**" (source: Tretyakov V. (2018). Russia, Eastern Europe and the Collective West. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 11. Available at: https://lgz.ru/article/-11-6635-14-03-2018/rossiya-vostochnaya-evropa-i-kollektivnyy-zapad/).

^{2. &}quot;The Western world traditionally includes the countries of Europe that were historically Catholic or Protestant – that is, all the countries of Western Europe, as well as most or even all the countries of Northern and Central Europe, depending on the geographical definition of these regions. Most of the countries of the European West are now part of the European Union. The former colonies of European countries in America and Oceania are also referred to the West, if these colonies are inhabited mainly by descendants of immigrants from Europe. These are primarily the so-called Anglo-Saxon countries (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), as well as the overseas territories of the UK, France and other European countries" (source: Ruekspert. Available at: https://ruxpert.ru/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BF%D0%B0%D0%B4).

^{3. &}quot;Today, the most widely used definition of the Western world, also known as the "Latin West", is based entirely on culture rather than geography. In this usage, the Western world includes all the countries of Western Europe, as well as to the countries formed by Western European culture. For example, countries such as the USA and Australia, which were once British colonies and adopted Western European Christianity (Catholic and Protestant churches), which use the Latin alphabet and whose population includes many descendants of European colonists. In practice, this means that the Western world usually includes most of the countries of the European Union, as well as the UK, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand" (source: Western Countries 2020 (June 4, 2020). Available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/western-countries).

^{4. &}quot;Regions generally considered to be part of the Western World – USA, Canada European countries, Australia, and New Zealand" (source: The Western World – World Atlas 2021. Available at: https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/list-of-western-countries.html).

³ Opinion of political scientist P. Petrovsky (source: The influence of Western countries is becoming less tangible for us every day. *BELTA – News of Belarus*. June 8, 2022 Available at: https://www.belta.by/society/view/petrovskij-vlijanie-stran-zapada-s-kazhdym-dnem-stanovitsja-dlja-nas-menee-oschutimym-506708-2022/).

a higher level after the *coup d'etat* in Ukraine, which ended with the events of the Crimean Spring: the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, the emergence of two self-proclaimed state entities in the east of Ukraine – the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic.

After that, for eight years, futile (as it turned out) attempts at a peaceful settlement of the war in the Donbas continued. The implementation of the Minsk Agreements was purposefully sabotaged by the new Kiev authorities, instead, regular shelling of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics continued, and the Collective West continued to implement its "anti-Russia" project on the territory of modern Ukraine⁴...

In the end, this could not but lead to a forced response from Russia in the form of a special military operation announced by the President on February 24, 2022, which became the "starting point" of a new era in the history of our country in the 21st century.

As we noted in the previous article, the special operation announced by the President was "the edge after which the running processes become irreversible and lead to irreversible consequences"⁵. Up to this point, experts say, there was "full integration of Russia into the global world, which means the adoption of all the norms and rules of the

"One of the clear results of the confrontation of the last eight years was not just a statement, but also the acceptance of the impossibility of agreeing with the West and the neo-Nazi authorities of Ukraine about anything; they basically do not comply with the agreement"⁷.

West, which is taken as the standard of globalization. This has been the main strategy of the Russian government since 1991. Adjusting all standards of life – education, economy, culture, science, politics, technology, fashion, art, education, sports, media – to the standards of the modern West was the main goal of all the reforms"⁶.

And of course this new time includes both new perspectives and new challenges, determining Russia's difficult but inevitable path to achieving full national sovereignty and its place in the changing geopolitical reality.

Today most experts agree that when the Collective West publicly declares the need to "completely eradicate"⁸ the "Russian world", it is, in fact, launching a direct attack that demands Russia to take appropriate steps to protect its national interests, which go far beyond the relatively local tasks set during the special operation in Ukraine (denazification, demilitarization, protection of the population of Donbass).

⁴ Putin V. About the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. Official website of the RF President. July 12, 2021. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181

⁵ Ilyin V.A., Morev M.V. (2022). The Rubicon has been crossed: February 24, 2022, Russia entered a new stage in its development in the 21st century. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 15(2), 29.

⁶ Dugin A. Rejection of the Bologna system and ideological convulsions of the elites. *Zavtra*. June 8, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/otkaz_ot_bolonskoj_sistemi_i_ideologicheskie_sudorogi_elit

⁷ Shkolnikov A. A peace treaty on Ukraine. *Zavtra*. June 12, 2022.

⁸ As Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki noted: "... it is not enough to support Ukraine in its military struggle with Russia. **We must completely eradicate this monstrous new ideology ["Russian World"]**" (source: Gorshkova E. Polish Prime Minister insulted Russia. *Ura.ru*. May 11, 2022. Available at: https://ura.news/news/1052552416).

It is about preserving state sovereignty as such (which is of "vital importance for our country") and Russia's achievement of full state sovereignty, which, as experts note, has five components: territorial, diplomatic, military, economic and cultural. At the same time, the latter, "as our history shows, is the most important component...; its absence announces the beginning of a path to nowhere"¹⁰ (ideas about the essence of state sovereignty in the assessment of the President of the Russian Federation are reflected in *Insert 1*).

It is important to note that the vast majority of Russians are aware of the essence of the historical

"It's not about Ukraine at all, it's about aggression against everything Russian – interests, religion, culture, language, security and so on... there is a life-and-death battle going on for Russia's right to be on the political map of the world with full respect for its legitimate interests"11.

Table 1. Attitude of Russians toward t he work of the RF President in February – June 2022, % of respondents

People's assessments	Feb. 20, 2022	June 12, 2022	Dynamics, (+/–), p.p.
Proportion of positive assessments	64,3	78,6	+15
Proportion of negative assessments	24,4	13,4	-11
Source: State institutions assessment rating. VCIOM. Available			

at: https://wciom.ru/ratings/dejatelnost-gosudarstvennykhinstitutov/ moment and in the current conditions of external and internal threats they are consolidating around the President and around the goals of the special operation in Ukraine. According to VCIOM, the level of approval of the work of the head of state against the background of the special operation (for the period from February 20 to June 12, 2022) increased by 15 percentage points (Tab. 1) The share of Russians supporting the special operation increased by 7 percentage points for the period from February 25 to May 26, 2022. (Tab. 2). According to the regional monitoring of public opinion conducted by VolRC RAS, for the period from February to June 2022, the share of positive judgments about the work of the head of state increased by 10 percentage points. According to experts, citizens support the President not only because the failure to achieve the goals of the special operation "will not be understood by society", but also because real threats to national security that have affected all segments of the population; because "NATO is at the gate"¹².

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People's assessments	Feb. 25, 2022	May 26, 2022	Dynamics, (+/–), p.p.
l support	65	72	+7
l don't support	25	18	-7
It's difficult to answer	10	10	0
Source: VCIOM analytical monitoring". VCIOM. May ru/analytical-reviews/anali	30, 2022. A	vailable at: h	nttps://wciom.

Table 2. Attitude of Russians toward the special operation on the territory of Ukraine, % of respondents

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⁹ National Security Strategy 2021 (approved by Presidential Decree 400, dated July 2, 2021). Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046

¹⁰ Starikov N.V. The deficit of state sovereignty. Official website of N. Starikov. July 28, 2010. Available at: https://nstarikov. ru/defitsit-gosudarstvennogo-suverenite-6047

¹¹ *Rossiiskaya gazeta*. March 10, 2022. Available at: https://rg.ru/2022/03/10/lavrov-rf-vedet-boj-ne-na-zhizn-a-na-smert-za-mesto-na-politicheskoj-karte.html

¹² What the survey data on the special operation show. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. June 2, 2022. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/editorial/2022-06-02/2_8452_editorial.html

 "We must create a solid, reliable and invulnerable system that will be absolutely stable in terms of the external contour and will securely guarantee Russia's independence and sovereignty. At the same time, this system must be organic, flexible and capable of changing quickly in line with what is happening around us, and most importantly, in response to the development of Russian society This renewal is indispensable for the progressive evolution of society and stable development that may not be infallible but society This renewal is indispensable for the progressive evolution of society and stable development that may not be infallible but ensures that the most important thing – Russia's interests – remains immutable Our nation's sovereignty must be unconditional. We have done a great deal to achieve this. We restored our state's unity. We have overcome the situation when certain powers in the government were essentially usurped by oligarch clans. Russia has returned to international politics as a country whose opinion cannot be ignored. We created powerful reserves, which multiplies our country's stability and capability to protect its citizens' social rights and the national economy from any attempts of foreign pressure". 	 "Against the background of the implementation of a purposeful policy to restrain the Russian Federation, it is of vital importance for our country to strengthen its sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, protect the traditional spiritual and moral foundations of Russian society, ensure defense and security, and prevent interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation". 	"Only sovereign states can effectively respond to the challenges of the times and the demands of the citizens. Accordingly, any effective international order should take into account the interests and capabilities of the state and proceed on that basis, and not try to prove that they should not exist. Furthermore, it is impossible to impose anything on anyone, be it the principles underlying the sociopolitical structure or values that someone, for their own reasons, has called universal. After all, it is clear that when a real crisis strikes, there is only one universal value left and that is human life, which each state decides for itself how best to protect based on its abilities, culture and traditions".	"The culture and values, experience and traditions of our ancestors invariably provided a powerful underpinning for the wellbeing and the very existence of entire states and nations, their success and viability. Of course, this directly depends on the ability to quickly adapt to constant change, maintain social cohesion, and readiness to consolidate and summon all the available forces in order to move forward having justice and truth on our side is what makes us truly strong. If this is the case, it would be hard to disagree with the fact that it is our strength and our readiness to fight that are the bedrock of independence and sovereignty and provide the necessary foundation for building a reliable future for your home, your family, and your Motherland".	Sources: Address of the President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, January 15, 2020. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582
Address of the President to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation January 15, 2020	National Security Strategy 2021 (approved by Presidential Decree 400, dated July 2, 2021)	Vladimir Putin's speech at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club October 21, 2021	Vladimir Putin's Address to Russians February 24, 2022	Sources: Address of the President to the Federa www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/62582

Russian President Vladimir Putin on the essence of national sovereignty

Insert 1

www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66975

kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046

The growing support for the head of state and for the special military operation on the territory of Ukraine also proves that Russian society understands the fact that a "combined, civilizational" conflict has been unleashed against Russia; during this conflict Russia must prove not only the ability of the armed forces to protect the territorial integrity of the country and the ability of the national economy to "survive" and develop effectively in an unprecedented sanctions pressure from the Collective West, but also "first of all, to show ourselves what kind of civilization we are. What is our uniqueness, what are our main differences?"¹³. Experts have been saying for a long time that this is "not just about a geopolitical confrontation ..., but about something much deeper and more important"¹⁴, which began long before the special

"We all understand that the hybrid warfare is going on against Russia now. The war is hot, because in a special military operation, the armed forces of Russia are opposed not by the Ukrainian army, but by the combined forces of NATO... There is an economic war going on: an unprecedented set of sanctions that have been adopted against our country today – there has never been such a thing. There is an informational and psychological war going on. The purpose of all this is to try to make us give up and stop defending the national interests of our country... And this conflict is systemic and civilizational"¹⁵. operation on the territory of Ukraine; about our ability to preserve what is called the "Russian world", its traditions, values and worldview in the conditions of aggressive expansion of the "consumer society" cultivated by the Collective West.

In this sense, it is advisable to consider the civilizational war declared on Russia in the context of two aspects.

First, in the context of the centuries-old, cultural and historical origin of the confrontation between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian civilizations, between which, as experts note, there is a "mental gulf ..., and the struggle of these two worlds is the essence of our history for the last few centuries"¹⁶.

"...it is necessary to take a look at the entire history of the formation of liberal ideology – starting from its roots. Only in this case we will be able to appreciate the seriousness of our situation.... Biden and the forces behind him embody the culmination of a historical process **that dates back to the Middle Ages**, reaches maturity in Modern Times with the advent of capitalist society and today is at its final stage"¹⁷.

Even if we take only the 20th century, we will clearly see that its key events that determined the course of development not only of our country, but also of the whole world (such as the First World War

¹³ Dugin and the clash of civilizations. Polit.ru. April 25, 2022. Available at: https://polit.ru/news/2022/04/25/dugin/

¹⁴ Dugin A. About the fronts of the ongoing global war. September 26, 2017. Available at: http://ruspravda.info/Dugin-o-frontah-idushchey-globalnoy-voyni-28987.html

¹⁵ Sources: The "Leaders of Russia" were called to join the intelligence. *Kommersant*. May 27, 2022. Available at: https:// www.kommersant.ru/doc/5369367 Kiriyenko: NATO opposes the armed forces in Ukraine. Rossiiskaya gazeta. May 26, 2022. Available at: https://rg.ru/2022/05/26/kirienko-na-ukraine-vooruzhennym-silam-rossii-protivostoit-nato.html

¹⁶ Starikov N. The confrontation of civilizations. March 6, 2012. Available at: https://nstarikov.ru/protivostoyanie-tsivilizatsij-16063

¹⁷ Dugin A. Manifesto of the great awakening. Zavtra. March 7, 2021. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/manifest_velikogo_probuzhdeniya

of 1914–1918, the October Revolution of 1917, the Second World War of 1939–1945 (including the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945), the Cold War of 1946–1991, the collapse of the USSR in 1991), were nothing more than an escalation of the conflict between the Anglo-Saxon and Russian civilizations, or rather the "attack" by the former and the "defense" of their national interests, their statehood by the latter (sometimes successful, sometimes not). Today's confrontation between the Collective West and Russia is of the same nature – the former are trying to "cancel" the latter, turning it, in fact, into a "gas station" (as one of the American senators noted)¹⁸, which does not have the slightest chance of sovereignty, national interests, culture, values, etc.

Second, the civilizational conflict that emerged (as we noted earlier) long ago, but that reached a new level after February 24, 2022, should be considered in the context of the crisis of the capitalist

"A number of events developing simultaneously and seemingly unrelated to each other have a common denominator. **These are elements of one global crisis – the systemic crisis of the world capitalist system**"¹⁹. system itself, liberal ideology and, in general, the unipolar world led by the Anglo-Saxons, the crisis that has been escalating throughout the 20th and 21st century.

From the collective introduction to the book (the general opinion of the authors²⁰): "Capitalism, along with its creative destruction of older technologies and forms of production, has also been a source of inequality and environmental degradation. Deep capitalist crisis may be an opportunity to reorganize the planetary affairs of humanity in a way that promotes more social justice and a more livable planet.

Capitalism is a system, and that all systems have lives; they are never eternal.... The question now facing the world is not how governments can reform the capitalist system... the question arises of what will replace it"²¹.

This fact is confirmed by the assessments of many foreign experts and by the results of authoritative international studies showing that in many countries (including NATO member states) more than half of citizens believe that "capitalism does more harm than good" (*Fig. 1*).

¹⁸ The phrase uttered by John McCain in 2014 (source: Putin refused to consider Russia a "gas station country". *RBK*. September 1, 2020.Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/09/2020/5f4e28f29a7947582b9ef8f1

¹⁹ Fursov A. What Hitler failed to achieve, the Anglo-Saxons are trying to implement today. *Izborsk Club*. April 29, 2022. Available at: https://izborsk-club.ru/22708

²⁰ I. Wallerstein (1930–2019) is an American sociologist, political scientist, philosopher, one of the founders of the worldsystem theory, winner of the Kondratiev Gold Medal "for outstanding contribution to the development of social sciences" (2004).

R. Collins is an American sociologist, PhD, professor at the University of Pennsylvania. One of the largest historical macrosociologists and specialists in the theory of revolutions and state disintegration.

M. Mann is a British sociologist, a specialist in historical macrosociology, a representative of the neo-Weberian school of socio-political studies, PhD (1971), honorary professor at Cambridge University, member of the British Academy (2015).

G. Derluguian is a Soviet and American historical sociologist, publicist, professor at New York University Abu Dhabi.

C. Calhoun is an American sociologist and public figure, PhD from Oxford, president of the Social Science Research Council, director and president of the London School of Economics and Political Science, member of the American Philosophical Society and the British Academy.

²¹ Wallerstein I., Collins R., Mann M., Derluguian G, Calhoun C. (2015). *Est' li budushchee u kapitalizma* [Does Capitalism Have a Future?] Moscow: Izd-vo Instituta Gaidara.




Figure 1. Proportion of people who believe that capitalism does more harm than good*, % of respondents

* The study was conducted in 28 countries: Thailand, India, France, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, Italy, Spain, United Arab Emirates, the Netherlands, Colombia, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Kenya, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Argentina, Australia, Canada, the U.S., South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan.

Source: Edelman Trust Barometr - 2020. Available at: https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2020-01/2020%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Global%20Report_LIVE.pdf

On average, 56% of respondents in 28 countries share this point of view. Which is quite natural in the context of growing global inequality²², due to the fact that "it is superprofit that gives rise to a greed for gain"²³.

In this context, the uncompromising and extremely harsh rhetoric from leading representatives of the political and economic elites of the United States and NATO²⁴ in relation to Russia becomes quite understandable: the defeat of

²² Novokmet F., Piketty T., Zucman G. (2018). From soviets to oligarchs: inequality and property in Russia, 1905–2016. Cambridge, MA: Journal of Economic Inequality. 79 p.

²³ Balatsky E.V. (2021). Return on equity as an economic growth driver. *Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast*, 14(1), 26–40.

²⁴ See, for example:

^{1.} President of the European Commission (EC) Ursula von der Leyen during the EU – Japan summit in Tokyo called Russia "a direct threat to the world order" (source: *Kommersant*. May 12, 2022. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5348294).

^{2. &}quot;*This war must be won on the battlefield*", said Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, summing up his visit to Kiev (source: Ivanov A. Borrel officially declared war on Russia on behalf of the EU. The last of the masks is dropped. Zavtra. April 10, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/borrel_ofitcial_no_ob_yavil_vojnu_rossii_ot_imeni_es_poslednyaya_iz_masok_sbroshena).

^{3.} G. Soros (speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on May 24, 2022): <u>"The best and, perhaps, the only way to preserve</u> <u>our civilization is to defeat Putin as soon as possible</u>" (source: Enews. 25.05.2022. Available at: https://enews.md/publicatsia/soros-edinstvennyi-sposob-sokhranit-nashu-tsivilizatsiiu-kak-mozhno-skoree-pobedit-putina);

^{4.} J. Stoltenberg (CNN interview): "Our relations with Russia in the future will definitely not remain the same as before, <u>we will</u> <u>not return to what could be called the former normality</u>" (source: RT. March 24, 2022. Available at: https://russian.rt.com/world/ news/980836-stoltenberg-rossiya-nato); (meeting with the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba): "Ukraine is waging a defensive war, so <u>there is no difference between the supply of defensive and offensive weapons</u>" (source: RT. April 7, 2022. Available at: https://russian.rt.com/ussr/news/987111-nato-ukraina-vooruzhenie).

the Collective West in this civilizational war leads to the fact that "Western domination will be nullified"; new economic, political, sociocultural "rules of the game" will be gradually established, in which there will be several sovereign world centers.

"The military defeat of Ukraine will essentially mean **the end of the West that we all know today...** No one in the world dares to challenge the power of the Collective West, although there are many who are dissatisfied. **If Moscow withstands the total pressure and wins, then others will follow, and Western domination will be nullified"**²⁵.

"According to the unanimous opinion of competent experts in international relations, the special military operation is **the last and decisive chord in the process of transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one**"²⁶.

"For about a century, the United States of America was a global monopolist, and suddenly the mechanism stopped working. **There are contenders for the role of the world capital center** – China, Russia, maybe India. Russia has all the advantages for this: it has a huge territory, vital natural resources, military power and cultural heritage"²⁸. "Multipolarity initially means that it is a dance with many players. **There is a much more complex system that becomes less manageable and more conflictual.** Moreover, we should not forget that this will be **a multipolarity with nuclear weapons**. And this is a very specific and unprecedented experience from a historical point of view... multipolarity itself suggests that it is **always a complex balance of power that is constantly changing**"²⁸.

And although some experts note that such a world will be "less manageable and more conflictual", one cannot but agree that this trend exists; that it is objective and inevitable.

Therefore, it is no coincidence, as international studies show, that "**negative views on Russia are mainly limited to Europe and other liberal democracies**"²⁹. According to some estimates, "at the moment at least 37 countries adhere to a fairly uniform strategy of sanctions against Russia. These 37 countries account for about 55% of global GDP"³⁰.

The results of a public opinion poll conducted by the Alliance of Democracies Foundation in 52 countries in the spring of 2022 showed that 55% of Europeans were in favor of ending economic ties with Russia (residents of Poland, Ukraine, Portugal, Sweden, Italy, the UK, Germany and the U.S. were the most negatively disposed toward our country).

²⁶ Dugin A. State-Civilization. The Continent-Russia and the multipolar world. Zavtra. May 31, 2022.

²⁵ The opinion of political scientist G. Mirzoyanov (source: Ozdemirov U. Russia has challenged the West. Who will the world support? *Pravda.ru*. May 1, 2022. Available at: https://www.pravda.ru/world/1704322-kogo_podderzhit_mir/).

²⁷ Balatsky E.V. Return on capital as a driver of global economic transformations. May 19, 2022. Available at: http://www. vscc.ac.ru/activity/view?id=7743

²⁸ Sysoev T. (2022). The USA has much more at stake than Russia (materials of an interview with the historian and philosopher A. Teslya). *Ekspert*, 10.

²⁹ Negative views of Russia mainly limited to western liberal democracies, poll shows // *The Guardian*. 30.05.2022. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/30/negative-views-of-russia-mainly-limited-to-western-liberal-democracies-poll-shows

³⁰ Gubanov S.S. (2022). N. Mulder: The purpose of sanctions is to change the political regime in Russia. *Ekonomist*, 4 (an opinion of the American historian N. Mulder, author of the book *The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War*).

At the same time, **the population of 20 out of 52 countries of the world treats Russia mostly positively and opposes the sanctions war:** two European states (Hungary, Greece), **major Asian countries** (China, India, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan), most Asian countries (including Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines), **major African countries** (such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya), Mexico (**the largest country in Latin America**), **most of the Arab world** (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, etc.)³¹.

According to Russian experts, "the world has divided into two unequal parts. **The anti-Russian minority is limited to the West...**; however, the special operation **did not turn either local elites or the bulk of the population** of the non-Western world against Russia (we are talking about Latin America, Africa and parts of Asia)"³².

Today, many Russian experts³³ draw parallels between the current world situation and the period of the Great Patriotic War, noting that "Hitler, unlike the previous enemies of Russia, set the task not just of military victory, but of erasing Russians from history. **Apparently, this is the task set today by his heirs – ultra-globalists on both sides of the ocean**"³⁴. However, at that moment (largely due to the industrialization carried out by Joseph Stalin in a timely manner) the Soviet Union survived and by the end of the first post-war decade was ahead of many Western countries in key indicators of industrial and agricultural development *(Tab. 3)*. Nevertheless, the Cold War turned out to be victorious for the West; it ended in 1991 with the betrayal of the elites, the collapse of the USSR and the "immersion" of post-Soviet Russia in long decades of so-called "market transformations", perceived today as a period of slow loss of national sovereignty, the transformation of the country into a semi-colonial power, decades of moral "decomposition of society"³⁵.

"When we talk about the events of 1991, it is worth remembering 1917. Both then and in the nineties, our country was going through tragic days. Both in 1991 and in 1917, **the elites betrayed the interests of the people and the state**"³⁶.

"The basis of the global dominance of the West is built **primarily on the adoption of the Western system of values,** a kind of Western semantic code"³⁷.

Some findings of sociological research speak eloquently about the results of these decades (1991– 2020) of existence in the coordinate system of the "consumer society" imposed by the West.

The monitoring of public opinion conducted by VoIRC RAS in the Vologda Oblast since 1996 makes it possible to trace the dynamics of changes in values and moral norms of society over the entire period of market transformations (from 1996 to 2020), and to analyze the corresponding changes in the context of major socio-demographic groups.

³¹ Negative views of Russia mainly limited to western liberal democracies, poll shows. *The Guardian*. May 30, 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/30/negative-views-of-russia-mainly-limited-to-western-liberal-democracies-poll-shows

³² Akopov P. Russian lesson: The world no longer believes the West. *RIA-novosti*. May 31, 2022.Available at: https://ria. ru/20220531/urok-1791878036.html

³³ See, for example: Delyagin M. Nationalization is the only peaceful language available to the Collective West. *Zavtra*. May 30, 2022.

³⁴ Fursov A., Titov I. At the turning point of the epochs. Zavtra. April 28, 2022.

³⁵ S. Shoigu's speech at the panel discussion of the All-Russian Youth Educational Forum "Territory of Meanings" (August 2021). Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/shojgu_nazval_strashnejshuyu_ugrozu_dlya_rossii

³⁶ Volodin named those responsible for the collapse of the USSR. *RIA-novosti*. August 18, 2021. Available at: https://crimea. ria.ru/20210818/volodin-nazval-vinovnykh-v-raspade-sssr-1120569046.html


³⁷ Korovin V. The end of Western hegemony. *Izborsk Club*. August 30, 2019. Available at: https://izborsk-club.ru/17626

Country	1937	1956	1956 to 1937, times
Gountry		s of industrial productio	
USSR	588	3018	5.1
Germany	116	223	1.9
France	114	179	1.6
UK	122	180	1.5
USA	172	409	2.4
00/1		in global industrial proc	
USSR	9.2	19.8	2.2
Germany	8.4	7.5	0.9
France	5.5	3.4	0.6
UK	11.5	8.0	0.7
USA	37.8	39.4	1.0
		coal production, million	
USSR	128	429	3.4
Germany	203	230	1.1
France	44	55	1.3
UK	244	226	0.9
USA	451	459	1.0
		Steelmaking, million to	
USSR	17.7	48.7	2.8
Germany	15.6	23.1	1.5
France	7.9	13.4	1.7
UK	13.2	21.0	1.6
USA	51.4	104.5	2.0
Growth ra	tes of gross output of mech	nanical engineering and	metalworking, times in relation to 1913
USSR	20.0	184.0	9.2
Germany	2.1	4.0	1.9
France	1.2	2.4	2.0
UK	2.4	5.0	2.1
USA	5.0	16.7	3.3
	Elect	ricity production, kilowa	itt-hours
USSR	218	954	4.4
Germany	715	1572	2.2
France	488	1234	2.5
UK	675	1875	2.8
USA	1136	4015	3.5
	Dynamics	of area under crops, mi	llion hectares
USSR	132	195	1.5
USA	132	129	1.0
	Dynamics	s of capital construction	n,% to 1929
USSR	445	2371	5.3
USA	51	427	8.4
	1	ort freight turnover, bill	
USSR	355	1079	3.0
USA	528	945	1.8
		abor productivity,% to	
USSR	258	726	2.8
USA	98	155	1.6
Germany	130	170	1.3

Table 3. Dynamics	of development of the	USSR in comparison with some	Western countries ((1937–1956)

The results of the study show that over the past almost 25 years **in Russian society**:

1. The importance of the majority (14 out of 18) of moral traits reflecting people's attitude toward their life in general, their country, profession, and surrounding people has noticeably decreased (Appendix 1A, p. 35).



In particular, there has been an increase in the proportion those who consider the following traits *unimportant*:

- ✓ empathy (by 8 p.p., from 14 to 22%),
- ✓ mutual aid (by 8 p.p., from 11 to 19%),
- ✓ tolerance (by 8 p.p., from 13 to 21%),
- ✓ decency (by 7 p.p., from 6 to 13%),
- ✓ honesty (by 7 p.p., from 7 to 14%) and many others.

Moreover, during this period, negative trends were noted in 7 out of 11 socio-demographic groups, including middle-aged and older people (the proportion of people who consider more than half of the moral qualities listed in the survey *unimportant* increased by 6 and 17 p.p. respectively); residents of districts (by 18 p.p.); both men and women (by 4 p.p.; *Appendix 1B, p. 36*).

Volume 15, Issue 3, 2022

moral qualities over the period from 1996 to 2020 in socio-demographic groups*			
Total number of socio-demographic groups	Number of negative changes	Number of positive changes	Absence of changes
11	7	1	3
11 * According to the es moral gualities "unim		1 ple who consid	3 er the lis

Dynamics of people's attitude toward various

2. Mainly negative trends over the past 24 years (1996–2020) are also observed in the dynamics of people's attitudes toward various moral phenomena and actions.

Ten of the 15 negative phenomena and actions listed in the survey have become "acceptable, quite normal" (*Appendix 2A, p. 37*).

various		attitude toward al phenomena 996–2020*	
Total number of negative acts listed in the question	Number of negative changes	Number of positive changes	Absence of changes
15	10	0	5
* According to the es "acceptable, quite no		ple who conside	er these acts

In particular, there has been an increase in the proportion of those who consider the following as *"acceptable" or "quite normal"*:

✓ laziness (by 20 p.p., from 22 to 42%),

✓ desire to work less and earn more (by 13 p.p., from 36 to 49%),

✓ arrogance and conceit (by 9 p.p., from 11 to 20%),

✓ sycophancy and servility (by 7 p.p., from 9 to 16%),

✓ bribes (by 4 p.p., from 10 to 14%), etc.


As well as with regard to moral qualities, negative changes in people's attitude toward

negative moral phenomena and actions are noted in almost all (12 out of 14) socio-demographic groups (with the exception of people under the age of 30 and those residents of the region who, according to self-estimates of income, belong to the top 20%; *Appendix 2B, p. 38*).

negative mo	ral phenome	ude toward va na and actions ographic grou	s for
Total number of socio-demographic groups	Number of negative changes	Number of positive changes	Absence of changes
14	12	1	1
* According to the es "acceptable, quite no		ple who conside	er these acts

3. Finally, we should note that along with people's general attitude toward various moral qualities, negative phenomena and actions existing in society as a whole, we observe negative changes in the dynamics of their behavior, according to the results of 1996–2020.

In total, out of the 11 negative actions and behaviors listed in the question, people began to experience feelings of guilt and remorse less often in nine cases (*Appendix 3A*, p. 39).



There has been an increase in the proportion of those who *do not feel* guilt or remorse when they:

 $\checkmark\,$ offend someone, are rude to someone (by 19 p.p., from 16 to 35%),


✓ show insufficient attention to parents (by 19 p.p., from 34 to 53%),

✓ commit some kind of unfair act (by 16 p.p., from 25 to 41%),

✓ don t fulfill their promise (by 15 p.p., from 25 to 40%),

✓ treat children badly (by 13 p.p., from 54 to 67%), etc.

Moreover, the **only** group of the population in which the proportion of those who feel guilty when committing any negative moral acts <u>has not</u> <u>decreased</u> is older people (as in 1996, it was 55%; *Appendix 3B, p. 40*).



* According to the estimates of people who "don't feel remorse" if they commit the abovementioned negative acts.

We should note that concerning these negative trends in the dynamics of the moral level of society, the Vologda Oblast is not a unique Russian region, but rather is a typical constituent entity of the Russian Federation³⁷. Thus, the data of VolRC RAS public opinion monitoring are confirmed by the results of all-Russian sociological surveys,

³⁸ At the same time, we should note that the Vologda Oblast, and in general the regions of the Northwestern Federal District, have traditionally been more critical of the activities of government bodies, which, in particular, is manifested in federal elections. For example, according to the results of the latest election to the State Duma of the Russian Federation (September 19, 2021), the turnout in Russia as a whole was 52%, on average in the NWFD – 42%, in the Vologda Oblast – 46%. Support for United Russia in these elections was 50% on average in the country, 35% in the Northwestern Federal District and 34% in the Vologda Oblast.

indicating that, compared with the Soviet period, "the basic life values of Russians, what they value in life, have undergone significant changes... The measure of a person's social status, well-being, and success in society has now been reduced to only one thing – material well-being. Other indicators of a person's social status in society have lost much of their significance"³⁹ (*Tab. 4*).

Table 4. Russians' perceptions of life values and succ	ess factors in 1	1986 and 2006*,	% of respondents

Answer option	1986	2006	Dynamics (+/), p.p.
	Life values		
Material well-being	31	55	+24
Family, marriage	60	53	-7
Children	55	45	-10
Respect on the part of others	27	17	-10
Interesting job	41	29	-12
Desire to be useful to society	26	6	-20
	Success factors		
"Connections" with influential people	7	30	+23
Luck	7	30	+23
Abilities, talent	15	32	+17
Ability to adapt, flexibility	4	20	+16
Education	39	54	+15
Help from influential relatives	4	14	+10
Purposefulness	27	37	+10
Financial assistance of parents	9	16	+7
Leadership	9	16	+7
Social connections, support of neighbors	27	31	+4
Initiative	21	25	+4
Integrity	22	14	-8
Unselfishness	20	10	-10
Responsibility	46	32	-14
Honesty, decency	63	41	-22
Industriousness	74	52	-22
Human understanding, mutual assistance	53	27	-26
Responsiveness, kindness	57	27	-30

³⁹ Andreenkova A.V. Changes in the lifestyle and values of Russians. Available at: http://www.cessi.ru/index.php?id=171 The study was conducted by the Institute for Comparative Social Research (CESSI).

CESSI is an independent research company with more than 30 years of experience (founded in March 1989) in the field of production and analysis of social information – social research, opinion polls, marketing research in Russia, as well as Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Mongolia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.


Sample parameters: 1986 – All-Union study of the population of different republics of the USSR (including the Russian Federation) on a random sample of the population aged 18 and older. The sample size in the Russian Federation is 4,400 people. The survey method is a questionnaire filled out by the respondents themselves at home. The study was conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the guidance of I.T. Levykin.

^{2006 -} An all-Russian study conducted on a random probabilistic sample of the population of the country aged 18 and older. The sample size is 1,200 people. The survey method is personal interviews at the respondents' home. The study was conducted by the CESSI under the direction of V.G. Andreenkova.

Another Russian study conducted by RAS Institute of Sociology allows us to assess the dynamics of value changes already in the 2000s (for

"The processes taking place in Russia in the last two decades have changed a lot not only in the economy and politics, but also in the everyday life of every person, in relations between people, in the understanding that today there is a success in life, what goals should be set and what means can be used to achieve these goals. **Many Russians are convinced of the complete and irrevocable loss of moral norms by our society and its citizens, that the erosion of morality has reached the critical point beyond which spiritual rebirth of Russia, or rather, its degeneration, is coming"⁴⁰.** the period from 2003 to 2011). Thus, according to experts, the share of Russians who believe that "the modern world is cruel; in order to succeed in life, sometimes you have to step over moral principles and norms" has increased from 34 to 43%. In turn, the proportion of those who "would rather not succeed in life, but would never overstep moral norms and principles" decreased from 65 to 57% (*Fig. 2*).

This trend continued in the mid-2010s: for example, in 2015, experts of RAS Institute of Sociology recorded that the proportion of people "ready to step over moral principles and norms" increased to 52% (see Fig. 2), and the proportion of those who "would rather not succeed in life, but would never step over moral norms and principles" has decreased to $49\%^{41}$.



Compiled according to: Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians (the experience of long-term sociological measurements) (2011): Analytical report of IS RAS. Moscow; Gorshkov M.K., Sedova N.N. (2015). "Self-sufficient" Russians and their life priorities. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, 12.

⁴⁰ Twenty years of reforms through the eyes of Russians (the experience of long-term sociological measurements) (2011): Analytical report of IS RAS. Moscow. 2014, 2015.

⁴¹ Gorshkov M.K., Sedova N.N. (2015). "Self-sufficient" Russians and their life priorities. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, 12.

Thus, the results of both Russian and regional sociological studies empirically show that the entire post-Soviet period was characterized by the processes of decline in the moral level in Russian society, and not in some groups, but in fact in all major sociodemographic categories of the population.

"Over the past 20 years, the values of our citizens have changed a lot, and not for the better... In the value system of Russians in modern Russia, material well-being and consumption occupy the first place... Decades of scarcity, the ostentatious consumption of the elites and the broadcast of the values of prestigious consumption in the media logically led to the fact that the "nation of winners" became a "nation of consumers"⁴².

Although this does not mean that over the past 25-30 years, Russian society has completely degraded morally. According to our research in 2020, as in the mid-1990s, the vast majority of Russians (from 70 to 90%) still consider such feelings as justice, decency, respect for elders, responsiveness, etc. important for themselves.

And this is of fundamental importance, because it means that "the ship has not sailed yet"; that it is quite possible to achieve cultural sovereignty with effective leadership, that is, when the orientation toward national interests (in economics, politics, culture) is confirmed not only by the public rhetoric of authorities at all levels, but also by honest steps that actually reach the broad strata of the population.

Nevertheless, if we talk about the dynamics of the changes noted so far, then in this case negative trends (in the form of an increase in egoistic attitudes, a willingness to step over the norms of morality and even the law for the sake of personal success) are obvious...

"The cultural sovereignty of a country includes the right of a country and its people to be guided by those patterns, values and norms of behavior that have been developed in the course of their history, recognized and accepted by its people ...; to counteract the spread of information products that threaten the historical and cultural identity of society ...; the duty of the state is not to allow the use of the cultural sphere to damage the national state-political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country"43.

And this, basically, is not surprising, since people could see examples and patterns of such "behavior" at all levels of the state hierarchy: starting with corruption at the regional, municipal,

⁴² National identity and the future of Russia: Report of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Moscow, 2014.

⁴³ Chernyakhovsky S.F. About cultural sovereignty. *Izborsk Club*. June 7, 2014. Available at: https://izborsk-club. ru/3354#:~:text=Культурный%20суверенитет%20страны%20включает%20в,признаются%20и%20принимаются%20 ее%20народом

and sometimes federal levels⁴⁴ and ending with "a scam that has no precedent in our history"⁴⁵ (as experts described the reform of collateral auctions conducted by Boris Yeltsin in 1995).

"The deideologization of the state turned out to be the main goal in the preparation of the Constitution of the RSFSR... As a result, for almost thirty years the country has been wandering in the dark and looking for a national idea..."⁴⁶

The RF President Vladimir Putin highlighted overcoming the processes of internal moral decay as a key landmark of the future Russian statehood, which he began to build from the moment of his first presidential term. This is evidenced by the fact that in his first program article "Russia at the turn of the Millennium" (1999), the "Russian idea" appears first in the list of guidelines for national development, anticipating such goals as "A strong state" and "An efficient economy"⁴⁷. The head of state noted that "achieving the necessary growth dynamics is not only an economic problem. This is also a political problem and, in a certain sense, an ideological one...⁷⁴⁸

Through his specific actions (such as the Munich Speech of 2007, a speech at the Valdai Forum in 2013, the Crimean Spring of 2014, amendments to the 2020 Constitution, the National Security Strategy and the draft law on traditional values of 2021, a speech at the Valdai Forum in 2021 and many others) the RF President not only personally contributed to the process of formation of a national idea in Russian society, but also stimulated the discussion of organizational and theoretical foundations of state ideology in the scientific community⁴⁹.

"The national idea is the main goal of the community of people united by national identity. The national idea is not rational, it is perceived by people not only as a task on the way to something, but as an end in itself, as a mission. Only on its basis can we talk about a national strategy aimed at implementing the national idea"⁵⁰.

⁴⁴ See, for example: the case of ex-Minister of Economic Development A. Ulyukayev, ex-head of the Ministry of Construction M. Men, ex-Minister for the Development of the Far East V. Ishaev, ex-Minister for "Open Government" M. Abyzov, ex-Minister for Atomic Energy E. Adamov, ex-Minister of Defense A. Serdyukov, Deputy Finance Minister S. Storchak, former Deputy Head of the Ministry of Agriculture A. Bazhanov, former Deputy Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations V. Artamonov, former Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education M. Lukashevich, former Deputy Minister of Energy A. Tikhonov, ex-Deputy Minister of Education M. Rakova, etc.

⁴⁵ Dobrenkov V.I., Ispravnikova N.R. (2013). The Russian version of "crony capitalism": Is there a way out of the impasse? *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 18. Sotsiologiya i politologiya*.

⁴⁶ Zikeev V. The ideology of a multinational people. *Ekspert*. May, 2022. Available at: https://telegra.ph/Ideologiya-mnogonacionalnogo-naroda-05-21

⁴⁷ Putin V.V. Russia at the turn of the Millennium. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. December 30, 1999. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ See, for example:

^{1.} Delyagin M. New Russian ideology. Official blog of M. Delyagin. February 5, 2021. Available at: https://delyagin.ru/articles/191-materialy-mgd/88332-novaja-russkaja-ideologija

^{2.} Gromyko Yu.V., Krupnov Yu.V. (Eds.). (2019). *Rossiya – Noev Kovcheg chelovechestva: Filosofsko-religioznye i metodologicheskie aspekty gosudarstvennoi ideologii budushchei Rossii* [Russia – Noah's Ark of Humanity: Philosophical, Religious and Methodological Aspects of the State Ideology of Future Russia]. Moscow: LENAND.

^{3.} Malinetsky G. Strategy and ideology of Russia in the 21st century. Available at: https://izborsk-club.ru/20772

⁵⁰ National Identity and the Future of Russia: Report of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Moscow, 2014.

Experts called some of these steps of the President the attempts to formulate a new state ideology.

"The value categories enshrined in the updated Basic Law of Russia are elements of a crystallized ideology"⁵¹.

Experts on Vladimir Putin's speech at the Valdai Forum on October 21, 2021: "The President has actually declared war on the ideology of globalism... moreover, Putin's speech (expanded with answers to questions) became a statement of a new Russian state ideology. This is the "ideology of healthy conservatism", or "reasonable conservatism", "moderate conservatism"⁵².

However, like many other initiatives of the head of state, the task of forming the "Russian idea", which the President set for himself and for the country back in 1999, was not fully realized.

And it could not be, because throughout this time there were "fifth" and "sixth" columns in the system of public administration.

Experts note that "the Russian version of crony capitalism began to take shape in 1991"⁵³, and in fact for 30 years (before the President announced a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine in February 2022), the ruling elites of the country were "fit in" with the liberal development

paradigm, so the head of state simply did not have the opportunity to complete the task of nationalizing the elites.

"The fifth column is those who serve the interests of other countries, and who are only tools for others' political goals"⁵⁴.

"The sixth column is the bearers of liberal Westernist ideology, who at the same time hide behind the "Putin's friend" badge, with some formal position in the state system"⁵⁵.

Back in the mid-2010s, experts noted that "the main problem of the current moment is that the oligarchic-comprador state is basically incapacitated and only aggravates the dramatic systemic crisis, bringing it closer to a domestic political crisis..."; to solve this problem "it is necessary to return the commanding heights of the economy – the banking sector, infrastructure industries, foreign trade – to national sovereignty. The state sovereignty of Russia should be restored over the commanding bases of the economy: there must not be any foreign, private and oligarchic-comprador capital"⁵⁶.

However, in 2013 experts said that "the real nationalization of the elites would be too cruel a punishment for officials, deputies and senators"⁵⁷, while after the launch of the special military

⁵¹ Zikeev V. The ideology of a multinational people. *Ekspert*. May, 2022. Available at: https://telegra.ph/Ideologiya-mnogonacionalnogo-naroda-05-21

⁵² Mozhegov V. Putin formulated a new Russian ideology. *Vzglyad*. October 28, 2021.Available at: https://vz.ru/opinions/2021/10/28/1126177.html

⁵³ Dobrenkov V.I., Ispravnikova N.R. (2013). The Russian version of "crony capitalism": Is there a way out of the impasse? *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 18. Sotsiologiya i politologiya*.

⁵⁴ Vladimir Putin's big press conference on December 18, 2014. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http:// www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/47250

⁵⁵ Trump's victory: What will happen to the liberal pandemonium in Russia? Experts on what awaits the fifth and sixth columns after the victory of Donald Trump. Available at: https://tsargrad.tv/articles/pobeda-trampa-chto-budet-s-liberalnym-zooparkom-v-rossii_34288

⁵⁶ Gubanov S.S. The comprador regime is hanging on the thread of history. *Biznes-Online*. February 24, 2015. Available at: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/126419

⁵⁷ Your purse and your life. *Gazeta.ru*. August 19, 2013. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2013/08/19_e_5597585. shtml

expert rhetoric changed: they say that "the real nationalization of the elites has begun"58; "the promised nationalization of the elites... will definitely happen how"⁵⁹.

We recall that back in 2021, A. Voloshin -aman who is called the "ideologue of the Family"60 and the "brain" of the liberal clan"61 left his "most significant post"62 (as experts note) of Coordinator of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation (to which he had been appointed by the former Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev⁶³).

After February 2022, Presidential Adviser V. Yumashev, Boris Yeltsin's son-in-law and a member of the Board and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Yeltsin Center, left his post (in the first days of the special operation, the Yeltsin Center called for "an immediate cessation of the military actions"⁶⁴).

According to experts, V. Yumashev was "one of the few remaining links between the Putin administration and Yeltsin's rule, the period of liberal reforms and Russia's openness towards the West ... Chubais was a manager, and Yumashev was a strategist and a guide to the policy of the remnants of the Family [actually beneficiaries of the unipolar world in Russia]... his leaving the post means in

operation on February 24, 2022, the vector of fact a complete break in the relations between the Family and the current government. The crisis of these relations has been maturing for a long time, since 2012, now the final end has come ... The obligations to the late Yeltsin have been recognized as fulfilled"65.

> It is premature to say that after February 24, 2022, all these problems in the public administration system will be solved by themselves. Nevertheless, the new Russia has not yet had such a historic chance to achieve full (not only external, but also internal) national sovereignty.

"...an oligarch is not just a billionaire, but a billionaire who determines the internal and foreign policy of the state or has a serious influence on it... a special operation of the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine would be impossible under the conditions of oligarchic rule. No one would have allowed the army to advance on the territory specially protected by the West, i.e. by the owners and the celestials"66.

"The actions of the United States and its satellites open up a wide range of opportunities for Russia, which increasingly seem to be perceived as responsibilities"⁶⁷.

⁵⁸ Mironov: Thanks to the sanctions, the real nationalization of the elites began. *Parlamentskaya gazeta*. May 17, 2022. Available at: https://www.pnp.ru/politics/mironov-blagodarya-sankciyam-nachalas-realnaya-nacionalizaciya-elit.html

⁵⁹ This is a good reason to get done with the parasite – foreign capital in Russia! *Biznes-Online*. March 5, 2022. Available at: https://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/542023

⁶⁰ Yeltsin's son-in-law ("mafia enforcer from the Family") resigned from the post of Putin's adviser. Zavtra. May 31, 2022.

⁶¹ Alexander Voloshin became the coordinator of the Expert Council under the Government of the Russian Federation. Nezavisimaya gazeta. December 12, 2019. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/economics/2019-12-12/4_7751_news1.html

⁶² "Music of the Spheres": Why Alexander Voloshin returns to power. Novye izvestia. December 14, 2019. Available at: https:// newizv.ru/news/politics/14-12-2019/muzyka-sfer-zachem-vozvraschaetsya-vo-vlast-aleksandr-voloshin

⁶³ Delyagin M. Voloshin came out of the shadows – the liberal clan is preparing for an offensive. *IA Realist.* December 18, 2019.

⁶⁴ Yeltsin Center urged to stop the military operation in Ukraine. *RBK*. February 25, 2022. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/ politics/25/02/2022/621907ef9a7947cdd40039499

⁶⁵ Yeltsin's son-in-law ("mafia enforcer from the Family") resigned from the post of Putin's adviser. Zavtra. May 31, 2022.

⁶⁶ Sorokin N. Without oligarchy and oligarchs. Zavtra. May 30, 2022.

⁶⁷ Delyagin M. Nationalization is the only peaceful language available to the Collective West. Zavtra. May 30, 2022.

For the first time in the entire post-Soviet period, the internal vector of movement, set and supported by the President, completely coincided with the external conditions that had been formed and stimulated (paradoxically) by the Collective West. And in this sense, the civilizational crisis that arose in 2022 between the Russian and Anglo-Saxon civilizations is a "window of opportunity" (and which can no longer be "closed" just like that).

Currently, the state is beginning to actively "master" this "window of opportunity", as evidenced by initiatives and decisions aimed (which is important to emphasize) not only at consolidating Russian society in difficult conditions for the country, but also at future generations. By and large, this process began even earlier: in particular, *Insert 2* presents the key decisions and actions of the President since the amendments to the RF Constitution supported by 79% or almost 58 million Russian voters came into force (January 1, 2021).

Thus, the practical realization of the goal of forming the "Russian idea" in society was going on long before the special operation in Ukraine.

"Our main task is to create a new solid and, therefore, artistically strong image of the future. And if it is bright, if people believe in it, then it will slowly become a reality... Creating an image of the future is the ideological foundation for building a new Russia. After the creation of the image, a "prototype" should arise (an experimental model, a standard, and in fact – the grain of the desired social arrangement of people's lives), after which the system of replication of an acceptable scenario of the future is turned on. In a broad sense, the education system is engaged in replicating what people have achieved. This is the sequence of development of society: "image – sample – education"⁶⁸. However, the Rubicon, which Russia crossed on February 24, 2022, provides the country and its President with a unique historical chance to complete this unfinished business.

In this perspective, the special operation in Ukraine is only a tactical, although the most important, task, without the successful solution of which it will not be possible to achieve strategic goals. But the essence of the global conflict and the prospects opening up for Russia consists in a much greater thing.

Ultimately, the essence consists in the possibility of creating conditions for effective and intensive internal development; for the final eradication of the obstacles represented primarily by the "sixth column", "family" or, simply put, the liberal "past" (in the future), which throughout the post-Soviet period were not interested in finding a real solution to the problems of poverty, inequality, corruption, increasing individualism, moral degradation and many other phenomena that characterized Russia during the period of movement along a market and liberal-capitalist development path.

The Soviet Union "sent only 14% of the energy produced in the country to the foreign market. The main donor was Saudi Arabia, which sent almost everything to the foreign market. But since the beginning of the 2000s, when we adopted the strategy of an energy superpower, the entire increase in energy production was exported, domestic consumption stagnated. And by the end of the 2000s, Russia, having increased the volume of production by one and a half times, began to send half of the energy produced in the country to the foreign market... **Russia should become an industrial power. But can we do it?**"⁶⁹

Volume 15, Issue 3, 2022

⁶⁸ Lebedev D. The axis of development. Zavtra. May 26, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/os_razvitiya

⁶⁹ Is it time to become an industrial power? Or is it not time yet? *Ekspert*, 2022, no. 22, p. 11.

Insert 2

Chronology of some actions of federal state authorities to strengthen the internal foundations of national sovereignty in 2021–2022

2021
2021

June 9, 2021 – The Moscow City Court satisfied the claim of the Prosecutor General's Office, recognizing the FBK and A. Navalny's headquarters as extremist organizations. Activists and donors face criminal liability if they continue their activities or funding⁷⁰.

"He created conditions for the "destabilization of the social and socio-political situation", his goal was "to change the foundations of the constitutional system", "including using the scenario of a "color revolution" – this is the wording of the prosecutor's verdict. Literally in a year, the entire grid of the so-called non-systemic opposition was cleared, and Alexei Navalny himself, after numerous possible violations of the order of serving his suspended sentences, went to jail"⁷¹.

June 30, 2021 – Former Minister of Education O. Vasilyeva was elected President of the Russian Academy of Education (RAO).

According to experts, O. Vasilyeva "revives the best traditions of Russian education"⁷²; "she sees ideological upbringing rather than business as the main task of education"⁷³; "she is perceived as a counterweight to the liberal public"⁷⁴; «she gives hope for overcoming the crisis phenomena that have accumulated in the domestic higher and secondary schools over the past decades"⁷⁵.

July 1, 2021 – the change of the rector of the Higher School of Economics, an establishment that is considered "the largest conductor of Western ideology in our country, the engine of liberal ideas"⁷⁶.

Rector of the Higher School of Economics (HSE) Ya. Kuzminov left his post; he had held this position since 1992 and, as some experts note, was "the ideologue of the liberal bloc in the Cabinet of Ministers of the Russian Federation and a recognized gravedigger of education"⁷⁷. His place was taken by the former rector of the Far Eastern Federal University N. Anisimov; according to some experts, "undoubtedly, a placeman of the Presidential Administration"⁷⁸.

July 30, 2021 – the Interdepartmental Commission on Historical Education was established.

The Commission was headed by V.R. Medinsky, Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the Commission is to "ensure a systematic and proactive approach to the issue of defending the national interests of the Russian Federation related to the preservation of historical memory and the development of educational activities in the field of history"⁷⁹.

⁷⁰ The court recognized the FBK and Navalny's headquarters as extremist organizations. *RBK*. June 9, 2021. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/09/06/2021/608670e09a7947709c4de06c

⁷¹ Sunset of non-systemic passionaries. *Ekspert*, 2021, no. 25, June 14–20.

⁷² Opinion of M. Strikhanov, RAO Academician, rector of MEPhI (source: The only right decision. *Kommersant*. June 28, 2021. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4877626).

⁷³ Opinion of D. Zhuravlev, Cand. Sci. (Pedagogy), director general of the Institute of Regional Problems (source: Zakharkin S., Gereikhanov A., Belyi M. Liberals use attacks in schools to remove Vasilyeva. *Ura.ru*. January 22, 2018. Available at: https://ura.news/articles/1036273645)

⁷⁴ Opinion of E. Minchenko, director of Minchenko-Consulting (Source: Ibidem).

⁷⁵ Opinion of A. Lubkov, rector of Moscow Pedagogical State University (Source: Vasilyeva revives the best traditions of Russian education. *RIA-novosti*. January 13, 2020. Available at: https://ria.ru/20200113/1563347621.html

⁷⁶ Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/kuz_minov_dvinulsya_v_nauchnie_rukovoditeli_vishki

⁷⁷ Available at: https://zavtra.ru/events/kuznitca_liberastnih_kadrov_obezglavlena

⁷⁸ Skrynnikova A., Yuzbekova I. "He is like a government official": Why Nikita Anisimov became Rector of the HSE. Available at: https://www.forbes.ru/tehnologii/434335-kak-gosudarstvennyy-chinovnik-pochemu-rektorom-vshe-stal-nikita-anisimov

⁷⁹ About the Interdepartmental Commission on Historical Education: Presidential Decree 442, dated July 30, 2021. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47084

2022

January 21, 2022 – the draft decree "On the approval of the foundations of state policy for the preservation and strengthening of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values" was published, developed by the Ministry of Culture in accordance with the National Security Strategy.

The document formulates a list of moral guidelines that "form the worldview of Russian citizens". Its tasks include "ensuring Russia's moral leadership in international relations as the guardian of traditional universal values", countering "destructive ideology", protecting the Russian language from abusive words"⁸⁰.

February 21, 2022 – Presidential Decrees on the recognition of the independence of the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic⁸¹.

In connection with the adopted decrees, the head of state made an appeal to the Russians, in which he noted that "each state is entitled to freely choose ways to ensure its security ..., but international documents expressly stipulate the principle of equal and indivisible security, which includes obligations not to strengthen one's own security at the expense of the security of other states... whereas Ukraine joining NATO is a direct threat to Russia's security... Russia has done everything to preserve Ukraine's territorial integrity. All these years, it has persistently and patiently pushed for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2202 of February 17, 2015, which consolidated the Minsk Package of Measures of February 12, 2015, to settle the situation in Donbass. Everything was in vain.... In this regard, I consider it necessary to take a long overdue decision and to immediately recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic..."⁸²

February 24, 2022 – Address of the RF President to the citizens of Russia in connection with the beginning of a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine.

The head of state noted that the purpose of the special operation is "to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime... in territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile "anti-Russia" is taking shape, fully controlled from the outside..., for our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation... It is not only a very real threat to our interests but to the very existence of our state and to its sovereignty... we are acting to defend ourselves from the threats created for us and from a worse peril than what is happening now"⁸³.

March 4, 2022 – Administrative liability for public actions aimed at discrediting the Armed Forces of Russia is established⁸⁴, as well as criminal liability for public dissemination of deliberately false information containing data on the use of the Armed Forces of Russia under the guise of reliable reports⁸⁵.

According to experts, this law is necessary "in order to fight information terrorism"⁸⁶; "the norms of direct action will force those who lied and made statements discrediting our Armed Forces to be punished, and very severely"⁸⁷.

⁸⁰ Federal portal of draft regulatory legal acts. Available at: https://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=123967

⁸¹ Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic (item 4). Available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/000120220220002

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the recognition of the Lugansk People's Republic (item 4). Available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/000120220220001

⁸² Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the citizens of Russia on February 21, 2022. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828

⁸³ Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the citizens of Russia on February 24, 2022. Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843

⁸⁴ Federal Law "On amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation". Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67910

⁸⁵ Federal Law "On amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation and Articles 31 and 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation". Official website of the RF President. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/ president/news/67908

⁸⁶ Opinion of political scientist A. Asafov (source: The political scientist explained why the law on punishment for fakes was adopted. *Ura.ru*. March 4, 2022. Available at: https://ura.news/news/1052536560).

⁸⁷ Comment by Chairman of the State Duma V. Volodin (source: Responsibility for the dissemination of fakes about the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is being introduced. Official website of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. March 4, 2022. Available at: http://duma.gov.ru/news/53620/).

Continuation of Insert 2

May 3, 2022 – Presidential Decree 252 "On the application of retaliatory special economic measures in connection with the unfriendly actions of some foreign states and international organizations"⁸⁸.

Pursuant to the Decree, a list of companies has been approved with which (and with those they control) Russian legal entities and individuals are prohibited from conducting any financial transactions and the supply of goods⁸⁹. As the experts noted, "this clear, tough and at the same time demonstratively deliberate and so far very limited response in the gas sphere, which is the most sensitive for the aggressor countries, testifies not only to Russia's ability to defend itself, but also to the readiness to launch new retaliatory strikes both in gas and in other sensitive areas for the West"⁹⁰.

May 16, 2022 – Rimas Tuminas, former artistic director of Vakhtangov Theater was excluded from the list of persons who were awarded the 2021 prize of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of culture⁹¹, who planned to stage the play My Friend Bandera and declared the need "to erase Russian artists from memory"⁹². According to experts, this is "a significant, albeit symbolic manifestation of Russia's determination to defend its national interests... Previously, the high-ranking Russophobes in the sphere of culture looked fundamentally untouchable"⁹³.

May 24, 2022 – V. Falkov, RF Minister of Science and Higher Education, announced Russia's withdrawal from the Bologna education system.

First of all, we are talking about the rejection of the accepted two-level system of training in universities (four years of bachelor's degree and two years of master's degree) and returning to the specialty (5–6 years of study). The Ministry will prepare a new list of specialties by 2024. As V. Falkov noted, "the Bologna system should be treated as a thing of the past. The future belongs to our own unique education system, which should be based on the interests of the national economy and the maximum space of opportunities for each student"⁹⁴. Many experts call this a "ripe decision"⁹⁵, which "will improve the situation regarding education in our country"⁹⁶.

June 7, 2022 – the RF State Duma approved the draft law "On the Russian movement of children and youth "Big Change"⁹⁷.

The movement is a mass non-profit self-governing organization. Its scale and specifics exceed the existing framework of public associations. The goals of the movement will be to promote the implementation of state policy in the interests of children and youth, participation in the upbringing of children, their professional orientation, organization of children's leisure, creation of opportunities for their comprehensive development and self-realization, preparation of children and youth for a full life in society. The Chairman of the Board of the "Big Change" is appointed by the RF President⁹⁸.

According to experts, "the fact that the State Duma adopted the draft law on the creation of the "Big Change" in the first reading is a step in the right direction. The creation of the movement will help strengthen ideological work with the younger generation"⁹⁹.

⁸⁸ Official website of the RF President. May 3, 2022. Available at: http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/68347

⁸⁹ On measures to implement Presidential Decree 252, dated May 3, 2022: RF Government Resolution 851, dated May 11, 2022 (source: Official Internet portal of legal information. Available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/00012 02205110017?index=0&rangeSize=1).

⁹⁰ Delyagin M. The Mishustin government: Going on the offensive. *Zavtra*. May 19, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_perehodya_v_nastuplenie

⁹¹ RF Government Resolution 1187-r, dated May 16, 2022. Official Internet portal of legal information. Available at: http:// publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202205160021

⁹² Delyagin M. The Mishustin government: Going on the offensive. *Zavtra*. May 19, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/pravitel_stvo_mishustina_perehodya_v_nastuplenie

⁹³ Ibidem.

⁹⁴ Russia is leaving the Bologna system: Whom it will affect and how. *RBK*. May 28, 2022. Available at: https://www.rbc.ru/spb_sz/28/05/2022/628e29749a794747a1ee085d

⁹⁵ Opinion of A. Belsky, chairman of the Legislative Assembly of Saint Petersburg (source: Ibidem).

⁹⁶ Opinion of M. Kuzmin, member of the State Duma Committee on Science and Higher Education (source: "The system left us rather than we left it": The Ministry of Education and Science reported the exclusion of all Russian universities from the Bologna process. RT. June 6, 2022. Available at: https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/1011967-bolonskii-process-rossiya).

⁹⁷ Legislative support system. Available at: https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/126405-8

⁹⁸ A draft law on the Russian movement of children and youth has been submitted to the State Duma. *Rossiiskaya gazeta*. May 19, 2022. Available at: https://rg.ru/2022/05/19/v-gosdumu-vnesen-zakonoproekt-o-rossijskom-dvizhenii-detej-i-molodezhi.html

⁹⁹ Comment by P. Krasnorutsky, chairman of the Russian Youth Union (source: Future leaders of the "Big Change" should understand the subtleties of working with children. *Vzglyad*. June 7, 2022. Available at: https://vz.ru/news/2022/6/7/1162067.html

End of Insert 2

June 7, 2022 – the RF State Duma adopted the draft law "On control over the activities of persons under foreign influence" in the first reading"¹⁰⁰. As part of the implementation of the draft law, it is proposed to amend 16 existing federal laws.

The draft law provides for the emergence of a single register of foreign agents instead of several existing ones now. It is proposed to recognize Russian or foreign legal entities as foreign agents, regardless of their organizational and legal form, that is, commercial organizations can also be recognized as foreign agents. New restrictions are being introduced: foreign agents will not be able to be organizers of public events; become civil servants or municipal officials; conduct teaching, educational, educational activities in relation to minors; produce information products for minors; receive state financial support; will not be able to invest in strategic enterprises in Russia, etc. The Ministry of Justice annually submits a report to the State Duma and the Federation Council on the activities of foreign agents.

According to experts, the essence of the draft law is "to do away with an extensive and confusing set of restrictions for foreign agents, to restore order in the relevant registers, to strengthen the prohibitive norms and powers of state agencies, and finally, to tighten the responsibility of all persons involved in this legislation"¹⁰¹.

June 7, 2022 – amendments were made to the law on the use of pension savings of liquidated non-state pension funds (NPFs), remaining after settlements with creditors.

The President gets the right to freeze almost any property (including cash); prohibit and restrict individual transactions (operations), including with currency; introduce requirements for the purchase or sale of financial instruments; establish "features" of currency control, introduce other temporary economic measures to ensure the financial stability of the Russian Federation, etc.

According to experts, "the fundamental meaning of the amendments is simple: the President of Russia can do anything in the financial sphere... liberals of all stripes formally remain in their places, but their real capabilities are reduced to operational, tactical, routine management... the real power in the field of finance will go to professionals who are not visible in the presidential administration (it has not been engaged in economics for a long time), but are quite obvious in the Mishustin government"¹⁰².

¹⁰⁰ Legislative support system. Available at: https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/113045-8

¹⁰¹ Rodin I. The government was ahead of the opposition with lustration. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. June 9, 2022. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/politics/2022-06-09/1_8458_law.html

¹⁰² Premier Mishustin provided the legal framework for ensuring financial stability and comprehensive modernization. Official website of M. Delyagin. June 13, 2022. Available at: https://delyagin.ru/articles/183-sobytija/102696-prem-er-mishustin-obespechil-juridicheskie-ramki-obespechenija-finansovoy-stabil-nosti-i-kompleksnoy-modernizatsii

According to actual facts and public opinion polls (which we have cited in this article) show, after the start of the special operation, the activity of the President and the Government of the Russian Federation to achieve full national sovereignty by Russia, despite unprecedented political and economic pressure from the Collective West, not only did not weaken, but even intensified.

"It is difficult to overestimate the severity of the sanctions imposed on Russia now. The country is functionally cut off from the global financial system. Most of the assets of its central bank are frozen. Hundreds of private companies, from Visa to Shell and McDonald's, have left indefinitely. And this is only an incomplete list... This is an economic war. And, in particular, it is an economic war directed against civilians..."¹⁰³

As the results of the 30th anniversary of market transformations show, there was a need to solve this problem, and today it is being actively implemented. We should note that the ongoing reforms are of a forced, urgent nature, largely dictated by external threats to national security. However, according to the results of regional and federal sociological surveys, people feel their importance and believe that over time they will have a significant positive impact on national development; that they are designed for tomorrow and will have historical consequences for the entire Russian society and the country as a whole, for future generations.

According to experts, "Russia, after a catastrophic defeat by the West in 1991 ... is forced today, as 105 years ago, in February 1917, to start a new world perestroika from scratch. Only this time, the perestroika will not be socialist, but structural, social and energy-related"¹⁰⁴.

"Major social upheavals occur in Russia once every 75–80 years (suffice it to recall in this regard the history of Soviet Russia in 1917–1991)... Russia's historical activity shows that its new, 80-year-old wave of life, which started with the beginning of the 21st century, will rise at least until the 2060s. If we count back 80 years, then we will find ourselves at a similar critical point in our history – the beginning of the Stalingrad battle against fascism"¹⁰⁵.

Thus, the country that crossed the Rubicon on February 24, 2022 and began a new stage in its history has a long and difficult way to go.

Staying on this path (especially at this crucial moment) will depend not only on how all the key actors of social development (broad segments of the population, ruling elites, civic associations, academia, cultural figures, etc.) will be able to consolidate around the President, but also on whether they will be able to "**think sovereign**", that

¹⁰³ Gubanov S.S. (2022). N. Mulder: The purpose of sanctions is to change the political regime in Russia. *Ekonomist*, 4.

¹⁰⁴ Dobrocheev O. Physical laws of life and death of "historical bodies". *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. April 26, 2022. Available at: https://www.ng.ru/nauka/2022-04-26/13_8427_life.html

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem.

is, not just to offer Russian analogues of Western standards, but to be guided by their own, unique, national values, traditions, management decisionmaking practices, human and scientific potential, and its practical achievements corresponding to our "gene code". We agree with one of the leading participants of the Izborsk Club, philosopher A. Dugin, who notes that "it is no longer possible to continue copying the West and its norms, standards and rules. Borrowing liberal Western standards... will lead us to ideological convulsions"¹⁰⁶.

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¹⁰⁶ Dugin A. Rejection of the Bologna system and ideological convulsions of the elites. *Zavtra*. June 8, 2022. Available at: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/otkaz_ot_bolonskoj_sistemi_i_ideologicheskie_sudorogi_elit

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DYNAMICS OF THE MORAL STATE OF SOCIETY FOR THE PERIOD FROM 1996 TO 2020

Appendix 1A (to page 20)

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				Important	nt				D	Unimportant	ant	
Phenomena / acts	1996	1999	2000	2012	2020	Dynamics $(+/-)$, 2020	1996	6661	2000	2012	2020	Dynamics $(+/-)$, 2020
						to 1996, p.p.						to 1996, p.p.
Responsiveness, sensitivity to other people	86.5	81.4	87.1	82.7	78.1	-8	13.6	18.6	12.8	17.3	21.9	+8
Mutual assistance	88.1	84.0	84.8	83.2	80.6	-8	11.9	16.0	15.2	16.8	19.4	+8
Tolerance, respect for the views and opinions of other people	86.7	80.7	82.5	83.5	79.0	-8	13.3	19.3	17.6	16.5	21.1	+8
Decency	93.7	87.5	91.2	90.2	87.1	L-	6.3	12.6	8.7	9.8	13.0	+7
Honesty, truthfulness	92.9	85.3	90.3	90.06	86.2	-7	7.1	14.7	9.6	10.0	13.8	+7
Self-esteem	91.2	87.4	91.4	88.4	84.5	-7	8.7	12.7	8.7	11.7	15.5	+7
High professionalism	85.3	76.0	78.1	82.5	78.5	-7	14.7	24.0	21.9	17.4	21.5	+7
Respect for parents, loved ones	93.3	89.9	92.9	91.5	88.4	-5	6.8	10.1	7.1	8.5	11.5	+5
Respect for the team	85.9	81.8	86.5	83.7	80.9	-5	14.1	18.2	13.4	16.3	19.1	+5
Performance of official duties	87.8	79.8	80.6	82.6	82.6	-5	12.2	20.2	19.4	17.4	17.4	+5
Showing compassion, mercy	80.4	75.6	78.5	79.1	76.0	-4	19.6	24.3	21.6	20.9	23.9	+4
Compliance with laws, law-abiding	80.6	72.4	72.6	79.7	77.0	-4	19.3	27.5	27.4	20.2	23.0	+4
Justice	91.8	83.1	90.1	88.3	88.7	-3	8.1	16.8	9.6	11.7	11.3	+3
Respect for someone else's (private, state) property	78.3	68.4	66.6	74.9	75.2	-3	21.8	31.6	33.4	25.1	24.8	+3
Being useful to society, to fulfill the duties of a citizen	71.5	67.5	72.1	74.8	72.1	+1	28.5	32.5	27.9	25.2	27.8	-1
Respect for elders	84.2	83.7	87.1	88.7	85.9	+2	15.7	16.3	12.9	11.3	14.1	-2
Respect for people of other nationalities	62.7	56.2	55.7	65.7	6.69	+7	37.2	43.8	44.3	34.3	30.1	-7
Equality between people	65.5	59.9	64.0	68.1	73.7	+8	34.6	40.0	36.1	31.9	26.3	-8
* Ranked by the change in the proportion of those for whom the listed moral qualities are unimportant. The wording of the question: "People evaluate different life phenomena	hom the	listed m	oral qual	ities are	unimpo	rtant. The wording	the di	uestion:	"People	evaluate	different	life phenomena
in different ways. For some, one thing is important, for others – anotherWhich of the following is important to you and which is not?"	others – a	another.	Which	of the fo	llowing i	s important to you	and whi	ch is not	?"			
Here and further Amendices 1–3 present the data of monitoring of the labor notential of the nonulation of the Vologda Ohlast which has been carried out since 1996. The	f monitc	ring of 1	the labor	potenti	al of the	population of the	Vologda	Oblast.	which ha	s heen c	arried of	it since 1996. The

survey is conducted once a year. The representativeness of the data is ensured by using a model of multi-stage zoned sampling with quota selection of observation units. The zoning structure includes two cities (Vologda and Cherepovets) and eight municipal districts with different levels of socio-economic development (Sheksninsky, Gryazovetsky, Velikoustyugsky, Tarnogsky, Kirillovsky, Babaevsky, Nikolsky and Vozhegodsky). The surveyed population is of working age – from 16 years old to retirement age (men – up to 59 -3 present the data of monitoring of the labor potential of the population of the vologia Oblast, which has been carried out since 1990. The years, women - up to 54 years inclusive; due to the increase in the retirement age from 2020 - 61 and 56 years respectively). Here and Iurner, Appenduces

During the period from 1996 to 2020, 14 of the 18 moral qualities presented in the question became less important to people. There has been a noticeable increase (by 7-8 percentage points) in the share of those who consider the following qualities unimportant: "responsiveness, sensitivity" (from 14 to 22%), "mutual assistance" (from 11 to 19%), "respect for the views of other people" (from 13 to 21%), "decency" (from 6 to 13%) "honesty" (from 7 to 14%), "self-esteem" (from 9 to 16%), "high professionalism" (from 15 to 22%)

20
page
(to
1B
Appendix

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19 85 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 98 99 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 98 98 99 91 92 93 94 94 95 96 97 98 99 91 92 93 94 94 95 96 97 98 99 90 91 92 93 94 94 95 96 97 98 99 90 91 92 93 94 94 <th>1999 78.3 88.8 79.7 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 88.9</th> <th>2000 85.6 93.0 91.7</th> <th>2012</th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th> <th></th>	1999 78.3 88.8 79.7 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 87.3 88.9	2000 85.6 93.0 91.7	2012								
Men Women Women Women Under 30 Under 30 Over 55(60) Over 55(60) Over 55(60) Secondary and incomplete cation Secondary vocational Higher and incomplete Higher and incomplete		85.6 93.0 91.7		2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.	1996	1999	2000	2012	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.
Women Under 30 Under 30 30-55(60) 30-55(60) Over 55(60) Secondary and incomplete secondary vocational Higher and incomplete		93.0 91.7	84.5	80.1	-5	12.9	18.7	11.1	12.5	17.3	+4
Under 30 30-55(60) Over 55(60) Over 55(60) Secondary and incomplete secondary vocational Higher and incomplete higher		91.7	89.0	87.4	-5	6.1	6.6	5.3	9.4	10.3	+4
30-55(60) Over 55(60) Over 55(60) Secondary and incomplete secondary vocational Higher and incomplete			86.9	82.6	-1	14.4	17.3	6.8	10.7	16.4	+2
Over 55(60)Secondary and incomplete secondarySecondary vocationalHigher and incomplete higher		C.48	87.2	85.4	-8	5.9	11.4	8.2	10.9	12.0	9+
Secondary and incomplete secondary Secondary vocational Higher and incomplete higher		84.1	82.3	77.0	-21	1.7	7.3	9.3	12.9	19.0	+17
Secondary vocational Higher and incomplete higher		85.7	9.77	74.5	-9	13.8	21.4	10.9	19.6	22.1	+8
and incomplete 90	_	91.4	90.4	87.8	-5	6.9	0.6	6.1	7.6	10.9	+4
	91.6	96.2	91.7	89.3	-1	7.2	6.8	3.8	6.0	8.4	+1
Bottom 20% n/a	75.2	79.2	71.7	75.7	n/a	I	22.0	15.5	26.0	20.2	n/a
Income groups Middle 60% n/a	87.1	92.4	91.6	83.0	n/a	I	11.3	5.9	6.4	14.8	n/a
Top 20% n/a	84.3	90.9	91.3	90.1	n/a	-	13.0	7.2	5.5	8.1	n/a
Vologda 96.4	89.8	90.7	86.8	95.7	-1	2.0	8.5	8.4	8.8	3.2	+1
Tarritory 70.9	87.0	95.1	90.1	84.5	+14	25.9	10.8	3.5	8.1	13.1	-13
Districts 94.8	80.4	85.8	85.1	74.8	-20	4.5	17.7	10.4	13.3	22.0	+18
Oblast 90.0	84.4	89.8	86.9	83.6	-6	8.4	13.6	7.8	10.9	14.0	9+
* Proportion of those who consider more than half (at least 10 out of 18) of the above moral qualities important. ** Proportion of those who consider more than half (at least 10 out of 18) of the above moral qualities unimportant (or "more or less important").	t 10 out of st 10 out of	18) of the 18) of th	above mo e above m	oral qua 10ral qu	lities important. alities unimportaı	nt (or "me	ore or less	importar	it").		

Importance of moral qualities in various socio-demographic groups, % of respondents

More positive changes over the period from 1996 to 2020 were recorded among residents of urban areas: in Vologda, the proportion of people among people over 60 (in this group, the proportion of people who consider most moral qualities unimportant increased by 17 percentage points, who consider most moral qualities unimportant has not changed (2-3%), in Cherepovets – decreased by 13 percentage points (from 26 to 13%). from 2 to 19%), as well as among residents of districts (by 18 percentage points, from 5 to 22%).

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2A
Appendix

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				Un	Unacceptable	ole					7	Accepta	Acceptable, quite normal	ce norma	al	
Phenomena / actions	1996	1999	2000	2004	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics $(+/-)$, 2020 to 1996 p.p.	1996	1999	2000	2004	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics $(+/-)$, 2020 to 1996 p p
Laziness	66.3	59.1	64.6	57.9	54.3	58.5	49.6	-17	22.3	31.0	27.4	35.9	35.6	34.7	42.6	+20
Desire to work less and earn more	52.4	47.4	46.5	55.2	50.0	44.7	41.1	-11	36.1	41.8	46.1	37.7	41	48.5	49.1	+13
Arrogance, conceit	79.4	72.1	79.3	76.1	71.5	74.0	70.0	6-	10.9	18.5	13.9	17.6	17.9	19.6	20.0	6+
Subservience, servility	81.8	76.8	83.6	78.8	75.1	78.1	73.6	-8	9.0	15.2	10.4	15.1	15.4	15.6	15.7	4
Disrespectful attitude toward a woman	88.0	84.6	87.4	86.8	83.4	85.7	79.9	-8	5.6	8.4	6.7	9.4	9.2	9.6	11.4	9+
Bribes	80.4	76.6	85.4	84.1	83.3	81.3	76.2	-4	10.7	15.8	9.3	11.8	9.3	13.4	14.2	+4
Dodging conscription	48.6	42.9	44.6	48.0	51.4	48.0	45.5	-3	40.2	45.9	47.4	45.1	40.2	43.9	44.5	+4
Passion for things	31.2	22.9	28.9	27.7	34.7	37.7	32.7	+2	56.8	64.3	6.09	61.8	53.7	53.8	60.6	+4
Embezzlement	85.0	84.7	88.6	89.3	85.0	89.3	81.5	-4	7.8	6.5	6.0	6.3	7.7	4.8	10.7	+3
Drug addiction	92.5	91.6	95.3	92.2	90.5	91.0	88.8	-4	2.0	4.1	2.0	5.7	3.9	5.1	5.4	+3
Frivolous attitude toward the family and children	90.2	90.2	93.4	92.6	88.1	90.7	88.2	-2	3.9	4.2	2.8	3.7	5.2	4.2	6.0	+2
Ultra-high earnings	34.9	29.7	30.4	35.0	34.1	38.8	35.1	0	53.4	59.3	62.6	57.4	55.7	54.4	54.2	+1
Passion for alcohol	72.9	6.69	82.6	80.7	77.3	76.5	74.7	+2	19.6	24.4	13.3	16.5	15.6	18.6	17.9	-2
Life according to the principle "Roll my log and l'll roll yours"	44.4	41.5	44.1	45.9	46.1	52.7	46.5	+2	46.4	48.8	48.9	47	43.3	40.4	44.7	-2
Smoking	26.5	29.0	29.7	40.9	41.0	35.5	31.7	+5	64.9	65.5	65.6	55.4	52	59.4	62.5	-2
* Ranked by the change in the proportion of those who The wording of the question is "Please, express your att	proporti "Please,	ion of th express	ose who	conside titude to	r the ab	ove pher followi	nomena ng phen	consider the above phenomena and actions "acceptable, quite normal". itude toward the following phenomena" In total, there are 15 possible answers in the question.	ceptable otal, ther	, quite n e are 15	ormal". possible	answers	s in the c	question		

Attitude toward negative moral phenomena and actions*, % of respondents

Over the period from 1996 to 2020, the proportion of those who consider 10 of the 15 negative moral phenomena and actions listed in the percentage points, from 22 to 43%), the desire to work less and earn more (by 13 percentage points, from 36 to 49%), arrogance and conceit (by 9 survey "acceptable, quite normal" has increased. First of all, attention is drawn to the increase in the share of residents who accept laziness (by 21 percentage points, from 11 to 20%), sycophancy, servility (by 7 percentage points, from 9 to 16%).

Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast

37

21
page
(to
2B
Appendix.
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Populatio					D	Unacceptable*	table*					A	cceptat	Acceptable, quite normal**	e norm	al**	
	Population group	1996	1999	2000	2004	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.	1996	1999	2000	1999	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.
Men	u	66.7	61.9	73.9	70.4	74.2	71.9	61.7	-5	17.1	20.0	15.6	18.7	14.4	19.9	25.0	+8
Mo Mo	Women	7.9.7	70.6	78.9	78.1	75.5	75.0	73.3	9-	8.3	13.2	10.1	13.3	14.3	17.3	16.6	+8
Un	Under 30	63.5	55.4	67.4	67.4	67.8	67.1	62.9	-1	21.3	27.1	22.0	21.7	22.2	24.7	22.4	+1
Age 30-	30-55(60)	72.3	67.3	76.2	78.5	75.2	72.4	66.0	9-	13.6	16.0	12.0	13.2	13.7	18.9	21.7	+8
Ovi	Over 55(60)	83.1	76.5	85.9	75.4	80.7	78.3	73.3	-10	4.3	6.2	5.6	13.9	8.5	14.9	17.5	+13
Sec	Secondary and incomplete secondary	73.8	66.7	81.6	74.1	69.69	74.0	66.7	L-	11.1	15.4	10.9	14.5	14.2	19.0	22.8	+12
Education	Secondary vocational	71.7	68.9	77.8	76.9	77.2	73.3	70.1	-2	14.6	14.4	11.4	15.5	12.6	20.4	18.5	+4
Hi	Higher and incomplete higher	77.6	64.4	66.4	74.3	77.3	73.5	67.4	-10	11.6	20.0	16.8	16.1	16.2	15.5	19.7	+8
	Bottom 20%	80.8	67.3	79.2	72.2	72.8	76.1	68.3	-13	9.4	16.7	10.0	16.1	12.0	16.5	19.6	+10
Income Mi	Middle 60%	79.8	70.8	79.0	78.3	78.5	73.2	72.4	-7	9.2	13.6	11.1	13.7	12.2	19.7	19.5	+10
	Top 20%	65.5	58.5	70.3	72.9	72.8	75.7	70.2	+5	23.2	22.6	17.9	20.1	19.9	15.1	18.5	-5
Vol	Vologda	88.9	70.5	73.6	75.3	68.6	72.8	69.69	-19	5.4	12.1	15.1	10.6	20.9	19.3	16.9	+12
_	Cherepovets	61.4	63.7	71.3	81.3	82.8	56.8	52.7	6-	21.1	21.8	17.3	13.8	13.4	32.3	29.5	+8
Dis	Districts	73.0	66.4	81.1	71.3	73.7	83.8	76.7	+4	11.3	15.4	8.8	18.8	11.7	10.0	16.7	+5
Ob	Oblast	73.8	66.8	76.7	74.9	74.9	73.6	68.2	-9	12.3	16.2	12.6	15.5	14.3	18.5	20.3	+8
* Proportion of tho ** Proportion of the	* Proportion of those who consider more than half (at least 8 out of 15) of the above negative phenomena and actions unacceptable.	e than re than	half (at half (a	t least 8 t least 8	out of 8 out of	15) of t 15) of	he abov the abo	e negativ we negati	e phenomena an ve phenomena a	nd action nd actic	ns unac	ceptable		or "quite normal".	:mal".		

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and actions "acceptable, quite normal" has especially increased in such groups as people over 60 years old (by 13 percentage points, from 4 to 17%). people with secondary and incomplete secondary education (by 12 percentage points, from 11 to 23%), residents of Vologda (by 12 percentage points, from 5 to 17%), those who, according to self-estimates of their own income, belong to the categories of the bottom 20% and the middle 60% (by 10 percentage points, from 9 to 19%)

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Appendix

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					Feel	Feel remorse	0		Feel remore Don't f				Ď	on't fee	Don't feel remorse	rse		
Phenomena / actions	1996	1999	2000	2004	2008	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.	1996	1999	2000	2004	2008	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.
Unwittingly (or consciously) offending a person, rudeness	83.8	76.7	82.4	70.8	72.2	70	66.4	65.3	-19	16.2	27.4	17.6	29.2	27.8	30.1	33.6	34.7	+19
Insufficient attention to parents (mother, father)	65.6	52.7	59.8	50.9	48.5	48.5	51.1	46.9	-19	34.4	47.3	40.2	49.1	51.5	51.5	48.9	53.0	+19
Injustice you have committed under the pressure of circumstances or of your own free will	75.4	69.1	73.0	64.6	68.4	61.9	62.4	58.9	21-	24.5	31.0	27.0	35.4	31.5	38.2	37.6	41.1	+17
An unfulfilled promise made to someone	74.7	69.5	72.1	61.1	67.1	62.6	61.5	60.1	-15	25.3	30.6	28.0	38.9	32.9	37.4	38.4	39.9	+15
Bad attitude toward children (your own or others')	45.4	35.9	41.9	42.4	41.2	32.8	33.1	32.5	-13	54.5	64.2	58.1	57.5	58.8	67.1	6.99	67.4	+13
Poor performance of your official duties for any reason	73	62.1	6.69	6.09	61.9	58.1	55.8	59.7	-13	27.0	37.9	30.1	39.1	38.1	41.9	44.2	40.3	+13
Involuntary or conscious deception of someone in something	71.0	66.1	69.2	63.3	69.1	62.9	61.6	62.1	6-	28.9	34.0	30.8	36.7	31	37	38.4	37.9	6+
Cheating on your wife, husband, friend, girlfriend	33.5	35.1	39.3	38.5	38.5	28.3	30.8	26.4	-7	66.4	64.9	60.7	61.5	61.5	71.7	69.2	73.6	+7
Unintentionally (or knowingly) damaging or breaking other people's property, etc.	61.5	58.3	64.8	59.8	63.9	60.7	51.8	58.1	-3	38.5	41.7	35.2	40.2	36.2	39.3	48.1	41.9	+3
Refusal for any reason to help someone in a critical situation	54.8	52.6	60.7	57.8	57.4	55.4	59.2	55.9	+1	45.2	47.5	39.4	42.2	42.6	44.5	40.8	44.1	-1
Unintentionally (or knowingly) damaging state property	37.8	42.9	44.2	47.4	49.3	45.3	45.7	48.2	+10	62.2	57.1	55.9	52.6	50.7	54.8	54.3	51.8	-10
* Ranked according to the change in the proportion of people who do not feel guilty when committing these negative actions. The wording of the question: "Have you ever experienced guilt, remorse in the cases listed below or not?"	e in the p we you e	oroport ver exp	ion of p	eople w ed guilt,	/ho do remors	not feel e in the	guilty ' cases l	when co isted be	ople who do not feel guilty when committing these guilt, remorse in the cases listed below or not?"	negativ	e actio	JS.						

Economic and Social Changes: Facts, Trends, Forecast

survey has increased. There has been an increase in the proportion of those who are not tormented by conscience in the following cases: offending Over the period from 1996 to 2020, the proportion of those who do not feel remorse about committing the 11 negative actions listed in the another person (by 19 percentage points, from 16 to 35%), insufficient attention toward parents (by 19 percentage points, from 34 to 53%), committing an unfair act (by 17 percentage points, from 24 to 41%), failure to fulfill a promise (by 15 percentage points, from 25 to 40%), etc.

39

Appendix 3B (to page 21)

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						Feel re	Feel remorse*							Do	n't feel	Don't feel remorse**	se**		
Popul	Population group	1996	1999	2000	2004	2008	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.	1996	1999	2000	2004	2008	2012	2018	2020	Dynamics (+/-), 2020 to 1996, p.p.
	Men	70.1	61.4	74.1	59.4	64.8	58.0	56.9	58.3	-12	29.9	38.6	25.9	40.6	34.4	40.7	42.8	41.4	+12
26X	Women	70.2	63.0	69.2	63.8	66.3	58.9	56.4	56.9	-13	29.8	37.0	30.8	36.2	33.0	39.8	43.3	42.7	+13
	Under 30	71.3	70.3	76.9	66.5	67.3	56.1	56.3	57.1	-14	28.7	29.7	23.1	33.5	32.0	42.8	43.3	42.4	+14
Age	30-55(60)	6.07	57.9	68.5	59.4	64.8	60.0	56.9	58.1	-13	29.1	42.1	31.5	40.6	34.4	38.6	42.9	41.7	+13
	Over 55(60)	54.2	40.0	68.2	61.2	61.3	59.7	56.4	56.5	+2	45.8	60.0	31.8	38.8	38.7	38.7	43.6	42.5	-3
	Secondary and incomplete secondary	71.0	62.7	70.4	61.9	61.8	59.5	64.1	65.2	-6	29.0	37.3	29.6	38.1	37.8	39.0	35.5	34.4	+5
Education	Secondary vocational	68.1	61.5	69.5	62.4	65.8	58.1	51.3	53.5	-15	31.9	38.5	30.5	37.6	32.9	41.2	48.4	46.1	+14
	Higher and incomplete higher	71.5	62.8	75.9	61.7	68.4	58.1	53.1	54.2	-17	28.5	37.2	24.1	38.3	31.0	40.4	46.9	45.6	+17
,	Bottom 20%	n/a	51.2	59.8	52.7	64.8	57.1	62.3	53.7	n/a	n/a	48.8	40.2	47.3	35.2	41.3	37.7	46.0	n/a
Income	Middle 60%	n/a	64.6	74.5	64.6	67.4	58.1	56.0	58.8	n/a	n/a	35.4	25.5	35.4	31.7	40.9	43.5	40.9	n/a
5	Top 20%	n/a	67.7	75.0	58.4	63.7	60.2	54.9	56.3	n/a	n/a	32.3	25.0	41.6	35.6	38.6	45.1	43.8	n/a
	Vologda	71.5	64.1	76.7	64.7	69.8	53.6	48.7	49.8	-22	28.5	35.9	23.3	35.3	29.4	43.4	51.3	50.0	+22
Tomiton	Cherepovets	70.1	70.0	73.2	59.2	56.4	63.6	61.7	66.2	-4	29.9	30.0	26.8	40.8	42.8	35.6	38.1	33.3	+3
retricty	Districts	69.3	56.9	67.2	62.0	68.2	57.7	58.6	57.5	-12	30.7	43.1	32.8	38.0	31.1	41.4	40.9	42.2	+12
	Oblast	70.2	62.3	71.3	62.0	65.5	58.5	56.7	57.7	-13	29.8	37.7	28.7	38.0	33.7	40.2	43.1	42.0	+12
* Proportio. ** Proportic	* Proportion of those who feel remorse in the case of committing more than half (6 or more out of 11) of the listed actions. ** Proportion of those who do not feel remorse (or, in their opinion, have not encountered such cases) when committing more than half (6 or more out of 11) of the listed actions.	remors not feel	e in the remors	case of 3 (or, in	commit their op	tting me	bre thar.	t half (6	or mor ntered s	e out of 11) of th such cases) when	listec comm	l actior itting n	ns. nore th	an half	(6 or m	tore out	: of 11)	of the l	listed actions.

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